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Since the recent Global Financial Crisis that led in August 2007 to the con-
certed liquidity provision by a number of central banks, the concept of sys-
temic risk received considerable attention from the academic community,
policy makers and the public at large. The formation of systemic risk can
be regarded as an accumulation of risks associated with the loss from some
catastrophic event with the potential to collapse an entire financial system.
Academics have been concerned with defining systemic risk as a concept
and investigate issues of measurement. Policy makers take an interest in the
problem of curbing agency problems associated with systemic risk forma-
tion and the role of regulation therein. The public has been concerned with
issues of fairness and the substantial bailout funds deemed necessary by
regulators to be channeled to the financial sector to maintain financial sta-
bility. This dissertation comprises a collection of four studies in the area of
systemic risk formation that are both empirical and theoretical and relate to
the above-mentioned concerns. All four studies are linked to the theme of
systemic risk formation, but approach the topic from different angles.
Chapter 2 gives rise to the notion of too-connected-fail and presents ex-
treme value theory methods to infer unobservable connections between fin-
ancial institutions from joint substantial movements in credit default swap
spreads and equity returns. Estimated pairwise co-crash probabilities identify
significant connections among up to 186 financial institutions prior to the
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crisis of 2007/2008. We show that highly connected financial institutions
were more likely to to be bailed out during the crisis. This result remains
intact also after controlling for too-big-to-fail considerations, systematic, as
well as idiosyncratic risks.
In Chapter 3 the subject of study is the impact of compensation of bank
executives prior to the Global Financial Crisis on the formation of systemic
risk during the crisis. Results indicate that for 92 financial institutions in
the U.S., cash bonus shares and equity stakes of CEOs correlate significantly
with a set of systemic risk measures. Most notably is the result that higher
pre-crisis bonuses for non-CEO board members increased systemic risk tak-
ing according to various systemic risk measures. This effect diminishes over
time after the first concerted liquidity provision by central banks in August
2007. Results are insensitive to differences in corporate governance indic-
ators, imprinting conditions, and compensation gaps between CEOs and
non-CEOs. We attribute this finding to the notion that not all layers of man-
agement, even at the executive level, share the same incentives. Backed by
results earlier found in the literature in different studies, the results seem to
suggest that managers are primarily concerned with the idiosyncratic per-
formance of the division or department where they stand at the helm. If
managers are not sufficiently concerned with the overall performance of the
firm, and the CEO is unable to incorporate these incentives in managers’
compensation scheme, the firm may take on excessive risk due to inefficient
decision making.
In Chapter 4 two policy instruments for the banking sector are subject of
investigation: systemic risk taxation and constructive ambiguity about bail-
out policy. Bailout expectations can induce moral hazard in the form of ex-
cessive risk taking by banks. Constructive ambiguity generates uncertainty
about bailout prospects. At first sight it seems that systemic risk taxation in-
duces banks to prefer uncorrelated investments, leading to lower systemic
risk formation. However, systemic risk taxation may inform banks about
the regulator’s objective to ensure financial stability and thereby its bailout
policy. Results indicate a trade-off between systemic risk taxation and con-
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structive ambiguity, which highlights the importance to consider policies’
interdependence when evaluating their effectiveness.
In Chapter 5 I present an investigation of whether and to what extent
financial institutions benefitted, prior to the Global Financial Crisis, from
implicit guarantees irrespective of whether they were an actual member
of a formal safety net. In general, financial institutions are more likely to
receive bailout support if deemed for instance too-big-to-fail or if they fail
when many others are about to. The prospect of receiving bailout support
may result in funding advantages for firms otherwise considered to be too
risky. The nature of these funding advantages is modelled in the paper as an
implicit guarantee. Results suggest that these implicit guarantees are likely
to exist and model validation tests indicate that estimated levels of implicit
guarantees indeed relate to future bailouts. The costs associated wiith these
guarantees is substantial and is estimated to comprise of around twenty per-
cent of the face value of a financial institutions’ liabilities.

Chapter 2
Too connected to fail? Inferring
network ties from price
co-movements
2.1 Introduction
Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/2008, regulators and academics
agree that systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) deserve ad-
ditional supervisory scrutiny given their pivotal role in the functioning of
the financial system. Freixas and Rochet (2013) argue that an international
prudential regulator with a far-reaching mandate to tax systemic risks and
discipline SIFI management is needed instead of national authorities. Con-
temporary regulation does not follow these suggestions literally. However,
the introduction of a Single Supervisory Mechanism in the European Union
and the systemic capital charges under Basel III (2013) underscore the ob-
jective to account for systemic risk in future regulation.
Which financial institutions are systemically relevant? In addition to the
This chapter is based on joint work with Michael Koetter and Michael Wedow, published as
a Deutsche Bundesbank Working Paper (Bosma et al., 2012).
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sheer size of financial institutions, already Eisenberg and Noe (2001) em-
phasized the importance of network connections to assess the systemic risk
of financial institutions and systems. The Bank of International Settlements
(2013) lists accordingly the interconnectedness of financial institutions as an
important (co-)determinant of a SIFI. However, a very practical challenge
continues to be the inherent unobservability of connections (see Upper, 2011;
Ceruttie et al., 2012).1
We suggest in this paper to infer interconnectedness from the joint like-
lihood of extreme credit and equity price movements between many global
financial institutions from various sectors prior to the crisis. In an attempt
to validate our inferred measures of interconnectedness, we argue that ob-
served bailouts during the financial crisis of 2007/2008 reveal which fin-
ancial institutions were considered SIFI’s by policy makers. To this end we
pursue a three-step procedure.
First, we use Extreme Value Theory (EVT, Hartmann et al., 2004a) to es-
timate so-called co-crash probabilities (CCP). CCPs measure the likelihood
of an extreme joint deterioration in CDS spreads or equity prices for pairs
of financial institutions. The former gauge credit risk links in the network
of global financial institutions to the extent that CDS spreads reflect market
participants’ expectations of credit defaults (see, for example, Duffie, 2010;
Giesecke and Kim, 2011; Knaup and Wagner, 2012). The latter capture the
argument in Acharya (2009) and Wagner (2011) that shocks to a common
exposure lead to a joint deterioration of market value of equity for all fin-
ancial institutions (see De Jonghe, 2010; Ibragimov et al., 2011, for empirical
applications).
Second, we identify significant connections between financial institutions
based on pairwise CCPs before the crisis with a bootstrap method. Based
on these significant CCPs we then generate measures of network centrality
to identify connected institutions, i.e. SIFIs. Thereby, we curb the notorious
1 Empirical work on systemic risk due to contagion in networks of financial institutions is
usually confined to only banks in a single country. Some fairly early examples are Upper
and Worms (2004) (Germany) and Elsinger et al. (2006) (Austria). The focus on banks fails to
gauge the complexity and global scope that according to the BIS (2013) defines SIFIs.
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unobservability of network ties among financial firms by both regulators
and market participants alike.
Third, we test if these inferred interconnectedness indicators correlate
with observable policy choices. We use connectivity indicators to predict ob-
served bailouts during the crisis of 2007/2008. Bailouts are defined as capital
injections and asset support measures issued by governments to rescue dis-
tressed banks that have been collected by Stolz and Wedow (2010). We argue
that these observed policy actions reveal the systemic importance assigned
by regulators to these banks.
We are neither the first to use EVT to measure extreme joint movement of
equity returns (see, for example Longines and Solnik, 2001; Hartmann et al.,
2004a) nor are we the first to use CDS prices for the measurement of con-
tagion as one dimension of systemic importance (Jorion and Zhang, 2009;
Duffie, 2010). However, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
to suggest a practical indicator of financial institutions’ interconnectedness
and relates it to observed policy choices revealing the regulator’s assessment
of individual institutions systemic (perceived) importance.2
We find ”League” tables of connectivity based on network centrality
measures that rank a number of arguably important banks as central ac-
cording to both equity and CDS-implied network interconnectedness (e.g.
Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, or Commerzbank). However, rank-order
correlations across different types of network centrality and CDS- versus
equity-based rankings are relatively low, namely in the order of around 28%.
Hence, the network importance of potential SIFIs should be assessed accord-
ing to both implied credit and equity connections. Logit regressions confirm
that higher pre-crisis network centrality of a financial firm increases the like-
lihood of a government bailout after controlling for the idiosyncratic risk
and size of the firm. Importantly, the sheer number of connections in both
2 A plethora of innovative systemic risk measures has been developed recently, such as mar-
ginal expected capital shortfall in Acharya et al. (2012) or ∆CoVaR of Adrian and Brunner-
meier (2011). Our approach differs to the extent that we explicitly seek to infer the intercon-
nectedness of individual financial institutions beyond banks without imposing substantial
structure on any data a priori.
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CDS and equity markets bear little explanatory power for bailouts during
the crisis. Especially financial firms that are important gatekeepers in con-
necting not many, but other central players in financial markets with another
were more likely to receive bailouts.
2.2 Data on CDS spreads and stock price returns
We gauge the role of connectivity for systemic risk by estimating the likeli-
hood of a simultaneous and drastic deterioration of the financial condition
for any pair of financial firms. Such a so-called co-crash probability (CCP)
can result from direct counter-party risk when an obligor fails to meet its
obligations to the creditor, or through joint asset exposures to common de-
teriorating factors that wipe out equity. Therefore, we use both data on the
joint occurrence of extremely negative equity returns as in Hartmann et al.
(2004a) and De Jonghe (2010) as well as extremely positive changes in CDS
spreads similar to Jorion and Zhang (2007) and Jorion and Zhang (2009).
Note that we remain deliberately agnostic as to the reasons for drastic
joint deterioration of financial firm value because we argue that neither mar-
ket participants nor regulators usually observe all potential contagion chan-
nels.3 Instead, we present below a method how to estimate CCPs from either
equity return or returns on CDS spreads.
We obtain CDS spread data from the Markit Group for the period Janu-
ary 2004 through January 2011.4 We use here, however, only the pre-crisis
period data between January 1, 2004 and August 8, 2007. The end date of the
period is marked by the first concerted liquidity provision by central banks
around the globe. Our objective is to test whether pre-crisis indicators of in-
terconnectedness correlate significantly with revealed policy actions during
the crisis. In order to validate whether our inferred indicators coincide with
regulators assessment of financial firms’ importance for the entire system.
3 Granger-causality tests conducted in an earlier version of this paper underpinned the in-
conclusiveness regarding the directionality of contagion based on raw equity returns and
CDS spread changes alone.
4 See Stulz (2010) for a comprehensive review of CDS contracts and markets.
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The sample consists of quotes contributed by more than 30 dealers for
all trading days during the period. Markit screens these quotes and removes
outliers as well as stale observations. Only when more than two contributors
remain, Markit calculates a daily composite spread. CDS spread quotes are
the most widely used source of CDS data in the literature (Mayordomo et al.,
2013).5 After culling the data, we end up with CDS spreads for 186 financial
firms. We obtain stock price data for 164 institutions from the Bloomberg
database. These data are adjusted for stock splits and cover the same sample
period.
Table 2.1 shows below descriptive statistics on CDS spreads and stock
price returns by financial sector and region. Most financial institutions are
banks, followed by insurance companies, trusts, and intermediaries from
other sectors of the financial industry. Banks exhibit the lowest mean (and
median) CDS spreads during this pre-crisis period from January 1, 2004 un-
til August 8, 2007. Insurance companies and financial firms from other sec-
tors are in turn significantly more risky as reflected by higher mean (and
median) CDS spreads. The standard deviation of stock price returns across
sectors is not statistically different across financial sectors. Therefore, the
credit risk measured by CDS spreads appears to gauge a different aspect
of potential connectivity compared to the risk embedded in equity returns,
which may rather reflect common asset exposures (see, for example Acharya
et al., 2012).
From a geographical perspective, financial firms from Europe and the US
account for about 80 percent of sampled institutions in terms of both CDS
spreads and stock price returns. The remainder is from other developed
(O.D.) and emerging market (E.M.) economies.6
5 We use CDS spreads of contracts with a maturity of five years, which are most liquid.
Where needed, we choose the currency with the potentially highest liquidity, usually US
dollars or Euros. We selected the CDS spreads based on the ex-restructuring clause for insti-
tutions from North America, modified-modified restructuring for Western Europe, and old
restructuring for Asia.
6 See Table 2.A.1 for a list of countries per region.
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Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics: CDS spreads and stock price returns
Sector/Region Mean SD Obs. N Min P25 P50 P75 Max
CDS spreads (bp)
Sector
Banks 18.4 16.1 106,479 118 3.3 10.1 14.0 21.2 417.3
Insurance 46.4 88.3 30,441 33 4.8 15.1 24.3 38.2 981.5
Investment Trusts 41.6 22.9 19,041 21 5.7 29.0 38.2 49.2 353.2
Other institutions 46.0 73.0 12,707 14 6.4 18.7 28.2 40.3 540.0
Region
U.S. 35.7 31.1 52,547 57 4.8 19.8 28.5 41.1 512.2
Europe 19.4 32.0 83,173 92 3.3 10.0 13.6 19.8 540.0
O.D. 38.3 91.0 26,280 29 3.9 10.2 15.8 32.5 981.5
E.M. 38.1 24.6 6,668 8 10.9 22.5 30.0 44.6 207.0
Total 28.1 46.9 168,668 186 3.3 11.3 17.7 30.3 981.5
Stock price returns (%)
Sector
Banks -0.1 1.5 95,772 109 -28.2 -0.8 0.0 0.7 27.0
Insurance -0.0 1.4 23,632 27 -16.3 -0.7 0.0 0.7 18.2
Investment Trusts -0.1 1.4 17,595 20 -8.8 -0.9 -0.1 0.7 18.4
Other institutions -0.1 1.5 6,908 8 -20.0 -0.9 -0.1 0.7 16.9
Region
U.S. -0.0 1.3 41,710 48 -20.0 -0.7 -0.0 0.6 18.2
Europe -0.1 1.3 61,741 69 -23.9 -0.7 0.0 0.6 27.0
O.D. -0.0 1.5 19,852 23 -16.3 -0.7 0.0 0.7 17.7
E.M. -0.1 2.2 20,604 24 -18.2 -1.2 0.0 1.0 22.2
Total -0.1 1.5 143,907 164 -28.2 -0.8 0.0 0.7 27.0
Market index returns (%)
MSCI World index 0.0 1.1 910 1 -7.3 -0.5 0.1 0.5 9.1
Notes: Descriptive Statistics of daily CDS spreads in basis points (bp) and stock price returns (%)
are reported for the period January 1, 2004 through August 8, 2007. CDS spreads are obtained
from the Markit Group databases. Stock prices are obtained from the Bloomberg databases. “In-
vestment Trusts” consists of real estate investment trusts, and private equity investment trusts.
“Other institutions” consist of financial services institutions, investment and lease firms, and sub-
sidiary firms. “U.S.” stands for United States. “Europe” for the developed countries in europe.
“O.D” stands for developed countries other than the U.S. and the countries in Europe. “E.M”
stands for “emerging markets”. The specific countries within these four groups are listed in table
2.A.1.
2.3 Co-crash probabilities and Extreme Value Theory
We measure the joint probability of extreme positive CDS spread percentage
changes or substantial joint negative stock price returns between all pos-
sible pairs of financial institutions with data. Denoting negative stock price
returns or percentage CDS spread increases interchangeably by Xit for insti-
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tution i, j ∈ {1, ..., N} at day t ∈ {1, ..., T}, we write the co-crash probability
(CCP) as a probability of the type:
Prob[Xit > u ∩ Xjt > v], i 6= j. (2.1)
CCPs denote the probability that the underlying processes Xit and Xjt of in-
stitutions i and j exceed jointly the critical thresholds u and v and are as such
extreme. Joint exceedance of markets’ expectations about credit events in the
case of CDS or extreme equity value deterioration are rare by definition.
Therefore, we employ multivariate extreme value theory to estimate the
probability of the joint event. We follow Draisma et al. (2004) and define F as
the common distribution of (Xit, Xjt) with marginal distributions Fi and Fj.
We assume that there exist normalising constants an, cn > 0 and bn, dn ∈ R
such that we can define the CCP between firm i and j formally as:
CCPij : = lim
T→∞




(max{Xi1, ..., XiT} − bT
aT
≤ xi,





The semi-parametric approach of Ledford and Tawn (1996) , and Dra-
isma et al. (2004) to estimate Equation (2.2) allows specifically to infer (in)
dependence between the underlying processes Xit and Xjt.7 Dependence
implies the existence of a connection between two institutions as reflected
by extreme equity return and/or CDS spikes. Thus, we gauge connections
in terms of shared risks from the perspective of debt and equity market par-
ticipants without observing any such structural ties.
7 See also Poon et al. (2004), Hartmann et al. (2007), Straetmans et al. (2008), and De Jonghe
(2010). Dependence, or more precisely asymptotic dependence, implies that Equation (2.2)
does not tend to zero as the sample size grows large. Asymptotic independence implies that
Equation (2.2) tends to zero for a large sample size. We develop a bootstrap technique to test
for dependence in subsection 2.3.3.
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2.3.1 A gauge of dependence between extremes: the tail index
To extract information on the dependence between the maximum values
of the two series, one needs to address the biasing impact of the marginal
densities on the joint probability estimate. Therefore, we follow the semi-
parametric approach of Draisma et al. (2004) and Drees et al. (2004), which
only involves the estimation of the tail index η of a univariate Pareto mar-
ginal distribution to infer dependence of the extreme values of two series.
The approach consists of two steps.
First, we transform the underlying processes Xit and Xjt to unit Pareto
marginals. This ensures that the marginal distributions of the series have no
impact on the estimated dependence between the two series’ maxima (Dra-
isma et al., 2004). Thus, differences in the estimated tail index are only attrib-
uted to differences in the dependency of extreme percentage changes in the
underlying processes. We denote the unit Pareto marginal transformation
of the series by X˜it := (ni + 1)/(ni + 1− R(Xit)), where ni is the number
of observations of institution i and R() returns the rank of the argument in
ascending order. Between any two institutions, the transformed series X˜it
and X˜jt have the same density. Therefore, the critical threshold values q are
the same across institutions and the type of probabilities (2.1) that represent
the CCP can be rewritten as:
CCPij := Prob[Xit > xj ∩ Xjt > xi] = Prob[X˜it > q ∩ X˜jt > q] (2.3)
= Prob[min{X˜it, X˜jt} > q].
Note that the multivariate probability is now transformed into a univariate
probability. This transformation permits the use of standard maximum like-
lihood (ML) techniques to estimate a generalized Pareto distribution for the
minimized series
Zt := min{X˜it, X˜jt}. (2.4)
For notational convenience, the subscripts i and j are dropped for Zt. Sup-
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pose that two institutions exhibit a perfect connection and as a result their
transformed underlying processes X˜it and X˜jt move identically in terms
of unit Pareto marginal rankings. Then Zt equals the transformed variable
X˜it and its density exhibits a unit tail index by construction. If such co-
movement does not exist, the minimized series Zt exhibits a minimal fat
tail and the tail index of its density is smaller than one. We use this feature
below to test for whether their exists a risk connection between two insti-
tutions. A tail index estimate close to one, indicates that two institutions
experience the largest movements in the underlying processes on any given
day, whereas a tail index estimate smaller than one shows the opposite.
Thus, the extent to which institutions are credit- or equity-risk connected
can be represented by the estimated value of the tail index of the generalized
Pareto density of the minimized series Zt. We use Hill’s (1975) ML technique












A typical problem in calculating the Hill estimator in Equation (2.5) is the
nontrivial choice of k: the sample of ”large” values in the joint underlying
series that proxy for the arrival of credit or equity risk events, i.e. large pos-
itive movements in the underlying processes. If k is too small, too few ob-
servations enter the estimation of the tail index to ensure consistent estim-
ation of the index. In contrast, too high levels of k result in a biased tail
index estimate because larger number of observations enter the estimation
that originate from the central mass of the distribution and do not represent
tail events. The decision on the optimal number of observations to estimate
Equation (2.5), k∗, thus represents a variance-bias trade-off between a too
high variance of the estimator for low values of k versus a lower variance
for large values of k which have the potential to introduce bias.
We follow Huisman et al. (2001) to determine k∗ and approximate the
bias in estimating the tail index to be linear in k.8 The bias is a linear rela-
8 Alternatively, one can plot Equation (2.5) for different k, evaluate the range of tail index
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tionship between the estimated tail index and the number of observations
included for estimation:
ηˆ(k) = γ0 + γ1k + εk, ∀k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}, (2.6)
where εk denotes a random noise term and the coefficient parameters γ0
and γ1 characterize the bias relationship between the tail index estimate (2.5)
and the number of observations included for its computation. Like Huisman
et al. (2001), we estimate the bias approximation (2.6) with weighted least
squares using weights proportional to
√
k to obtain unbiased and consistent
estimates of γˆ0 and γˆ0. This procedure assigns less weight to the tail index
estimates in the region where they are least consistent, which is likely to
be the case for low values of k. The unbiased estimate of the tail index is
obtained from γˆ0, which is substituted in Equation (2.5) to determine k∗
We choose k by minimizing (ηˆ(k)− γˆ0)2. The k that minimizes this se-
quence in a stable area is denoted as k∗.9 Substitution of k∗ in (2.5) yields the
tail index estimate of the two series of percentage changes in CDS spreads.
Table 2.2 summarizes the percentage changes in CDS spreads for the 186
sampled financial institutions in the periods before August 8, 2007. In ad-
dition the table reports the critical returns of the sampled 164 institutions’
stock prices. The cutoff day marks the initiation of the first major public
interventions by central authorities due to the Global Financial Crisis. To
alleviate market concerns about widespread exposures of financial institu-
tions to U.S. subprime mortgage lending markets, the ECB provided low-
interest credit lines of USD 130 billions. The Federal Reserve followed suit
with USD 12 billions in temporary reserves. Therefore, we consider only the
pre-crisis period until August 9, 2007 to infer interconnectedness from sig-
nificant CCPs. Additionally, summary statistics of the percentage changes
in CDS spreads and negative stock price returns that have been included for
estimates that are stable across k, and choose k∗ in a region with minimal tail indeces. Al-
ternatively Danielsson et al. (2001) provide a double bootstrap procedure to determine k∗.
9 We do a grid search to choose k∗ in an area where neighboring k values also yield squared
prediction errors sufficiently close to zero to avoid obtaining an accidental k∗ in an area
where ηˆ is inconsistent.
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Table 2.2. Extreme changes in CDS spreads and stock prices
CDS changes in pct./ Mean SD Obs. Min P25 P50 P75 Max
PCTL
CDS spread pct. changes
Overall sample 0.15 4.58 158,695 -169.93 -0.59 0.00 0.51 211.95
Critical changes only 2.29 4.68 71,361 0.00 0.26 0.93 2.45 209.58
PCTL of critical changes 87.91 7.74 17,561.00 39.88 81.86 88.46 94.72 100.00
Stock price returns
Overall sample -0.12 1.51 143,907 -28.20 -0.83 0.02 0.70 27.02
Critical changes only -0.93 1.07 72,188 -28.20 -2.12 -0.65 -0.12 -0.05
PCTL of critical changes 86.73 8.85 13,809 63.74 80.35 88.41 94.15 100.00
Notes: Top two rows for of the two categories report descriptive statistics on percentage changes
in the underlying series, both for the overall sample and for the critical changes that are included
in the calculation of the Hill estimator, (2.5). The total number of observations differ from Table 2.1
because of an unbalanced panel. The last row of each category reports statistics of the percentiles
of the minimum percentage change in CDS spreads included for estimation of the tail index,
as outlined in section 2.32.3.1 The considered sample period for estimation purposes runs from
January 1, 2004 through August 8, 2007.
estimating the CCPs are reported.
On average we only use observations for estimating the tail index that
are above the 87th and 86th percentile respectively for the joint CDS change
series and for negative stock price returns, as indicators for extreme move-
ments. It is important not to confuse the percentiles in Table 2.2 with those
specified in Value-At-Risk based approaches to calculate ”extreme” events,
since the critical cutoff value that denotes extreme is not imposed by the re-
searcher. Instead, the Huisman et al. (2001) method determines the optimal
sample size to calculate CCPs in light of the consistency-bias tradeoff faced
when estimating the tail index.
2.3.2 Co-crash probability estimation
Draisma et al. (2004) extend Ledford and Tawn (1996) and develop an estim-
ator for the probability of an extreme event as denoted by (2.2) that allows
for both asymptotic dependence and independence between two series. This
semi-parametric estimator requires no assumptions about the specification
for the joint density of the underlying processes Xit. However, a marginal
density is required to be defined. To this end, let the maximum of Xit follow
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the generalized Pareto distribution with shape parameter ξi, scaling para-







)− 1ξi . (2.7)
Parameters are estimated with ML techniques and calculated for each insti-
tution separately. Thus, heterogeneity with respect to idiosyncratic failure
probabilities is preserved. Parameter estimates are denoted by ξˆi, aˆi, and bˆi.
Let Fˆi be specified as (2.7) with parameters replaced by estimates. Let
Fˆij := (Fˆi, Fˆj), a two-dimensional vector with elements reflecting the idiosyn-
cratic probabilities of non-extreme events for both institutions, for example
percentage changes in CDS spreads are smaller than the critical levels of




j ). This term identifies the
values of the underlying process that are larger than the thresholds im-
plied by the Huisman et al. (2001) method discussed earlier. Last, let Dij :=
(1− Fˆi, 1− Fˆj) a row vector with probabilities of the event in which both in-
stitutions’ CDS spread percentage changes exceed their critical thresholds.


















returns a 1 if the condition in braces is fulfilled and a zero
if not: a 1 indicates the occurrence where both institutions face an extreme
event, and 0 that they do not. The operand {(Xit, Xjt) ∈ Fˆ−1ij (.)} identifies
the set of CDS spread percentage changes that are larger than the critical
values returned by Fˆ−1ij (.). Hence, the summation over the sampled days,
nij, yields the number of observations for which both institutions experience
contemporaneously a detrimental credit event.
The constant cij ∈ (0, 1] inflates the set of critical exceedance values.
Note that for smaller values of cij, the critical levels in Fˆ−1ij (.) are larger, i.e.
more extreme. Smaller values of cij essentially imply a reduction in the num-
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ber of observations for which both institutions experience simultaneously a
detrimental credit event. Because the domain of Fˆ−1ij (.) is [0, 1] × [0, 1], the
choice of cij is limited to (max{Dij}, 1]. We determine cij by evaluating ĈCPij
as a function of cij, and choose the minimal value of cij for which ĈCPij is
sufficiently stable (Draisma et al., 2004).10
2.3.3 Inferring extreme risk connections from the tail index
Draisma et al. (2004) investigate the asymptotic properties of the tail index
estimate ηˆij as defined by the Hill estimator (2.5) and find that the estim-
ate exhibits asymptotic normality as the number of observations becomes
large. This result motivates the use of a bootstrap procedure to obtain a
standard error of ηˆij for the purpose of developing a statistical test to infer
dependence between extreme credit events of two institutions. We employ
the stationary bootstrap procedure suggested by Politis and Romano (1994)
to allow for weakly dependent observations in the underlying to calculate
the standard error of the tail index estimate in Equation (2.5). The bootstrap
procedure consists of the following steps:
1. A tail index estimate ηˆij, (2.5) is calculated along the lines of the estim-
ation technique described in subsection 2.3.1
2. For each of the B bootstrap replications the underlying processes Xit
and Xjt are resampled in blocks of consecutive observations of random
block length to yield a bootstrap sample Xbit and X
b
jt of equal length as
the original sample, where b indexes the bth replication.11 From these
bootstrap samples B tail index estimates ηˆbij are generated as in step 1.






4. Let η0 be the hypothesized true value of ηij under the null. Then the
10 The same grid search is adopted as in determining the optimal numbers of observations
k∗ in the estimation of the tail index.
11 For one particular block the starting value and the length are chosen uniformly at random
across the number of observations.
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test statistic ηˆij−η0s(ηˆij) can be computed and follows a student-t distribu-
tion with B− 1 degrees of freedom. A one-sided t-test can be conduc-
ted to gather evidence against the null of asymptotic dependence.
Dependence in large percentage changes of CDS spreads between two
institutions is then determined by testing the null of dependence against
the alternative of independence. In terms of the tail index value, dependence
holds if ηij = 1, perfect co-movement among the largest values in the un-
derlying processes. Independence holds if ηij < 1. For ηij = 1 the joint crash
probability converges eventually to a positive value, whereas for ηij < 1
the probability converges eventually to zero. If the null is not rejected, a
credit link between institutions i and j is assumed to exist. Throughout, the
number of bootstrap replications is 10,000, and the significance level is one
percent.
Table 2.3 reports descriptive statistics of the estimated co-crash probab-
ilities. Note that we distinguish between all co-crash probabilities and those
for which dependence in credit events could not be rejected. Since 186 in-
stitutions are sampled for which we have sufficient observations on CDS
spreads, a maximum of 17,205 potential links can exist.12 Likewise, for the
stock-price based CCPs we have 13,366 connections, because we sampled
164 institutions.
CCPs are right-skewed for both stock price-based and CDS spread-based
CCPs. For those CCPs for which we failed to reject asymptotic dependence
the estimated size of the CCP is larger across percentiles relative to the full
sample of estimated CCP. This observation shows that for institutions for
which we find evidence of a credit risk connection the probability of exper-
iencing both a spike in the underlying process is higher, which is not neces-
sarily borne out by the method. What’s noticeable is that CDS spread-based
CCPs are generally larger than the stock price-based CCPs. A potential ex-
planation for this phenomena lies in the nature of the CDS contract which is
typically short term (five years for our data) and relates solely to the likeli-
12 Each institution can share a credit connection with 185 institutions. Counting connections
only once results in 186(186−1)2 = 17, 205 potential credit risk connections.
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Table 2.3. Descriptive statistics: Co-Crash Probabilities
Sample covers both pre and during-crisis period
Co-crash probabilities Mean SD Obs Min P25 P50 P75 Max
in basis points
CDS spread-based CCPs
Overall sample 5.47 5.58 17,205 0.00 2.20 4.21 7.43 71.75
Only significant CCPs* 7.19 5.88 11,785 0.00 3.69 5.90 9.15 71.75
Stock price-based CCPs
Overall sample 2.21 2.18 13,366 0.00 0.93 1.73 2.94 27.67
only significant CCPs* 5.32 2.61 2,595 0.00 3.54 4.77 6.59 27.67
Notes: Co-crash probabilities are reported in basis points. ‘*’ indicates that only statistics are
reported for co-crash probabilities between two institutions that share a common ‘credit-risk
link’. For these co-crash probabilities, the tail index is not significantly different from one at the
1%-significance level. The number of observations reflect the number of co-crash probabilities
estimates for any possible combination of two institutions in the sample. Since 186 institutions
are investigated with respect to the CDS spread-based CCPs, the total number of co-crash prob-
abilities per period amounts to 186(186− 1)/2 = 17, 205. Likewise, the total number of possible
ties for the Stock price-based CCPs amounts to 13, 366, based on 164 institutions.
hood of a credit risk event. Whereas stocks prices relate both to short as well
as long term profitability prospects and movement in prices do not neces-
sarily only concern credit events.
2.4 Connectivity
Based on significant CDS and equity-based CCP links, we identify next
those financial intermediaries that take central positions in the financial sec-
tor. To this end, we define the nature of centrality for the example of credit-
risk connectivity.
2.4.1 SIFI identification based on network centrality
Jorion and Zhang (2007) define credit risk contagion as a directional phe-
nomenon. One institution’s credit event has a direct impact on the credit
position of institutions with which it shares a substantial correlation in CDS
spread percentage changes. In our study direct credit contagion between
two institutions is reflected by those CCPs for which we fail to reject the
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null that both of the underlying processes are asymptotically dependent. An
important difference to Jorion and Zhang (2007) is that we remain agnostic
with respect to the direction of effects. This feature of our CCP measure is
important because ultimately neither we nor market participants and regu-
lators observe existing credit ties and shocks. We thus rely on the observable
yet very rare occurrence of joint extreme movements.
Credit risk shocks can be transitive when one institution’s credit event
affects negatively the credit position of another institution via a third insti-
tution rather than directly. The finding of Arora et al. (2012) that counter-
party credit risk of dealer firms is priced in CDS spreads of other institu-
tions serves as an argument for such indirect credit risk effects. The failure
and rescue of AIG, a major seller of CDS protection, further illustrates the
importance of indirect connections via a protection seller to policy makers.
AIG was not central in terms of many credit links with other institutions
in the financial system. But it connects large clusters of other agents which
are not directly connected. Figure 2.1 illustrates the two considered types of
centrality: direct degree and “gatekeeper” betweenness centrality.
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Centrality (%) Degree  Betweenness  
Institution A 10.71 13.77 
Institution B 17.86 12.96 
Institution C 17.86 12.96 
Institution D 14.29 9.49 
Notes: Figure displays 14 hypothetical financial institutions as nodes which share signific-
ant credit links. Significant credit links are displayed as edges. Degree centrality denotes
the proportion of institutions with which the subject institution shares a significant credit
link. Betweenness centrality represents the number of times an institution acts as key link
that connects two institutions along the shortest path (Bonacich, 1972). The Betweenness
centrality measure is rescaled to a percentage of the total number of times an institution
connects two other institutions along the shortest path.
The direct degree centrality of institution A in figure 2.1 is low relative
to the centrality of B and C, because A shares only with three institutions a
significant credit link out of the total of 14 possible other institutions. Insti-
tution B and C seem to be the most connected based on degree centrality.
However, from a “betweenness” centrality perspective, institution A con-
nects the large hubs with institutions B and C at their respective centres.
This feature renders institution A central in the gatekeeper sense.
We measure the connectivity of financial institutions in the network rep-
resented by significant credit and equity risk links. First, we assess how the
institutions are connected in the overall financial system. CCPs for which
we do not reject the null of a tail index equal to one indicate the strength
with which two institutions are linked (see Section 2.3.3). A simple meas-
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ure for the network centrality of an institution is the ratio of the number of
CCPs for which tail dependence could not be rejected and the number of in-
stitutions in the sample except for the institution in question. Let lij denote
a credit link variable that takes a value of 1 if dependence is found between
the institutions’ percentage changes in CDS spreads or negative stock price
returns. Let I denote the total number of institutions present in the sample.
Following Jackson (2010), degree centrality is denoted by:
degreei = 100%× 1I − 1 ∑j∈{1,...,I|j 6=i}
lij, (2.9)
and ranges from zero to one hundred percent. Zero percent indicates that
the institution has no direct credit links with other institutions. A value of
100 percent implies that the institution is connected to all institutions.
The betweenness centrality measure is somewhat more tedious to obtain
than degree centrality. The idea is to assign high centrality to an institution
that may have only significant CCPs with a few, yet important peers. This
measure denotes the number of times an institution acts as key link that con-
nects two institutions along the shortest path of credit links. In this context,
Bonacich (1972) proposes to take the centrality of an institution to be propor-
tional to that of its neighbors. Let Ci denote such a measure for institution i
and λ an arbitrary scaling value, then λCi = ∑j∈{1,...,I|j 6=i} ĈCPij × Cj. Note
that the centrality measures of the neighbors are weighted with the corres-
ponding co-crash probability. To calculate the Ci values a system of linear
equations needs to be solved, namely one equation for each of the sampled
institution.
This approach amounts to retrieving the eigenvectors of the square sym-
metric matrix that has diagonal elements equal to zero and the co-crash
probabilities as off-diagonal elements and the institutions index the rows
and columns. Let such a matrix be denoted by P and gather all centrality
measures Ci in the column vector C. The system can then be stated as
λC = PC. (2.10)
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Note that the solution to C denotes the eigenvector of P that corresponds to
the eigenvalue λ. Typically, the associated type of centrality is often denoted
as eigenvector centrality. We take the largest eigenvalue of P to ensure that
the eigenvector centrality scores can be positive. The centrality measure Ci
for each institution is then retrieved from the ith element of the considered
eigenvector. Bonacich centrality represents the number of times an institu-
tion acts as key link that connects two institutions along the shortest path
(Bonacich, 1972). This Betweenness centrality measure is rescaled to a per-
centage of the total number of times an institution connects two other insti-
tutions along the shortest path.
To identify systemically important financial institutions, Tables 2.4 and
2.5 show the ranking of the top 40 connected financial firms according to de-
gree centrality and Bonacich centrality based on CCPs for both CDS spread-
based and stock price-based CCPs.
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Table 2.4. Institutions ranked by degree centrality
Spearman correlation of degree centrality for the two types: 0.236***
CDS spread-based CCPs Stock price-based CCPs
Name Country sector Degree Name Country sector Degree
centrality (%) centrality (%)
Banco BPI PT Bank 99.4 Axa FR Insur. 53.3
DZ Bank Zentral DE Bank 97.8 Commerzbank DE Bank 52.7
Comm. W. Bank of Aus. AT Bank 96.7 United Overseas Bank SG Bank 49.6
SEB SE Bank 95.1 The Hartford Fin. Serv. US Insur. 49.6
Bank of Montreal CA Bank 94.5 Malayan Banking MY Bank 49.0
IKB DE Bank 94.0 Deutsche Post Bank DE Bank 46.6
St. George Bank AU Bank 92.9 Swedbank SE Bank 46.0
Standard Chartered UK Bank 92.9 Banco Espirto Santo PT Bank 44.7
Public Bank Berhad MY Bank 92.9 Hammerson UK IT 44.7
HSH Nord Bank DE Bank 92.9 Syd Bank DK Bank 44.7
HBOS UK Bank 92.4 Banco Commercial Port. PT Bank 44.1
Bank of Nova Scotia CA Bank 91.8 BBV Argentaria ES Bank 42.9
LBank Hessen Theur. DE Bank 91.3 UBS CH Bank 40.4
United Overseas Bank SG Bank 91.3 JPMorganChase US Bank 40.4
Mizuho Bank JP Bank 91.3 Anglo Irish Bank IE Bank 40.4
Banco Sabadell International ES Bank 90.8 Svenska Handels Banken SE Bank 39.8
ANZ Banking Group AU Bank 90.2 Wendel FR IT 39.8
Anglo Irish Bank IE Bank 90.2 Dexia BE Bank 39.2
Sompo Japan Insurance JP Insur. 90.2 Banco Santander ES Bank 39.2
Caja de a Horros de V. ES Bank 89.7 IVG Immobilien DE IT 38.6
Raiffeisen Bank Zentral AT Bank 89.1 Goldman Sachs US Bank 38.0
Prudential UK Insur. 89.1 Allied Irish Bank IE Bank 38.0
Assicurazioni Gen. IT Insur. 89.1 Credit Suisse CH Bank 37.4
Credit Agricole FR Bank 89.1 Wells Fargo US Bank 37.4
Commerz Bank DE Bank 89.1 IKB DE Bank 36.1
HV Bayerische HypoVer. DE Bank 88.6 Bank Mandire ID Bank 36.1
Aegon NL Insur. 88.6 Assicurazioni Gen. IT Insur. 35.5
Goldman Sachs US Bank 88.6 3i Group UK IT 34.9
HSBC Holding UK Bank 88.1 Lincoln National US Insur. 34.9
Aviva UK Insur. 88.1 Unibail Rodamco NL IT 34.9
BBV Argentaria ES Bank 88.1 Banco Sabadell Intern. ES Bank 34.3
BNP FR Bank 88.1 Deutsche Bank DE Bank 34.3
Swiss Reinsurance CH Insur. 87.5 Standard Char. UK Bank 33.7
HSBC Bank UK Bank 87.5 Irish Life Perm. Public IE Fin. Serv. 33.1
Unicredito IT Bank 87.0 Allianz DE Insur. 33.1
Banco Santander ES Bank 87.0 Jyske Bank DK Bank 32.5
Banca Popolare di Milano IT Bank 87.0 Banco Pop. di Verona IT Bank 32.5
Svenska Handels Banken SE Bank 87.0 Erste Bank AT Bank 31.2
Banco Espirto Santo PT Bank 86.4 Banco Populare Es. ES Bank 31.2
Banco Commercial Port. PT Bank 86.4 Merrill Lynch US Bank 31.2
Notes: Pre-crisis is the period of January 1, 2004 until August 9, 2007. Institutions are sorted in descending
order by their degree centrality measure. The number of established ties over possible ties is denoted as
degree centrality, and is calculated by dividing the number of significant co-crash probabilities associated
with an institution through the number of institutions in the sample minus one, 192. The two characters
in the country codes correspond to the ISO 3166 country codes. ‘***’ denotes a significantly different from
zero Spearman rank order coefficient at the 1%-level (Bonferroni adjusted).
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Table 2.5. Institutions ranked by Bonacich centrality
Spearman correlation of degree centrality for the two types: 0.284***
CDS spread-based CCPs Stock price based CCPs
Name Country sector Bonacich Name Country sector Bonacich
centrality (%) centrality (%)
Anglo Irish Bank IE Bank 99.4 Axa FR Insur. 98.5
BBV Argentaria ES Bank 95.0 Commerzbank DE Bank 90.8
Capitalia IT Bank 94.1 Deutsche Post Bank DE Bank 87.9
ABN Amro NL Bank 93.8 Banco Santander ES Bank 84.1
Banco Comm.l Port. PT Bank 90.8 Dexia BE Bank 82.4
Banca M.dei Paschi di S. IT Bank 88.8 Wendel FR IT 80.4
Banco Santander ES Bank 86.2 Swedbank SE Bank 78.9
Banco Espirto Santo PT Bank 85.3 UBS CH Bank 78.6
Aviva UK Insur. 84.7 IKB DE Bank 78.1
Comm. W. Bank of Aus. AS Bank 83.6 BBV Argentaria ES Bank 77.0
Aegon NL Insur. 82.0 Banco Pastor ES Bank 75.6
Swiss Reinsurance CH Insur. 79.0 Banco Comm. Port. PT Bank 75.1
Societe Generale FR Bank 78.0 Banco Espirto Santo PT Bank 75.1
Prudential UK Insur. 76.1 Svenska Handels Banken SE Bank 74.1
Credit Agricole FR Bank 74.3 Ageas BE Insur. 73.1
Banco BPI PT Bank 73.8 Credit Suisse Group CH Bank 70.8
Lehman Brothers US Bank 73.4 Allianz DE Insur. 70.0
Unicredito IT Bank 73.2 Banco Sabadell Inter. ES Bank 69.5
AIG US Insur. 71.5 Assicurazioni Gen. IT Insur. 67.6
Assicurazioni Gen. IT Insur. 70.0 Aegon NL Insur. 67.2
Royal Bank of Scotland UK Bank 69.8 Banco Pop. Espanol ES Bank 67.1
The All State US Insur. 69.0 BNP FR Bank 66.8
IKB DE Bank 68.5 Standard Chartered UK Bank 66.5
Lloyds Bank UK Bank 68.0 Hammerson UK IT 66.2
HV Bayerische HypoVer. DE Bank 67.3 Jyske Bank DK Bank 65.6
Public Bank Berhad MY Bank 66.2 Syd Bank DK Bank 65.2
Barclays Bank UK Bank 64.6 The Hartford Fin. Serv. US Insur. 65.0
Dresdner Bank DE Bank 64.5 Allied Irish Bank IE Bank 64.9
General Electir Capital US Bank 64.4 IVG Immobilien DE IT 64.8
ING Bank NL Bank 64.0 Wells Fargo US Bank 63.2
Legal General Group UK Insur. 63.0 Banco Pop.e di Verona IT Bank 62.8
Ex Im Bank China CN Bank 61.4 Deutsche Bank DE Bank 62.1
Muenchener RE DE Insur. 61.3 3i Group UK IT 61.7
MGIC Investment US Insur. 60.5 Credit Agricole FR Bank 61.6
BNP FR Bank 60.4 JPMorganChase US Bank 61.4
Goldman Sachs US Bank 60.4 Merrill Lynch US Bank 61.2
ANZ Banking Group AS Bank 59.5 Unibail Rodamco NL IT 60.7
Rabobank NL Bank 59.4 Medio Banca IT Bank 60.3
Abbay National UK Bank 58.9 Legal General Group UK Insur. 60.3
Credit Lyonnais FR Bank 58.7 Barclays Bank UK Bank 57.5
Notes: Pre-crisis is the period of January 1, 2004 until August 9, 2007. Institutions are sorted in descending
order by their Bonacich centrality measure. Bonacich centrality is a measure of the influence of an institu-
tion among peer members in a financial network. It assigns relative scores to all institutions in the system
based on the concept that connections to highly connected institutions contribute more to the connectivity
of the institution in question than equal connections to low-scoring nodes. The measure therefore reflects
the extend to which an institution is an important gatekeeper in the financial system. The two characters
in the country codes correspond to the ISO 3166 country codes. ‘***’ denotes a significantly different from
zero Spearman rank order coefficient at the 1%-level (Bonferroni adjusted).
The resulting rankings highlight first of all that implied interconnec-
tedness measured by CDS and equity return ties gauge different aspects.
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For both measures of network centrality, the rank-order correlation between
CDS- and return-based network centrality is significant but fairly low (23%
– 28%). Hence, these league tables underpin the importance to consider mul-
tiple indicators of systemic relevance regarding the interconnectedness di-
mension.
Second, all four rankings are plausible to the extent that a number of
banks are listed were actually rescued. Examples are IKB and Commerzbank,
which appear among the 40 most interconnected banks in six out of the eight
rankings shown in Tables Tables 2.4 and 2.5.
Third, a number of insurances as well as not so obvious banking firms
are connected to many other financial institutions. Likewise, the regional
dispersion of central financial firms is high in all rankings. Therefore, these
measures indicate that effective prudential supervision of SIFIs should prob-
ably not only focus on banks. Instead, a more holistic approach to supervi-
sion that is crossing not only national borders, but also sectoral boundaries,
seems warranted.
2.4.2 Implied network centrality and revealed SIFI assessment
But do implied measures of network centrality properly identify SIFIs? Whereas
we cannot “validate” our agnostic CCP-based connectivity measures of sys-
temic importance with structural data, such as for example observed inter-
bank credit connection, we seek to test this notion more formally.
Bailouts during the crisis
To do so, we argue that a bailout of any financial institution reveals the regu-
lators perception of that firm’s systemic relevance. Numerous financial insti-
tutions were bailed out during the financial crisis of 2007/2008 in the wake
of unparalleled concerted efforts of central banks and governments around
the world. Many of these bailed out banks are actually among those iden-
tified as SIFIs based on network centrality represented by significant CDS
co-crash probabilities. Actual bailouts under the auspices of the various na-
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tional schemes, such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program in the US or the
Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilisation fund (”Bundesanstalt fu¨r
Finanzmarktstabilisierung”) and other schemes, have been collected system-
atically by the European Central Bank (see Stolz and Wedow, 2010). Bailouts
entail either capital injections by governmental institutions or various forms
of asset support for financial institutions.13 These data are shown in Table
2.6.
13 More specifically, governmental institutions include federal and local governments. As a
consequence measures taken outside official schemes are also included. With regard to as-
set support, these measure include asset guarantees and asset removal. Under the former
approach, the actual assets remain on the bank’s balance sheet but are insured by the gov-
ernment while the latter typically implied the set up of a bad bank.
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Table 2.6. Dates of first time rescue measures for financial institutions
First time fin. Capital Asset Total cap. Total asset
Name Country support received injection support injections support
ABN Amro NL 07/31/09 x 1
Aegon N.V. NL 10/28/08 x 1
AIG US 11/11/08 x x 3 1
Allied Irish Bank IE 12/12/08 x 2
Alpha Bank GR 01/12/09 x 2
American Express US 01/09/09 x 1
Anglo Irish Bank IE 05/29/09 x 3
Banca Monte Paschi IT 12/30/09 x 1
Bank of America US 10/28/08 x 3
Bank of Ireland IE 01/08/09 x 1
Banque Pop. France FR 06/30/09 x 1
Bayrische Landesbank DE 10/21/08 x 2
BNP FR 10/20/08 x 2
Caisse d’ Epargne FR 10/20/08 x 1
Capital One Fin. Corp. US 11/14/08 x 1
Citigroup US 10/28/08 x 1
Commerzbank DE 11/03/08 x 2
Credit Agricole FR 10/20/08 x 1
Danske Bank DK 05/05/09 x 1
Dexia BE 09/30/08 x 1
EBS Building Society IE 04/02/10 x 1
EFG Eurobank GR 01/12/09 x 1
Erste Bank DE 02/27/09 x 1
Fannie Mae US 03/02/09 x 7
Fortis Group NL 10/03/08 x 3
Freddie Mac US 11/14/08 x 5
Goldman Sachs Group US 10/28/08 x 1
HSH Nord Bank DE 05/20/09 x 1
Hypo Real Estate DE 03/30/09 x 6
IKB DE 07/27/07 x 4
ING Groep NL 10/20/08 x 1
Irish Nationalwide IE 04/02/10 x x 1
JPMorgan Chase US 10/28/08 x 1
KBC Group BE 10/27/08 x 2
Landesbank Baden-Wurtemb. DE 11/21/08 x 1
Lloyds Bank GB 01/19/09 x 2
Morgan Stanley US 10/28/08 x 1
National Bank of Canada CA 01/21/09 x 1
Natixis FR 05/14/09 x 1
Nordea Bank SE 03/12/09 x 1
Northern Rock GB 10/28/09 x 1
Pireus Bank GR 01/23/09 x 1
RBS GB 10/13/08 x 2
SNS Bank NL 11/13/08 x 1
Societe Generale FR 10/20/08 x 2
Sparkasse Koln-Bonn DE 01/01/09 x 2
Suntrust Banks US 11/14/08 x 2
UBS CH 10/16/08 x x 1 1
US Bank Corp. US 11/14/08 x 1
Wells Fargo US 10/28/08 x 1
Westdt. Landesbank DE 02/01/08 x 3
Table provides overview of financial support for financial institutions implemented by financial
regulators. Dates are denoted by ”mm/dd/yy”. ”Total Capital injections” and ”Total Asset Sup-
port” refer to the total amount of capital injections received and asset support received in the
period defined by the first time of financial support received until March 10, 2011.
The vast majority of the 51 financial institutions receiving either capital
injections or asset support were banks. Bailouts were conducted in 14 differ-
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ent countries, illustrating the global nature of the fallout from the financial
crisis. Regarding timing, only one bank, the German IKB, was rescued be-
fore the first concerted liquidity provision by global central banks on August
8, 2007. The last bailouts in the sample are recorded on April 2, 2010 whereas
events have been collected systematically for this sample until March 10,
2011. As mentioned earlier, we collapse the data into just two periods, pre-
and post August 8, 2007, to test whether the cross-sectional difference in im-
plied connectivity measures correlates with an assigned SIFI status of banks
as revealed by bailouts.
Centrality and other SIFI determinants
In order to validate the measures of degree and Bonacich connectivity for
financial institutions we evaluate their relation with future bailouts. To this
end we estimate a simple logit model with the dependent variable equal
to one if a financial firm was bailed out and zero otherwise. The first an-
nouncement of a rescue measure constitutes the event. In case of successive
rescue measures during the sample period, we denote these as one event.
To avoid endogeneity, we predict bailouts during the crisis with indicators
of connectivity based on co-crash probabilities pertaining to the pre-crisis
period. If this measure of inferred connectivity is informative, we hypothes-
ise that policy makers are more inclined to bail out banks they considered
connected already prior to the crisis, i.e. identified as SIFI.
We measure connectivity by direct degree centrality and in a gatekeeper
sense using Bonaccic centrality. Both measures are calculated on the basis of
both equity return and CDS spread change series. The descriptive statistics
for these variables are shown in Table 2.7.
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Table 2.7. Descriptive statistics of bailout determinants: centrality indicat-
ors and firm-specific factors
Variables Values in Mean SD Obs. Min P25 P50 P75 Max
CDS centrality
Degree (%) 68.97 21.99 186 9.19 60.54 75.68 84.86 99.46
Bonacich (%) 40.61 22.38 186 0.00 23.24 37.38 56.22 99.43
Equity centrality
Degree (%) 20.03 13.60 164 0.61 8.59 16.56 30.06 53.37
Bonacich (%) 41.78 20.36 164 0.00 27.46 38.89 57.12 98.46
Rescue measures
Capital injections (B USD) 12.43 17.69 50 0.53 2.84 5.02 18.2 88.62
Asset guarantees (B USD) 50.91 78.44 21 0.26 6.33 15.12 41.15 283
Control variables
Total Assets (B USD) 328.62 499.35 138 0.02 20.91 104.77 337.49 2,070.02
CCP with market (bp) 21.39 3.85 164 7.89 19.50 21.49 23.91 31.42
CAPM Beta 0.26 0.16 164 -0.09 0.14 0.25 0.33 1.01
Solvency ratio (%) 15.54 19.07 138 1.25 4.75 6.88 18.12 99.14
RoA (%) 2.04 4.79 138 -27.59 0.86 1.43 2.48 22.10
Notes: Centrality measures are reported in percentages. Degree centrality reflects the proportion of mem-
bers with which the institution shares a significant co-crash probability, i.e. a co-crash probability for which
the null of unit tail index could not be rejected at the one-percent significance level. The Bonacich centrality
measures are rescaled to percentages where zero percent indicates that the institution is not connected to
institutions that do not share a significant co-crash probability but are highly connected with other mem-
bers; higher values indicate that the institution acts as a gatekeeper in the sense of sharing a significant
co-crash probability with multiple independent institutions which are themselves highly connected with
others. All variables cover the period January 2004 through August 2007, except for Total Assets (book
value), Solvency ratio and RoA, which are obtained for the fiscal year of 2006 only.
The data shows that the network in terms of direct credit risk connec-
tions is more densely connected compared to equity ties. For the average fin-
ancial institution, we could not reject the dependence assumption in terms
of extreme co-movements of CDS spread change series for 69% of all pos-
sible connections. For equity return co-movements, this share is only 20% on
average, indicating that the average financial institution is only significantly
tied to one out of five potential peers via extreme joint equity return spikes.
We also show in Table 2.7 mean values for the gatekeeper type of cent-
rality, the Bonacich indicator. These are scaled in such a way that larger per-
centages indicate a more central role in the network in terms of connecting
more clusters of other financial institutions in the network. This indicator
yields virtually identical averaged “gatekeeper” importance for both CDS
and equity based connectivity.
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As noted in BIS (2013), the SIFI status of financial institutions should also
reflect additional factors other than connectivity. Among the most important
ones are too-big-to-fail concerns. To this end we augment our analysis with a
set of control variables that stem from the period before the Global Financial
Crisis period, and in particular cover the period January 2004 through Au-
gust 2007 unless stated otherwise. We specify the log of total assets,14 using
total assets from the fiscal year of 2006. Additionally, bailout choices may
have been driven by concerns of systemic importance that a specific failure
would lead the entire system to collapse. The notion of systemic importance
that emphasizes the relationship between individual institutions and the en-
tire market is central to recent measures, such as marginal expected short-
fall (Acharya et al., 2012) and ∆CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011). We
specify here also an EVT-based measure, namely the co-crash probability of
each institution with the market as in (De Jonghe, 2010). This variable CCP
market thus estimates for each financial firm the probability that it’s stock
prices crashes jointly with the entire financial market index.15 We employ
the method outlined above in Section 2.3 to estimate this variable.
Finally, we control for the idiosyncratic risk-return traits of each finan-
cial firm. These are likely to co-determine the choice of regulators regarding
bailouts as well.16 Specifically, we specify CAPM betas, solvency ratios, and
return on assets (RoA), which we obtain from Datastream. The solvency ra-
tios and RoA are obtained from the fiscal year of 2006 only.
Too-connected-to-fail: Which type of network centrality matters?
Table 2.8 shows below the marginal effects from logit estimations to test the
too-connected-to-fail notion based on degree centrality for equity (columns
1–4) and CDS ties (columns 5–8), respectively. Results in columns (1) and (5)
14 Specification of total employees as a robustness check did not qualitatively change the
results.
15 We only specify an equity market CCP because for CDS no reliable index is available.
16 For example Duchin and Sosyura (2014) discuss that equity capital support to U.S. banks
was granted on the basis of an assessment of the future viability of the bank, implying for
example an assessment of profitability and liquidity outlooks.
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show that an increase of 1% in the proportion of significant ties over all pos-
sible ties that a financial firm has with its sampled peers leads to an increase
in the probability of receiving bailout support during the crisis in the order
of 5.4%. This result suggest that financial institutions that are more central in
terms of sharing significant extreme CDS spread return co-movements with
peers are both statistically and economically more likely to be considered
worthy of a bailout. Further support for this finding is obtained from the are
under the ROC curve, or the coefficient of concordance, which for column
(5) is significantly larger than the benchmark value obtained for the baseline
logit regression in which no connectivity variables are included. Hence, the
discriminatory power of the model increases when including CDS-spread
based connectivity measures.
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Table 2.8. Rescue measures explained by pre-crisis degree centrality
Received gov. support during the crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)



















ln(Total Assets) 0.093*** 0.100*** 0.103*** 0.097*** 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.109***
[0.023] [0.021] [0.019] [0.021] [0.026] [0.027] [0.025] [0.026]
Co-crash probability -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
with market index [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010]
CAPM Beta -0.178 -0.151 -0.113 -0.065 -0.087 -0.094 -0.090 -0.090
[0.224] [0.233] [0.209] [0.225] [0.171] [0.185] [0.180] [0.195]
Solvency ratio -0.032** -0.033** -0.034** -0.031** -0.029 -0.030 -0.033 -0.034
[0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.015] [0.023] [0.024] [0.023] [0.024]
RoA 0.042** 0.045** 0.048** 0.044** 0.039 0.040 0.044 0.048
[0.020] [0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.032] [0.035] [0.032] [0.035]
Observations 124 124 124 124 112 112 112 112
log-likelihood -50.712 -51.489 -51.850 -51.938 -38.375 -38.645 -39.720 -40.623
Pseudo R2 0.261 0.250 0.244 0.243 0.410 0.406 0.390 0.376
Area under ROC curve 0.838 0.832 0.826 0.825 0.904** 0.902* 0.892 0.888
Notes: Table reports the marginal effect of variables derived from logit regressions for whether
an institution received financial support or guarantees from central regulators during the Global
Financial Crisis. The regressors are obtained in the pre-crisis period. Bootstrap standard errors are
reported in brackets, 1000 replications. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote respectively significantly different
from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. ‘Area under ROC curve’ reports the coefficient of concord-
ance and whether it differs significantly relative to the value obtained where degree centrality
measures are excluded.
In columns (2) – (4) and (6) – (8) we show results for degree centrality
calculated for three different sub-samples. Intra-industry degree centrality
relates the significant co-crash probabilities per financial institutions not to
all possible ties, as in the baseline, but only to those possible connections
within the firm’s own financial sector. For example, we relate bank connec-
tions only to all possible connections with other banks, but exclude insur-
ances, investment funds, and so forth. Likewise, intra-country connectiv-
ity confines the set of possible connections only to financial firms within a
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country. The last, and smallest possible connectivity set is the one confined
by both industry and country, say only banks in the US are considered pos-
sible connectors. These alternatives gauge whether the role of connectivity
to predict policy makers’ choices to bailout banks increasing in increasingly
narrow definitions of potential peers. A potential reason for such a pattern is
the fact that, for example, explicit rescue schemes were usually orchestrated
and targeted at specific sector of the financial industry in a single country,
such as equity support to banks under the Capital Purchase Program as
part of TARP in the US or the direct equity support of German banks by
the Financial Market Stability Authority. The evidence in Table 2.8 suggests
that centrality in increasingly narrowly defined networks prior to the fin-
ancial crisis bears little or no explanatory power of bailouts after August 7,
2007. Although the coefficients in of the CDS-based centrality measures in
columns (6) – (8) are significantly different from zero, the model’s discrimin-
atory power is not significantly better relative to the benchmark model with
no centrality measures specified.
Overall, there is statistical evidence of too-connected-to-fail considera-
tions based on pre-crisis degree centrality for bailout choices during the
crisis. A comparison with the other control variables vividly illustrates that
the too-big-to-fail consideration used to be the major driver of bailout prob-
abilities. An increase in financial firm size as measured by the log-level of
total assets by 1% increased the bailout probability by 9% – 10%. This result
corroborates regulators’ emphasis on identifying SIFIs in particular in terms
of size.
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Table 2.9. Rescue measures explained by pre-crisis Bonacich centrality
Received gov. support during the crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)



















ln(Total Assets) 0.087*** 0.048* 0.098*** 0.077*** 0.103*** 0.086*** 0.111*** 0.102***
[0.022] [0.029] [0.020] [0.020] [0.025] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
Co-crash probability -0.016 -0.010* -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.000 0.002
with market index [0.010] [0.006] [0.010] [0.012] [0.008] [0.012] [0.010] [0.012]
CAPM Beta -0.198 -0.135 0.051 0.124 -0.088 0.034 -0.120 -0.044
[0.205] [0.140] [0.218] [0.237] [0.179] [0.214] [0.196] [0.222]
Solvency ratio -0.034** -0.019* -0.028* -0.021 -0.032 -0.024 -0.043** -0.039
[0.014] [0.010] [0.015] [0.015] [0.022] [0.024] [0.021] [0.024]
RoA 0.043** 0.037** 0.035 0.024 0.042 0.037 0.058* 0.052
[0.020] [0.016] [0.022] [0.022] [0.031] [0.036] [0.030] [0.036]
Observations 124 124 124 124 112 112 112 112
log-likelihood -49.269 -45.036 -48.854 -45.500 -39.305 -34.324 -42.926 -41.201
Pseudo R2 0.282 0.344 0.288 0.337 0.396 0.473 0.340 0.367
Area under ROC 0.852 0.879 0.841 0.862 0.926** 0.897 0.872 0.887
Notes: Table reports the marginal effect of variables derived from logit regressions for whether
an institution received financial support or guarantees from central regulators during the Global
Financial Crisis. The regressors are obtained in the pre-crisis period. Bootstrap standard errors are
reported in brackets, 1000 replications. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote respectively significantly different
from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. ‘Area under ROC curve’ reports the coefficient of concord-
ance and whether it differs significantly relative to the value obtained where Bonacich centrality
measures are excluded.
In Table 2.9 we replace the degree centrality measures with the Bonacich
centrality measures. As before, for columns (1) – (4) and (5) – (6) we spe-
cify respectively equity-based Bonacich centrality and CDS-based centrality.
In columns (1) and (5) we find that both equity-based and CDS-based pre-
crisis Bonacich centrality pertains positively and statistically significant to
our rescue measure. In the case of column (5), this indicates that if the num-
ber of times an institution acts as a key link that connects two institutions
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along the shortest path by 1% a bailout is more likely to be received in the
order of 10.1%. What’s noteworthy about the specification in column (5) is
the discriminatory power of the specification. The significance of the area
under the ROC curve indicates that CDS-based Bonacich centrality marks
an economically relevant addition to the baseline specification.
In columns (2) – (4) and (6) – (8) we specify Bonacich centrality meas-
ures in addition to the controls for which we consider network ties within
industries, within countries, and within both industries and countries as
in 2.8. For instance, for the intra-industry equity-based Bonacich centrality
measure we restrict ties that are interindustry to zero, such that the pos-
sible shortest paths along which firms are connected can only be of an intra-
industry nature. Throughout we find positive and statistically significant
results except for columns (7) and (8). However, as in the case of column (1)
the Area under ROC curve does not significantly improve upon the baseline
value. Hence, the restricted types of centrality do not significantly contrib-
ute to the discriminatory power of the model.
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Table 2.10. Centrality and the nature of ties
Received gov. support during the crisis
(1) (2) (3)
Degree centrality in logs
Equity based 0.066 -0.069
[0.045] [0.088]
CDS based 0.017 0.028
[0.017] [0.044]
Bonacich centrality in logs
Equity based 0.019 -0.035
[0.033] [0.085]
CDS based 0.192** 0.304**
[0.091] [0.152]
Controls
ln(Total Assets) 0.100*** 0.088*** 0.086***
[0.027] [0.027] [0.030]
Co-crash probability -0.005 -0.012 -0.018
with market index [0.011] [0.011] [0.012]
CAPM Beta 0.159 0.087 0.176
[0.275] [0.257] [0.248]
Solvency ratio -0.045 -0.050* -0.057**
[0.028] [0.026] [0.028]
RoA 0.056 0.062* 0.074*
[0.040] [0.037] [0.039]
Observations 78 78 78
log-likelihood -34.526 -32.293 -30.056
Pseudo R2 0.450 0.486 0.522
Area under ROC 0.913 0.923* 0.944***
Notes: Table reports the marginal effect of vari-
ables derived from logit regressions for whether
an institution received financial support or guar-
antees from central regulators during the Global
Financial Crisis. The variables are obtained in
the pre-crisis period. Bootstrap standard errors
are reported in brackets, 1000 replications. ‘***’,
‘**’ and ‘*’ denote respectively significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
‘Area under ROC curve’ reports the coefficient of
concordance and whether it differs significantly
relative to the value obtained where degree and
Bonacich centrality measures are excluded.
In Table 2.10 we present the results associated with the joint specification
of degree and Bonacich centrality for the cases when they are both equity
and CDS based. Results further corroborate the previous findings presented
in Tables 2.8 and2.9. CDS based Bonacich centrality pertains significantly to
our rescue measure. Based on columns (2) and (3) we find that a 1% increase
in CDS based Bonacich centrality increases the probability of receiving fin-
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ancial support from central regulators respectively by 20% and 30% points.
Upon evaluating the coefficient of concordance for columns (2) and (3) we
find that the specification of Bonacich centrality measures results in a im-
provement of the model’s discriminatory powers in distinguishing between
whether an institution received support. This result indicates that regulat-
ors incorporated the centrality of financial institutions in their decision to
extend bailout supper during the Global Financial Crisis, and paid in par-
ticular attention to those institutions that are central in the gatekeeper sense
of connecting highly connected hubs of financial institutions. At the same
time, the logarithm of total assets stands out as a variable that pertains pos-
itively to the probability of receiving bailout support with an effect of 9%
point as a result of a 1% increase in total assets. Additionally, the solvency
ratio shows a detrimental effect on the probability of receiving bailout sup-
port, indicating that firms with higher leverage where more likely to receive
bailout support during the crisis period.
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Table 2.11. Centrality and the intensity of rescue measures
Dependent variable Capital injections ($B) Asset guarantees ($B)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Degree centrality in logs
Equity based -3.093 -17.750* 38.162 62.468
[4.909] [9.665] [24.944] [44.770]
CDS based 4.973** -5.557 8.645 -3.708
[1.955] [5.493] [7.420] [18.022]
Bonacich centrality in logs
Equity based 2.907 33.345* 46.214 -47.436
[8.835] [19.488] [36.869] [70.604]
CDS based 10.166** 19.979** 18.425 24.637
[3.876] [10.051] [15.103] [36.126]
ln(Total Assets) 13.663*** 12.749*** 11.212*** 32.651** 30.336** 32.491**
[3.388] [3.491] [2.640] [13.297] [12.968] [13.755]
Co-crash probability -1.088 -1.152 -1.922 3.823 2.661 5.728
with market index [1.073] [1.117] [1.183] [4.453] [4.332] [5.038]
CAPM Beta -28.301 -35.257 -20.109 -57.102 -16.929 -59.551
[24.006] [26.790] [20.818] [95.126] [90.549] [96.291]
Solvency ratio -2.706 -2.431 -3.773* 0.065 -1.489 0.898
[2.057] [1.996] [2.001] [5.160] [5.780] [4.405]
RoA 3.780 3.210 5.305* 0.573 2.648 -0.217
[2.894] [2.802] [2.781] [8.639] [9.396] [8.012]
Constant -29.441 -38.581 -11.872 -458.201** -398.178* -479.144**
[31.343] [30.794] [29.334] [222.369] [204.394] [220.547]
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
lnL -139.131 -138.521 -136.003 -78.789 -79.704 -78.254
pseudo-R-squared 0.180 0.184 0.199 0.155 0.145 0.161
Notes: Table reports parameter coefficient estimates associated with variables
included inTobit regressions for whether and to what extend, in U.S. dol-
lars, an institution received positive capital injections, (1) – (3), or positive as-
set guarantees, (4) – (6), from central regulators during the Global Financial
Crisis. The variables are obtained in the pre-crisis period. Bootstrap stand-
ard errors are reported in brackets, 1000 replications. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote
respectively significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
In Table 2.11 we explore in a series of six Tobit regressions whether and
to what extend centrality contributed to the intensity of the bailout support
extended by central regulators during the Global Financial Crisis. We dis-
tinguish between two types of rescue events: capital injections, columns (1)
– (3), and asset guarantees, columns (4) – (6). For those firms that received
support we observe the amount they received or the asset value guaranteed
and regard the values for institutions that did not receive bailout support
as missing such that the data is left censored at zero. For the case of capital
injections we find that an increase of 1% in Bonacich centrality results in a
$10.17B and $19.98B increase in capital injections during the crisis. We can
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not claim that capital injections were indeed effective in preventing institu-
tions from collapsing, because we lack the counterfactual. However, since
this result is obtained while controlling for size, it indicates that central reg-
ulators were not solely concerned with the institutions’ ‘sizes’ but also in-
corporated connectivity in their decision to extend bailout support. We do
not find this result for the case in which the regulator extended asset guaran-
tees. These guarantees seem to be primary driven by the institution’s size in
the form of total assets. Results also suggest that asset guarantees are more
sensitive to changes in total assets relative to capital injections. In columns
(4) – (6) we report a marginal effect of about $31.00B change in extended
asset guarantees as a result of a 1% increase in total assets.
2.5 Conclusion
We employ Extreme Value Theory to measure tail risks of financial firms and
use the proposed method to assess interconnectedness between these firms.
Based on a comprehensive sample of daily CDS spreads for 186 financial
firms, and daily stock prices for 164 institutions we calculate a so-called co-
crash probability (CCP) for all possible pairs of these financial firms. We use
return rates on credit default swap quotes and stock prices between January
2004 and August 2007 and employ a bootstrap method to obtain standard
errors of potential CCP ties to assess the statistical significance of our joint
crash probability estimates. The main results are as follows.
Although it is not necessarily borne out by our method, we find CCPs
to be larger across percentiles if we fail to reject asymptotic dependence
between the underlying series. This finding indicates that for institutions
for which we gather evidence of dependence in their performance under
extreme conditions we also find that the probability that both institutions
face a detrimental decline in their performance is generally estimated to be
higher as well. Exactly how performance in this respect is affected depends
on for instance direct credit events where one firm affects the credit posi-
tion of the other; indirect events stemming from third parties which affect
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both institutions in question jointly; or changes in the market’s perception of
long term profitability prospects. To avoid the trap of interpreting our CCP
measure in an ad hoc manner as a measure of interconnectedness we em-
ploy tests to validate the economic significance of the CCP along the lines of
the too-connected-to-fail hypothesis.
To this end we use the CCP estimates and the test results for depend-
ence between the CCP’s underlying series to identify those institutions that
take central positions in the financial sector. From the CCP estimates we in-
fer two types of centrality: degree centrality and Bonacich centrality. The
former measures an institution’s centrality as the proportion of other insti-
tutions with which the institution in question shares dependence in extreme
returns in either CDS spreads or share prices. The latter, Bonacich central-
ity, measures the total number of times an institution connects two other
institutions along the shortest path, for which a CCP estimate with a high
value denotes a small distance. Whereas degree centrality has the potential
to capture direct contagion between any two firms, Bonacich centrality can
reveal whether an institution is central in a ‘gatekeeper’ sense by connect-
ing hubs of highly connected peers. By estimating the relation between the
network measures and rescue measures implemented by central regulators
during the Global Financial Crisis we aim to validate the CCP estimate as a
measure of interconnectedness.
Results indicate that the CDS-based Bonacich centrality measure per-
tains positively to the likelihood of receiving capital injections and asset
guarantees implemented by central regulators during the Global Financial
Crisis. This result is indicative that central regulators are not primarily con-
cerned with the institution’s size in terms of total assets, leverage, and other
idiosyncratic risk factors, but also focus in particular on whether an insti-
tution is central in the financial sector in the gatekeeper’s sense. A similar
result is found for the relation between CDS-based Bonacich centrality and
the magnitude of the capital injections implemented during the Global Fin-
ancial Crisis. Here we find that if an institution experiences a one percent
increase in the total number of times the institutions connects along the
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shortest path via the estimated CCP network it is likely to have received
a 20B USD worth of capital injections. Asset guarantees on the other hand
are primarily explained by past levels of total assets.
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2.A Appended tables
Table 2.A.1. Countries within regions
U.S. Europe O.D. E.M.
United States (US) Austria (AT) Australia (AU) Argentina (AR)
Belgium (BE) Canada (CA) Brazil (BR)
Denmark (DK) Hong Kong (HK) China (CN)
France (FR) Japan (JP) India (IN)
Germany (DE) Singapore (SG) Indonesia (ID)
Greece (GR) Kazakhstan (KZ)
Iceland (IS) Korea (KR)
Ireland (IE) Malaysia (MY)
Italy (IT) Russia (RU)
Luxembourg (LU) South Africa (ZA)
Netherlands (NL) Taiwan (TW)
Norway (NO) Thailand (TH)
Portugal (PT) Turkey (TR)




Notes: ISO 3166 country codes reported in parentheses. In the classification of “Other






In light of the substantial cost of the financial crisis of 2007/2008, higher
compensation in the financial industry compared to other sectors of the
economy (Kaplan and Rauh, 2010), and in particular that of top bankers at
failed institutions (Bebchuk et al., 2010), fuelled public fury. Diamond and
Rajan (2009) conjectured that bank executives’ compensation schemes, inab-
ility to assess tail risks of novel financial products, and lack of control over
other executives’ actions were important factors that contributed to the near-
collapse of the financial system. Aside from conventional (idiosyncratic and
systematic) risk, the contribution of individual institutions to the risk that
the entire system fails appears to be the main motive for concerns about ex-
ecutive compensation in contemporary policy making. We test the relation-
ship between past bank executive compensation and systemic risk formation
during the crisis, explicitly gauging the tail nature of systemic risk.
We investigate the relationship between 92 U.S. banks’ executive pay
This chapter is based on joint work with Michael Koetter.
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components in 2006 and five systemic risk indicators that cover the period
July 2007 through December 2008.1 We specify executive compensation prior
to the crisis to explain systemic risk per institution during the crisis to avoid
endogeneity by construction. Our focus is thus on cross-sectional differences
of risk cultures across U.S. banks that are emphasized in Cheng et al. (2010)
and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012).2
Most studies focus on CEO compensation, which may be unable to mon-
itor (too) large and complex banks effectively (Diamond and Rajan, 2009).
Kim et al. (2011) show indeed that it is the option portfolio value of Chief
Financial Officers (CFOs), not CEOs, which correlates with dramatic stock
price slumps, thereby corroborating the importance of non-CEO compensa-
tion. Therefore, we test for the existence of a relationship between systemic
risk, CEOs, and non-CEOs compensation schemes.
The swift policy responses to regulate bank executive pay in the U.S.
and elsewhere is without precedent3, and remarkable because of the scant
evidence that bankers pay prior to the crisis correlated with risk and per-
formance during the crisis. Whereas some studies investigate the effects of
bank manager incentives and compensation on risk and performance, the
evidence is mostly confined to samples before 2006.4 The systemic turmoil
1 We consider two variants of systemic capital shortfall (Acharya et al., 2012; Brownlees
and Engle, 2012), ∆CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011), co-crash probabilities of indi-
vidual banks with the equity market based on extreme value theory (Hartmann et al., 2004b;
De Jonghe, 2010), and a simple Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipient indicator
(Duchin and Sosyura, 2012,0).
2 See also Henri (2006) on the influence of organizational culture differences and perform-
ance measurement in non-financial firms.
3 The U.S. Treasury installed binding compensation guidelines for all banks using TARP,
endorsed by Secretary Geitner, Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke, and President Obama.
4 Chen et al. (2006) contradict early evidence by Houston and James (1995) by showing for
a sample of 591 U.S. bank CEO-years between 1992 and 2000 that bank executives were
increasingly compensated in stock-options after deregulation. Subsequently, various mar-
ket risk measures derived from a CAPM model augmented with interest rates increased.
Chesney et al. (2012) emphasize the difference between equity and asset incentives of (bank)
executive pay. Only the latter considers leverage of the banking firm, which is central to the
theoretical prediction that owners and managers incentives are aligned at the expense of
debt holders. They show for a sample of U.S. financial institutions’ CEOs between 2003 and
2006 that asset incentives, measured as vega and delta, increased risk measured in terms
of loan write-downs. These metrics denote the dollar response in CEO stock and cumu-
lative stock option wealth in response to a 1% change in asset return volatility (vega) and
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in financial markets is illustrated best by the first concerted action of various
central banks to provide liquidity on August 7, 2007.
An important exception is Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), who show that
high-powered incentives of bank CEOs prior to the crisis did not lead to
worse bank performance during the crisis. They provide some evidence that
larger equity-based pay of 92 U.S. bank CEOs in 2006 did explain worse
performance during the crisis, measured in terms of buy-and-hold returns,
return on equity (RoE), and return on assets (RoA) between July 2007 and
December 2008. However, they do not find any correlation for option and
cash components of pay and performance. Based on the result that CEOs did
not shed stocks during the crisis period, some argue that high-powered in-
centives of senior management did not lead to excessive risk taking.5 Acrey
et al. (2011) consider bank risk more explicitly. They regress compensation
components of 84 U.S. bank CEOs in 2006 on variables used by prudential
supervisors to assess banks’ stability with so-called CAMEL ratings as well
as expected default frequencies calculated from market data in 2008. Their
results confirm Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) to the extent that they find no
relationship between option and cash compensation components with any
of these risk measures.
A possible explanation is that these studies consider idiosyncratic or sys-
tematic risk during the crisis. However, the concerns reflected by policy ac-
tions and the public pertain to large and important banks that exploit op-
portunities associated with systemic risk, which is particular to the banking
industry. John et al. (2000) show that neglecting managerial compensation
in the pricing of deposit insurance ex ante leads owners and managers to
excessive risk taking, which is shifted ultimately to tax payers. Freixas and
Rochet (2013) emphasize that the failure of depositors to monitor their bank
is in particular aggravated for systemically important financial institutions,
firm value (delta). Conventionally used equity incentives based on stock return volatility and
stock prices explain little risk-taking among financial institutions. DeYoung et al. (2013) find
that between 1994 and 2006, CEOs of U.S. commercial banks with high (equity) vega took
more risk measured in terms of riskier loan portfolios, larger fee-based income sources, and
more securitization activity.
5 A view criticized vocally by Bebchuk et al. (2010).
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which enjoy in addition to deposit insurance an implicit too-important-to-
fail guarantee. Such implicit insurances therefore generate incentives for
owners and incentive-aligned managers compensated in stocks and options
to exploit this externality in the form of loading systemic risk.
Our results show in line with Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) that mana-
gerial compensation traits prior to the crisis have no significant impact on
idiosyncratic bank profitability, equity returns, and return volatility during
the crisis. Likewise, cash bonuses, managerial ownership, and equity port-
folio risk sensitivity of CEOs have no effect on most systemic risk measures.
However in line with the concerns raised by John et al. (2000), Diamond
and Rajan (2009), and Freixas and Rochet (2013), we find that higher cash
bonuses of non-CEO executives increase all but one indicator of systemic
risk taking significantly. The consideration of bank executive pay beyond
the CEO therefore seems crucial in potential future regulation. These ef-
fects are driven by a subset of banks, which are systemically most import-
ant as measured by their contribution to aggregate capital shortfall of the
entire system.6 Analyzing compensation components separately, we find
that selected classical solutions to the agency problems between owners,
managers, and shareholders can be effective. Selected long-term incentives
for non-CEOs reduce systemic risk, namely larger stock option shares and
deferred earnings. Controlling for differences in corporate governance, im-
printing conditions reflected by the tenure of executives, and compensation
gaps between CEOs and non-CEOs does not alter these results.
This Chapter is organized as follows. We discuss executives’ incentives
and the sample of U.S. financial institutions in Section 3.2 before presenting
the methodologies to measure systemic risk in Section 3.3. We discuss results
in Section 3.4 and conclude in Section 3.5.
6 Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.
Executive Incentives and Compensation 49
3.2 Incentives, hypotheses, and data
3.2.1 Incentives and hypotheses
For non-financial firms, the two canonical agency conflicts are between share-
holders and managers and between shareholders and debt holders. The
seminal paper by Jensen and Murphy (1990) shows that the former is re-
solved if managers’ incentives are tied through incentive compensation to
the development of shareholder wealth, for instance by means of stock pay-
ments, or ‘skin in the game’.7
But the alignment of incentives pertaining to the first agency problem
can amplify the latter conflict between shareholders and debt holders. Under
limited liability, managers now share the risk-shifting incentives of equity
owners to depositors. This problem is particularly relevant in the presence
of deposit insurance, which eliminates the incentives of depositors to mon-
itor risk taking by manager-owners.
Deposit insurance thus represents an externality that shareholders and
incentive-aligned managers can exploit if the insurance premium is ill-designed.
In light of the Savings and Loans crisis in the U.S., John et al. (2000) showed
that the socially optimal premium of deposit insurance should depend ex
ante on management compensation to avoid excessive risk taking.8 Note
that it is sufficient for the optimal contract to state the equity and option
component rather than having to impose a certain cap on either the level or
the composition of compensation. Since 2007, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) calculates risk-based premiums for U.S. banks that are
7 If stock markets are efficient, managers have an incentive to maximize long-term perform-
ance of the firm when compensated in stocks (Murphy, 1999). Because stock prices incor-
porate all information about banks’ long term performance, a short-term focus reduces man-
agement’s wealth due to resulting lower stock prices. However, Jensen (2004) finds that the
overvaluation of equity in inefficient markets leads to misaligned incentives for manage-
ment to pursue shareholders’ interests. Thus, contracts in which managerial incentives are
seemingly aligned with shareholders’ interests are no guarantee for shareholder wealth max-
imizing choices by the management.
8 John et al. (2010) provide empirical evidence that it can be optimal for shareholders to
induce their management to engage in risk-shifting activities in order to increase the ‘put’
value of the deposit insurance provided by the FDIC.
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covered by the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF).
However, Freixas and Rochet (2013) develop a model where the bank in
question is too large to unwind. For such a systemically important financial
institution (SIFI), they show that shareholders will always have an incent-
ive to remunerate (new) managers with high performance bonuses, which
will lead to excessive risk taking. Such systemic risk charges are not part of
contemporaneous prudential regulation. Accordingly, they argue for even
tighter regulation in the hand of a central planner, a so-called Systemic Risk
Authority (SRA), which can limit bank executives’ pay and restructure the
SIFI, i.e. expropriate owners and replace managers. Neither deposit insur-
ance nor capital charges accounted (yet) for systemic risk nor did a SRA
exist with a far-reaching mandate during the financial crisis of 2007/2008.
Therefore, we hypothesize that the relation between larger ownership
shares of executives and higher equity-based compensation components with
systemic risk is positive. Alternatively, the possibility of losing the charter
because of failure became a real one after the Lehman collapse. Ex ante, bank
managers and owners that were uncertain about whether they qualified as
a SIFI might have been effectively disciplined by classical equity incentives.
Second, Bolton et al. (2006) show that managers may assign more weight to
the short-term performance of stock prices so as to benefit from speculative
behavior in the stock market. Therefore, we expect that short-term perform-
ance pay spur systemic risk taking. We follow Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011)
and measure short-term performance pay by cash bonuses.
However, the prospect of receiving bailout support by SIFI institutions
and its potential to induce moral hazard in risk-taking behavior by man-
agement may not be the full story to explain systemic risk formation. Issues
of internal bank governance and heterogeneity in incentives of managers at
various levels along the hierarchy within a bank may also affect the bank’s
risk position. Boot and Schmeits (2000) study the optimality of conglomer-
ation and argue that the benefit of coinsurance for divisions in a conglom-
erate induces management to no longer fully internalize their risk-taking
behavior. This change in behavior by division management can aggregate
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to excessive risk taking at the overall firm level. Esarey (2011) argues that it
is difficult for senior management to implement in bureaucratic institutions
adequate contracts that solve internal principal-agent problems among di-
visions’ management. In order to motivate managers to perform in such or-
ganizations competitive procedures over budget allocation are considered
by Esarey (2011).
In this light compensation of management is often tied to the perform-
ance of the division, department or business unit; in particular when it comes
to bonuses and equity-based compensation. The scope of the aforementioned
internal principal-agent problems is likely to depend on the relative size of
compensation tied to the manager’s performance and the extent with which
the CEO is concerned with internalizing the default risk of the firm. If the
CEO only partially internalizes the risk of default as a result of future bailout
prospects, there can be scope for division managers to not fully internalize
their risk-taking behavior. This situation has the potential to agravate the
problems associated with lack of internal bank governance and can lead to
additional systemic risk formation driven by divisions’ management taking
inefficient project as a result of coinsurance among divisions, or competi-
tion for a larger slice of the budget. This motivates us to include non-CEO
executives’ compensation schemes in the analysis in addition to the CEO’s.
3.2.2 Executive compensation data
To investigate if CEO and non-CEO compensation from before the crisis
contributed to systemic risk during the period between July 2007 through
December 2008, we closely follow Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) to construct
our sample and compensation proxies.9 Although the crisis did not end
by 2008, the period includes the substantial decline in banks’ stock prices,
the uncertainty about the stability of the whole system, and the responses
of central banks. Given the widespread bailout and governmental support
9 We derive systemic risk measures in Section 3.3 using market value data of financial firm
equity and the total return index of stocks from Thomson Reuter’s Datastream from 1992 to
2011.
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schemes to stabilize the financial system after 2008, we limit our sample
period until then.
We select financial firms with a Standard Industry Classification (SIC)
code between 6000 and 6300, which yields 92 unique financial firms avail-
able for analysis.10 We gather bank balance sheet data from the Orbis data-
base of Bureau Van Dijk. Table 3.1 reports summary statistics on these fin-
ancial accounts data.
10 We exclude SIC code 6292 because these firms are engaged solely in investment advice.
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics on balance and income sheet data
variable mean sd N p25 p50 p75
Values in millions of USD
Revenue 4,971.2 14,547.7 92 130.2 493.7 1,627.0
Gross income 1,637.1 5,140.4 92 33.3 149.5 460.6
Net Income 1,164.9 3,557.1 92 26.9 129.1 461.2
Cash Flow 40.8 32.8 78 25.2 38.5 110.5
Total Assets 91,473.8 301,405.5 92 1,885.0 6,081.5 17,899.9
Shareholder Funds 7,448.4 21,891.6 92 344.4 1,033.4 3,852.2
Deposit and short term funding 55,345.3 201,823.4 83 845.3 1,822.2 11,252.1
Values in percentages
Current ratio 1.0 2.9 58 0.2 0.3 0.8
Profit margin 32.1 19.0 92 20.5 32.5 44.0
Return on equity RoE 13.4 31.3 80 9.2 15.5 21.4
Consolidated return on equity 2.4 6.8 80 1.5 2.7 3.6
Net interest rate margin 2.2 2.3 75 1.3 2.8 3.6
Return on assets RoA 2.8 5.2 80 1.4 1.8 2.6
Buy & hold returns 15.31 16.89 91 4.85 14.01 24.26
Values in ratios
Current ratio 1.0 2.9 58 0.2 0.3 0.8
Total capital ratio 6.8 6.7 80 3.1 10.8 12.3
Price earnings ratio 14.0 23.4 80 8.0 11.9 18.9
Cost to income ratio 38.0 29.1 80 25.3 50.1 63.1
Solvency ratio 21.4 19.5 80 8.3 11.5 33.2
in persons
Number of employees 13,596.9 44,364.0 92 312.0 1,168.0 67,800.0
Notes: Table lists descriptive statistics for firm-specific variables and balance and in-
come sheet items for the fiscal year 2006. The source of the data is Bureau van Dijk’s Or-
bis database. The Profit margin is net income expressed as a percentage of revenue. return
on equity stands for the net income as a percentage of shareholders’ funds. Net interest
rate margin is the difference between interest income and costs as a percentage of loans
outstanding. Return on assets is net income expressed as a percentage of total assets. The
Current ratio is defined as the quotient of current assets and current liabilities. Total capital
ratio is defined as the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital divided by the Risk Based Assets
of the bank. Price-earnings ratio is calculated by the quotient of the share price and the
earnings per share. Cost-to-income ratio is the quotient of operating expenses and operat-
ing income. RoE is calculated by dividing the cumulative net income for the same period
through total book value of equity reported for June 2007, in percentages.
In line with the Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) sample, the average firm
is large with gross total assets of 91 billion USD and 13,597 employees on
average. They are sufficiently capitalized with mean capital ratios of 6.8%,
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realize around 13% return on equity, and none of the banks incurred a loss
in 2006.
The main variables of interest are executives’ compensation compon-
ents, which we obtain from the Execucomp database and which determines
the size of the final dataset. Table 3.2 summarizes the compensation data for
bank CEOs. Definitions of the variables presented in the table can be found
in Table 3.B.1.11
11 Sampled firms in Table 3.B.2 in the appendix are almost identical to Fahlenbrach and Stulz
(2011).
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Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics on CEO and non-CEO compensation
CEO executives non-CEO executives
variable (fiscal year, otherwise 2006) mean median sd N mean median sd N
Total annual compensation
Total compensation 6,771.3 3,191.3 8,550.5 92 3,389.4 1,310.1 6,643.3 412
Salary 716.2 745.6 267.4 92 386.4 341.8 345.2 412
Cash bonus 945.4 275.3 2,872.4 92 751.9 257.1 3,075.8 412
Non-equity incentives 1,072.3 345.3 1,940.7 92 423.3 78.8 894.6 412
Value of stock grant 1,930.1 339.2 3,939.0 88 758.3 525.9 1,621.2 403
Value of option grant 1,192.0 462.5 3,036.8 88 354.9 240.3 718.8 403
Total deferred earnings 660.8 146.0 2,762.9 79 172.6 0.0 645.4 368
Other compensation 335.1 115.0 1,274.6 92 229.6 41.8 883.4 375
Cash bonus / Salary∗ 1.5 0.5 6.0 92 1.6 0.7 5.7 412
Cash bonus / Salary∗ (2005) 2.5 1.0 6.0 91 2.1 0.8 4.2 408
Cash bonus / Salary∗ (2004) 1.8 1.0 2.5 83 1.8 0.8 3.1 357
Cash bonus / Salary∗ (2003) 2.0 0.9 4.1 77 1.6 0.7 2.9 326
Cash bonus / Salary∗ (2002) 1.7 0.7 3.1 66 1.5 0.7 2.9 265
Equity portfolio items
Value of total equity portfolio 127,051.5 29,170.8 379,534.7 92 20,676.1 3,191.9 116,520.5 412
Value of shares 99,148.4 4,791.0 362,895.8 92 10,828.3 2,945.3 109,907.8 412
Value of vested shares 1,703.0 846.2 5,118.9 88 617.4 191.5 1,447.6 403
Value of exercisable options 17,809.2 4,565.1 47,476.2 85 4,897.1 1,118.8 17,386.5 395
Value of unexercisable options 1,936.0 762.4 4,040.7 85 973.2 262.6 2,431.5 395
Value of unvested restricted stock 4,475.9 783.8 11,566.1 85 2,782.4 290.6 10,303.2 403
Value of equity incentive plan 1,979.0 645.3 4,910.5 82 577.8 0.0 1,950.6 375
Value of shares / Salary∗ 181.3 7.2 635.6 92 18.1 8.9 202.0 412
Value of total equity portfolio / 53.8 7.3 187.9 82 29.5 1.8 266.2 412
Total compensation∗
Equity portfolio incentives
Black-Scholes volatility of equity 0.2 0.2 0.1 92 0.2 0.0 0.1 412
Percentage ownership, 1.8 0.3 4.1 92 0.2 0.2 1.3 395
options excluded
Percentage ownership 2.4 0.5 4.3 92 0.2 0.0 1.1 395
Percentage ownership (2005) 2.3 0.5 4.2 92
Percentage ownership (2004) 1.4 0.4 3.8 86
Percentage ownership (2003) 1.3 0.6 4.1 79
Percentage ownership (2002) 1.3 0.0 3.3 68
Board and governance
Years in boardroom 4.6 5.0 0.9 92 3.7 5.0 1.8 412
Number of positions held 0.9 1.0 0.7 92 0.8 1.0 0.7 412
during years in boardroom
Board size (in persons) 5.4 5 0.9 92
Governance Index 10.1 10.0 2.7 78
Notes: Table lists descriptive statistics for executive compensation for the fiscal year 2006, or for
previous years stated subsequently in parentheses. All values are denoted in thousands of U.S.
dollars. Items indexed with superscript “*” denote ratios. The relatively high standard deviation
for Cash Bonus over Salary ratio of non-CEO executives is due to some institutions exhibiting
high ratio’s: Most notably Citigroup (16.1), Goldman Sachs (39.1), Morgan Stanley (27.46) and JP
Morgan Chase (18.1) for the fiscal year 2006. A full description of the variables can be found in
the appended Table 3.B.1.
Bank CEOs earned on average 6.8 million USD in 2006. The split across
different salary components underlines the importance of variable compens-
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ation. The ratio of total cash bonuses to total fixed salaries is 1.5 on average.
The wealth effect of stock and option portfolios is also large for bank CEOs.
The value of shares of the bank is 180 times the value of annual fixed salaries
and still a sizable factor of around 54 relative to total compensation. Equity
stakes of CEOs are around 2.4% on average, reflecting substantial ‘skin in
the game’ before the onset of the financial crisis.
The right panel in Table 3.2 shows the average values of compensation
levels and composition for non-CEO board executives. The level of com-
pensation is markedly lower at 3.4 million USD on average, but the ratio
of cash bonuses compared to fixed salary components is comparable (1.6).
Senior executives other than the CEO have substantially less skin in the
game. Equity portfolios are just worth a multiple of 18 relative to fixed salary
and 30 regarding all equity components relative to total compensation. The
average stake of other senior executives is on average only 20 basis points.
Non-CEOs incentives are thus much less aligned with long-term perform-
ance interests of non-management owners compared to CEOs.
3.3 Measuring systemic risk
3.3.1 Two measures of Systemic Capital Shortfall
We estimate an institution’s expected capital shortfall as in Acharya et al.
(2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2012) respectively. The metric gauges an
insufficient capital buffer of a financial institution to meet credit obligations
conditional on the entire financial system being distressed as reflected by
pronounced equity market declines.
Expected capital shortfall equals the expected amount a financial insti-
tution’s equity falls below a pre-specified target level of current total assets
in a given period, conditional on economic downturn. This target level is
denoted by k, total assets of institution i by ai, and the future market value
of equity over a horizon of p days by Epi . Current market value of equity
is denoted by ei and has a future random return R
p
i . We use a cumulative
market return index Rpm of the S&P 500 index to describe the state of the
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economy over the p day horizon. If the return of the market index falls be-
low the critical value κ, the economy is assumed to be in an adverse state.
Expected capital shortfall, CSpi , in a period of p days is defined as:
CSpi : = E[kai − Epi |Rpm < κ]
= kai − eiE[Rpi |Rpm < κ]. (3.1)
The current values of the threshold, total assets, and equity are observable.
Therefore, we only need to estimate a conditional expectation of the future
return of equity, also known as marginal expected shortfall, MESpi , to estim-
ate (3.1).12
We follow Brownlees and Engle (2012) and Acharya et al. (2012) and set
the critical threshold κ at minus twenty percent and the prudential asset
ratio k at eight percent. In addition, we estimate recursively quarterly mar-
ginal expected shortfalls for institutions to match the frequency with which
we observe the current values of total assets and total equity. Substitution
of the estimate of marginal expected shortfall in (3.1) for E[Rpi |Rpm < −20%]
yields the expected capital shortfall estimate:
ĈS
p
it = kai − ei M̂ES
p
i,t. (3.2)
Following the intuition of Acharya et al. (2012), an institution with a large
capital shortfall is likely to trigger financial distress of others. The systemic
risk measure of firm i at time t is defined as SRISKit = max{0, ĈSpit}. The






SCSit measures the relative weight of an institution in the formation of total
systemic capital shortfall among the considered institutions and takes val-





κ], denotes the change in the expected capital shortfall.
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ues between 0 and 100 percent. Two types of estimates of the systemic cap-
ital shortfall are used for the purpose of our analyses: a specification based
on the work of Brownlees and Engle (2012) (SCS1) and a parsimonious spe-
cification based on Acharya et al. (2012) (SCS2). The main difference is that
the former allows for time-variant return volatilities and correlations with
market returns. Dynamic volatility and correlation measures have the bene-
fit that periods of regular market conditions and adverse conditions can be
distinguished. Appendix 3.A.1 provides a complete outline of the methodo-
logies to calculate both measures of SCSit. Table 3.B.2 provides an overview
of estimated values of SCS1 for the sampled institutions. Bank of America,
Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley exhibit the largest values of
SCS1, we omitted SCS2 since it is almost identical to the reported SCS1. This
pattern is in line with the reported top ten systemically relevant financial
institutions on the V-lab website of NYU Stern.13
3.3.2 Conditional Value at Risk of the financial sector
The third measure of systemic risk is the conditional value at risk of the fin-
ancial sector at large as proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). One
of the main differences compared to the SCSit measures concerns direction-
ality. The systemic capital shortfall index is derived from the impact of the
market on an institution. The conditional value at risk measure of Adrian
and Brunnermeier (2011) is based on the influence of an institution on the
value at risk of the market.
The so-called CoVaRqsystem,t|i represents the value at risk of a market per-
formance index Xsystem,t conditional on the event in which the perform-
ance of an institution i, Xit, is about to fall short beyond a critical threshold
in a particular week.14 As threshold we use the value at risk of the insti-
13 Based on reported values: http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/risk/.
14 We use the growth rate of the market value of total assets as bank performance measure.
Market performance is measured by the average growth rate of market valued assets of all
sampled institutions weighed by respective market valued total assets, see the appended
Section 3.A.2 for details.
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it) of the system is then implicitly defined by the
probability of adverse market performance
P{Xsystem,t ≤ CoVaRqsystem,t|i|Xit = VaR
q
it} = q,
where q denotes a pre-specified quantile. We are interested in an institution’s







− CoVaRqsystem,t|i(Xit = median(Xit)), (3.4)
which measures the sensitivity of the sector’s value at risk to the distress of a
particular financial institution i. Financial distress is defined as a departure
in performance from median performance to a value at which the institu-
tion is considered to be at risk. If the value of ∆CoVaRqsystem,t|i is negligible,
the market’s critical value is hardly affected by the distress of institution i.
A negative value indicates that the value at risk is more substantial under
adverse conditions for institution i. Section 3.A.2 in the appendix contains a
detailed outline of the method to estimate (3.4).
3.3.3 Co-crash probability
The fourth measure of systemic risk is the so-called co-crash probability
(CCP). It is derived from extreme value theory and used, for example, by De
Jonghe (2010). CCP measures the likelihood of a large decline of an institu-
tion’s stock price jointly with an extreme downturn of market performance.
We use multivariate extreme value theory to estimate the joint probability of
such a rare event of extreme stock return declines, Rit, and market portfolio




return declines, Rmt, on day t. The co-crash probability is of the type
Prob[Rit < xi ∩ Rmt < xj], (3.5)
where xi and xj are the threshold levels that denote the extreme event.
The estimation procedure of (3.5) is outlined in detail in Chapter 2 of
this book. Note that in our estimation procedure, which is based on the
work of Draisma et al. (2004) and Drees et al. (2004), we are not required
to specify the threshold values xi and xj. These values are determined en-
dogenously by the estimation procedure that aims to minimise the bias in
estimating (3.5), and has the added advantage that the researcher does not
specify, which events are regarded as extreme events.
3.3.4 Troubled Asset Relief Program
The final measure of systemic risk is a simple indicator of whether a finan-
cial institution tapped into the so-called TARP funds. Duchin and Sosyura
(2012,0) show that not all banks that applied for TARP were also granted
equity. Similar to Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), we therefore argue that the
use of these emergency funds indicates which banks were considered im-
portant enough by the treasury to receive support.
3.4 Results
Table 3.3 shows descriptive statistics for all five measures of systemic risk as
well as idiosyncratic performance measures. Volatility risk is calculated by
taking the average of monthly calculated standard deviations of the total re-
turn index for each institution in the sample from July 2007 through Decem-
ber 2008. Returns on assets and equity are calculated as explained in Table
3.1 and buy-and-hold returns are obtained as in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011).
Reflecting the considered crisis period, profitability measures are negative,
thereby illustrating the strain on the financial system during July 2007 and
December 2008.
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Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics of performance measures
variable mean sd N p25 p50 p75
Idiosyncratic performance measures
Volatility risk % 0.14 0.09 92 0.10 0.12 0.15
RoA % -1.61 3.98 83 -3.94 -0.83 1.03
RoE % -4.79 16.60 83 -13.70 -1.89 7.50
Buy & hold returns % -30.83 15.11 79 -42.43 -29.40 -19.57
Systemic risk measures
SCS1 % 0.91 2.83 92 0.03 0.08 0.24
SCS2 % 0.89 2.79 92 0.03 0.08 0.23
∆CoVaR % -1.54 0.72 92 -2.07 -1.41 -1.05
CCP bp 159.45 64.51 91 110.59 157.93 200.73
TARP recipient {0, 1} 0.49 0.50 92 0 0 1
Notes: Table lists descriptive statistics across institutions for performance
measures and systemic risk variables for the period July 2007 through Decem-
ber 2008. Volatility risk is the average of monthly calculated standard devi-
ations of the total return index for each institution in the sample from July
2007 through December 2008. Buy and hold returns, are the total returns as-
sociated with owning a stock through this period. SCS1 denotes the capital
shortfall according to Brownlees and Engle (2012) and SCS2 is the parsimo-
nious estimate suggested by Acharya et al. (2012). ∆CoVaR is the conditional
value at risk measure of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). CCP stands for the
joint probability of the event where both the institution and the market ex-
perience an extreme negative return. TARP recipient denotes a dummy that
indicates ‘1’ if the institution received support from the Tarp or not ‘0’.
Both SCR measures are in line with the summary statistics reported in
Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2012). The mean of the
∆CoVaR measure is also similar to the -1% reported in Adrian and Brun-
nermeier (2011). The joint co-crash probabilities of the institutions’ returns
and the market index returns average 159 basis points and have a standard
deviation of 65 basis points between July 2007 and December 2008.
3.4.1 Conventional performance
Table 3.4 shows the results from OLS regressions that explain conventional
profitability-based performance measures during the crisis with executives’
compensation components from 2006. We focus on cash bonuses as a share
of total salary to gauge short-term incentives, ownership shares as the clas-
sical alignment device between principals and agents, and equity incentives
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measured by the portfolio risk of the manager in terms of volatility sensitiv-
ity. Correlations between explanatory variables are presented in Table 3.B.3.
Table 3.4. Performance and past executive compensation
Dependent variable: RoA RoA RoA RoA RoE Buy &
hold return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO compensation
Cash bonus / Salary 0.001 -0.016 -0.016 -0.131 0.128
[0.041] [0.038] [0.044] [0.178] [0.212]
Percentage ownership 0.150** 0.035 0.042 0.223 -0.610
[0.060] [0.071] [0.071] [0.303] [0.400]
non-CEO compensation
Cash bonus / Salary 0.006 -0.001 0.043 0.269
[0.060] [0.080] [0.326] [0.303]
Percentage ownership -0.053 -0.298 -0.804 3.952
[0.720] [0.742] [2.943] [3.456]
Overall compensation
Black-Scholes volatility 2.056 3.224 1.275 3.566 2.194 -2.843
of equity [4.249] [3.995] [3.960] [3.997] [6.124] [3.273]
Institution variables






Book to Market ratio -5.655** -6.702*** -5.675** -8.503** -6.249**
[2.675] [2.407] [2.720] [4.485] [3.093]
log(Market value) 0.065 -0.096 0.051 0.345 -1.793
[0.373] [0.403] [0.407] [1.655] [1.319]
Total capital ratio -0.003 0.003 -0.004 0.004 0.138
[0.020] [0.020] [0.021] [0.078] [0.094]
Constant -2.328** -0.309 1.810 -0.196 0.600 -4.964
[1.051] [3.782] [3.971] [4.065] [16.657] [13.314]
Observations 83 82 83 82 82 78
R2 0.040 0.144 0.156 0.144 0.148 0.135
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.063 0.078 0.037 0.042 0.021
Notes: Table reports cross-sectional regression results, ordinary least squares, of an insti-
tution’s return on assets calculated for the period July 2007 through December 2008 on ex-
ecutive compensation variables and controls that cover the fiscal year 2006. The last two
columns’ specifications have return on equity as dependent variable for the period July 2007
through December 2008, and buy-and-hold total returns for the institution’s stock which cov-
ers the same period. The variables under non-CEO compensation are mean values taken among
non-CEO executives of an institution. Heteroscedastic robust standard errors are reported in
brackets. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote respectively significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and
10 percent level.
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The first two columns in Table 3.4 show that the cross-sectional disper-
sion in RoA during the crisis is primarily explained by firm-specific factors
rather than any of the five executive compensation traits. Specifically, larger
book-to-market ratios prior to the crisis depress profitability, as in Fahlen-
brach and Stulz (2011). Larger cash bonuses in 2006 exhibit in no specific-
ation any significant correlation with profitability during the crisis. Larger
CEO ownership is also insignificant when controlling for firm-specific traits.
Finally, we also do not find a significant effect of equity portfolio risk in the
managers’ portfolios as in the conventional pay-performance literature.16
Columns (3) and (4) tests whether non-CEO executive pay matters, as
suggested by Kim et al. (2011). Contrary to their study of stock price crashes
among non-financial firms, we do also not find any evidence that bank RoA
is significantly influenced by non-CEO pay. To compare our results with
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), we show in columns (5) and (6) results that
explain the cross-sectional variation in RoE and buy-and-hold returns. Only
book-to-market ratios exhibit (negative) explanatory power, thereby con-
firming their results.
3.4.2 Systemic and idiosyncratic risk
The absence of a relationship between executive compensation and idio-
syncratic bank performance during the crisis confirms previous evidence
in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and Acrey et al. (2011). Next, we turn to
the regressions explaining the five alternative systemic risk measures. Table
3.5 shows cross-sectional estimations specifying the contribution to systemic
capital shortfall as the dependent variable in columns (1) through (5). Next
to compensation components, we specify bank-specific controls for the prof-
itability, value, and size of the banking firm similar to Fahlenbrach and Stulz
(2011).
16 Equity risk denotes a standard deviation volatility estimate of equity calculated over 60
months and derived from implied Black-Scholes values for options.
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Table 3.5. Contribution to systemic risk and executive compensation
Systemic Capital Shortfall Additional systemic risk measures and volatility risk
Method: OLS OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent variable: SCS1 SCS1 SCS1 SCS2 SCS2 ∆CoVaR CCP Tarp Volatility
Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CEO compensation
Cash bonus / Salary 0.108** -0.060 -0.059 -0.059 -0.036*** -1.565** -0.006 -0.001
[0.041] [0.067] [0.066] [0.045] [0.011] [0.743] [0.004] [0.001]
Percentage ownership 0.061 0.047 0.046 0.062 0.035** -1.548 0.003 0.003*
[0.054] [0.051] [0.051] [0.056] [0.013] [1.237] [0.017] [0.002]
non-CEO compensation
Cash bonus / Salary 0.206*** 0.255** 0.240** 0.189** 0.049*** 2.622** 0.018** 0.002*
[0.073] [0.113] [0.112] [0.091] [0.016] [1.088] [0.007] [0.001]
Percentage ownership 0.454 0.299 0.292 -0.012 -0.397*** -2.022 -0.071 -0.038*
[0.493] [0.453] [0.449] [0.562] [0.149] [12.685] [0.144] [0.021]
Overall compensation
Black-Scholes volatility 2.735 0.622 1.239 1.264 2.219 0.488 128.731 -0.647 0.093
of equity [2.181] [1.781] [1.677] [1.664] [2.349] [0.793] [81.930] [0.592] [0.071]
Institution variables
RoA -0.002 -0.010 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 0.001 2.524*** 0.002 -0.000
[0.031] [0.028] [0.025] [0.025] [0.029] [0.010] [0.688] [0.013] [0.001]
Book to Market ratio 3.066** 2.041** 2.718** 2.696** 2.871** -0.089 -1.174 -0.222 0.126*
[1.205] [1.013] [1.226] [1.240] [1.302] [0.414] [36.921] [0.269] [0.074]
log(Market value) 1.233*** 0.988** 1.066** 1.066** 1.192** -0.221*** 20.253*** -0.001 -0.010
[0.392] [0.376] [0.407] [0.412] [0.448] [0.077] [5.077] [0.044] [0.008]
Total capital ratio -0.025** -0.016* -0.018* -0.018* -0.021* 0.006* 0.139 -0.004 -0.001
[0.011] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011] [0.003] [0.317] [0.004] [0.001]
Constant -11.103*** -8.444** -9.540** -9.535** -10.713** 0.030 -46.523 0.805* 0.166**
[3.650] [3.325] [3.758] [3.800] [4.152] [0.772] [62.613] [0.463] [0.071]
Observations 78 79 78 78 78 81 78 83 78
R2 0.531 0.578 0.596 0.585 0.584 0.334 0.388 0.094 0.166
Adjusted R2 0.485 0.536 0.543 0.530 0.249 0.307 -0.018 0.056
H0 : Underidentifcation 14.798*
Hansen J statistic 6.793
Notes: Table reports cross-sectional regression results, ordinary least squares, of various systemic risk
measures on past characteristics of institutions. Column (7) displays the marginal effects of a logit re-
gression. The systemic risk measures are calculated for the period July 2007 through December 2008 and
executive compensation variables and other controls cover the fiscal year 2006. The variables under non-
CEO compensation are mean values taken among non-CEO executives of an institution. Heteroscedastic
robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote respectively significantly different
from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Identification in the specification in (5) is achieved by hav-
ing the regressors uncorrelated with the product of heteroskedastic errors (Lewbel, 2012), we specify the
non-CEO compensation variables ‘Cash bonus / Salary’ as endogenous. The test statistic for the Under-
identification test is Chi-squared distributed with degrees of freedom equal to one plus the number of
excluded instruments minus endogenous regressors (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006).
Columns (1) to (3) specify SCS calculated according to Brownlees and
Engle (2012), which allows for time-variant return correlation. Column (4)
and (5) features the SCS measure of Acharya et al. (2012) based on a parsi-
monious calculation of marginal expected shortfalls that uses the average
return for those days in which the market performed ‘bad’.
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Contrary to the profitability regressions, all four regressions show that
the level of cash bonus payments relative to fixed salary influences SCS sig-
nificantly positive. Recall that SCS denotes each individual institution’s con-
tribution to the total quantum of systemic risk, which is on average around
90 basis points (see Table 3.3). The result in column (1) implies that an in-
crease in the cash bonus ratio for CEOs by one increases this contribution by
11 basis points. The results in column (2) show that non-CEO bonus hikes
have an even larger effect of 21 basis points. Thus, higher bonus components
in total compensation of bank executives prior to the crisis had an undesir-
able positive effect on systemic risk, which is in line with the detrimental
effects of short-term incentives stressed in Jensen (2004), Bolton et al. (2006),
and Freixas and Rochet (2013).
The joint specification of bonus shares of CEOs and non-CEOs in column
(3) shows, however, that it is the cash compensation of the latter that matter
for systemic risk according to systemic capital shortfall. Whereas the coef-
ficient of CEO bonus shares turns insignificant, the effect for non-CEOs in-
creases to 26 basis points. This result underscores the argument of Diamond
and Rajan (2009), Kim et al. (2011), and The Economist (2012) that CEOs
of large, complex financial institutions might not even be able to discipline
other high-powered managers. Incentives of the latter to take excessive sys-
temic risk appear to crowd out any potentially aligned incentives of the CEO
itself. Thus, any regulation aiming to restrict only CEOs of banks might fall
short to tame systemically relevant financial institutions as argued for by
Freixas and Rochet (2013).
Column (4) shows that this relationship is not due to the permission of
changing return correlations underlying the SCS measure by Brownlees and
Engle (2012). Here, we specify the parsimonious systemic risk contribution
according to Acharya et al. (2012), which confirms that only non-CEO bo-
nus shares exert a significantly positive, and economically relevant effect on
systemic risk formation.
Other managerial compensation components, in turn, remain insignific-
ant. More skin in the game as reflected by the percentage ownership share of
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both CEOs and non-CEOs does not influence systemic risk. Likewise, higher
risks in the equity portfolio of managers does also not induce more systemic
risk taking. Overall, we find therefore little evidence that aligning incentives
of managers through ownership in the vein of Jensen and Murphy (1990) is
effective to curtail systemic risk formation.
Column (5) presents the same specification as in Column (4), but differs
in the sense that we instrumented the Cash Bonus over Salary of non-CEO
executives. Despite the use of control variables the compensation variables
may still be endogenous as a result of third factors that potentially drive
both systemic risk formation as well as executives’ compensation schemes.
Some features of the firm are hard to control for but are potentially correl-
ated with the explanatory variables. In particular when it comes to factors
that are hard to measure or suffer from measurement error such as cultural
factors. In response to these issues we employ the method proposed by Lew-
bel (2012) where identification is achieved by having the regressors uncor-
related with the product of heteroskedastic errors. This approach is likely
to be somewhat less reliable then identification based upon the use of ap-
propriate instruments. However, these instruments must be uncorrelated
with the error term and at the same time must exhibit meaningful correl-
ations with the compensation data. In light of the current ongoing debate
on how to measure systemic risk in which no consensus is reached yet as
to what exactly causes systemic risk formation, we retain a skeptical view
with regard to availability of plausible identifying restrictions and resort to
identification based on the exogeneity assumption of higher moments of the
error term. Results in Column (5) do not differ substantially from Column
(4), and corroborate the finding that non-CEO bonus shares exert a signific-
antly positive and economically relevant effect on systemic risk formation.
Tests for over and under identification provide evidence that supports the
validity of the identification strategy.
An important caveat on the generalizability of these results pertains to
the challenge how to measure systemic risk. We therefore show the relation-
ship between managerial compensation and firm traits with three alternat-
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ive indicators in columns (6) through (8). With the exception of ∆CoVaR,
the detrimental effects of short-term cash incentives for non-CEOs is con-
firmed. Both the tail risk of a co-crash probability between financial insti-
tutions and the market as well as the likelihood to tap TARP funds dur-
ing the crisis respond positively to higher cash compensation of non-CEOs
prior to the crisis. Likewise, the absence of risk-reducing effects of more skin
in the game is also confirmed. These results therefore indicate that despite
the challenges to gauge systemic risk, especially short-term cash incentives
among non-CEOs deserve closer attention.
The results for ∆CoVaR warrant caution, the inference depends greatly
on how we define systemic risk. Recall that lower values of ∆CoVaR indicate
a higher sensitivity of the systems value at risk with respect to the distress
of an individual institution. Contrary to all other specifications, our results
indicate that both cash compensation as well as equity stakes of CEOs cor-
relate significantly with this measure of systemic risk. Specifically, the res-
ults indicate contrary to the findings for SCS, CCP, and simple TARP in-
dicators that larger cash bonuses of CEOs increase the system’s sensitivity
whereas more skin in the game reduce it. This result therefore suggests that
also CEOs compensation is of relevance. Regarding non-CEO compensa-
tion, however, we also find that larger cash components actually increase
∆CoVaR (i.e. reduce systemic risk sensitivity) whereas larger equity stakes
of non-CEOs have the opposite effect. The divergent inference based on this
measure of systemic risk is interesting and further research on why popular
measures differ, such as SCS and ∆CoVaR, is important.
Column (9) shows that except for∆CoVaR, systemic risk measures gauge
something else than idiosyncratic risk. Both the bonus share as well as a
larger percentage ownership by non-CEOs affects bank-specific risk as ex-
pected on the basis of agency theory, albeit with less statistical significance
and lower magnitude compared to systemic risk regressions. Whereas lar-
ger short-term bonuses increase volatility risk significantly, a larger equity
stake of managers aligns interests with shareholders to the extent that volat-
ility risk is reduced. The risk of managers’ equity portfolios remains insig-
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nificant. Thus, classical instruments to solve agency conflicts may work for
idiosyncratic risks in the financial industry, but not necessarily for systemic
risk.
One potential concern is that not all the financial firms sampled are
banks, but also include financial services firms that might not be subject to
the incentives borne out by, for example, deposit insurance. Table 3.6 there-
fore replicates the baseline results for the approximately 60 banks only.
Table 3.6. Systemic risk and executive compensation for banks only
Dependent variable: SCS1 SCS1 SCS1 SCS2 ∆CoVaR CCP Tarp Volatility
Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CEO compensation
Cash bonus / Salary 0.103** -0.053 -0.051 -0.035*** -1.583** -0.009*** -0.001
[0.041] [0.067] [0.066] [0.009] [0.626] [0.003] [0.001]
Percentage ownership 0.095 0.073 0.073 0.048*** -1.834 -0.015 0.002
[0.065] [0.063] [0.063] [0.017] [1.681] [0.016] [0.002]
non-CEO compensation
Cash bonus / Salary 0.198*** 0.235** 0.220* 0.039** 2.461** 0.026*** 0.002*
[0.073] [0.111] [0.111] [0.016] [1.148] [0.007] [0.001]
Percentage ownership 1.381 1.371 1.365 -0.145 28.387 -0.119 -0.088*
[0.825] [0.868] [0.871] [0.272] [21.429] [0.224] [0.048]
Overall compensation
Black-Scholes volatility 1.532 -1.588 0.187 0.254 2.380** 219.807 -2.701*** 0.096
of equity [3.742] [2.842] [2.857] [2.842] [1.041] [138.786] [0.682] [0.123]
Institution variables
RoA -0.007 -0.035 -0.031 -0.031 0.002 1.643 -0.012 0.001
[0.036] [0.043] [0.031] [0.030] [0.012] [0.995] [0.011] [0.002]
Book to Market ratio 3.490** 1.936 3.091** 3.063* 0.381 -4.458 -0.692** 0.139
[1.478] [1.277] [1.525] [1.545] [0.553] [50.788] [0.300] [0.100]
log(Market value) 1.396*** 1.188*** 1.316*** 1.316** -0.140 21.989*** -0.052 -0.017
[0.432] [0.436] [0.487] [0.493] [0.094] [6.549] [0.048] [0.013]
Total capital ratio -0.025* -0.008 -0.013 -0.012 0.005 0.409 0.005 -0.001
[0.015] [0.014] [0.012] [0.012] [0.003] [0.361] [0.004] [0.001]
Constant -12.498*** -9.761** -11.799** -11.799** -1.348 -82.944 1.919*** 0.235*
[4.081] [3.832] [4.646] [4.702] [1.064] [92.425] [0.530] [0.119]
Observations 59 60 59 59 61 59 61 59
R2 0.561 0.610 0.631 0.620 0.370 0.409 0.217 0.204
Adjusted R2 0.500 0.557 0.563 0.550 0.258 0.300 0.079 0.058
Notes: Table reports cross-sectional regression results, ordinary least squares, of various sys-
temic risk measures on past characteristics for banks only. Column (7) displays the marginal
effects of a logit regression. The systemic risk measures are calculated for the period July 2007
through December 2008 and executive compensation variables and other controls cover the fiscal
year 2006.The variables under non-CEO compensation are mean values taken among non-CEO ex-
ecutives of an institution. Heteroscedastic robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ‘***’,
‘**’ and ‘*’ denote respectively significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
Results are virtually identical regarding significance, magnitude, and
direction compared to those shown in Table 3.5. We therefore continue to
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assess the entire sample of financial institutions, and refer to them synonym-
ously as banks.
In sum, systemic risk responds differently to compensation traits com-
pared to idiosyncratic risk. Especially short-term cash compensation of non-
CEOs seems to induce systemic risk taking. Whereas most systemic risk
measures suggest this relationship, the deviating results for ∆CoVaR em-
phasize the importance how to measure systemic risk for policy making.
3.4.3 Robustness
Extremely important banks
Henceforth, we focus on the SCS with time-variant correlation as our main
measure of systemic risk. An important feature of the systemic risk indicator
SCS, but also others, that is shown in Table 3.B.2 of the appendix is the large
skew across banks. Put differently, the four most important contributors to
systemic capital shortfall account for just about half of the entire systemic
risk quantum in the system.
We argue, however, that these four very large contributors to systemic
risk are not outliers in the classical sense that should be excluded from
the analysis. The result underlines instead the skewed industry structure
where fairly few financial firms account for the major share of activity, a
phenomenon that is not restricted to the financial industry (see Gabaix, 2011,
for the pervasive presence of Zipf’s Law in finance and economics). Accord-
ingly, we consider it plausible that also the major share of aggregate sys-
temic risk is mostly accounted for by only relatively few, very important
banks. To accommodate, however, the non-normal distribution of SCS, we
show in Table 3.7 results where we regress compensation and other controls
on the log of SCS.
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Table 3.7. Contribution to log scaled systemic risk and executive compens-
ation
Dependent variable: log(SCS1) log(SCS1) log(SCS1) log(SCS2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO compensation
Cash bonus / Salary 0.012*** -0.007** -0.007*
[0.004] [0.003] [0.004]
Percentage ownership -0.046* -0.051* -0.048**
[0.027] [0.027] [0.024]
non-CEO compensation
Cash bonus / Salary 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.028***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007]
Percentage ownership 0.068 0.164 0.190
[0.207] [0.191] [0.179]
Overall compensation
Black-Scholes volatility 1.017 0.010 0.701 0.872
of equity [0.787] [0.704] [0.727] [0.748]
Institution variables
RoA 0.030* 0.026 0.028 0.029**
[0.016] [0.019] [0.017] [0.014]
Book to Market ratio 2.326*** 2.580*** 2.296*** 2.261***
[0.464] [0.498] [0.466] [0.464]
log(Market value) 1.016*** 1.020*** 1.002*** 1.011***
[0.048] [0.054] [0.052] [0.052]
Total capital ratio -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.038***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Constant -11.184*** -11.265*** -11.038*** -11.154***
[0.594] [0.609] [0.612] [0.603]
Observations 78 79 78 78
R2 0.931 0.925 0.934 0.936
Adjusted R2 0.924 0.918 0.925 0.927
Notes: Table reports cross-sectional regression results, ordinary least
squares, of various systemic risk measures on past characteristics of institu-
tions. Column (7) displays the marginal effects of a logit regression. The sys-
temic risk measures are calculated for the period July 2007 through December
2008 and executive compensation variables and other controls cover the fiscal
year 2006.The variables under non-CEO compensation are mean values taken
among non-CEO executives of an institution. Heteroscedastic robust standard
errors are reported in brackets. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote respectively significantly
different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
The results corroborate the positive effect of non-CEO cash bonuses on
systemic risk contribution. The semi-elasticity of the cash bonus share with
respect to SCS is 0.03. That is, increasing the ratio of cash bonuses to the
fixed salary component by 1 percentage point increases systemic risk by 3
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basis points, which is a reasonably important effect in light of mean SCS of
around 90 basis points.
In addition, the semi-log specification indicates that both larger cash bo-
nuses and higher equity stakes for CEOs actually reduce systemic risk tak-
ing. The latter result is in line with the notion that skin in the game dis-
ciplines managers. Certain classical instruments to align incentives between
owners and managers may therefore also be useful to align the interest of the
public to contain systemic risks with those of managers. Note, however, the
confirmation of diverging effects between CEOs and non-CEOs. The results
from the semi-log model corroborate that a firmer understanding potential
intra-firm agency conflicts require further theoretical and empirical research
to inform policy.17
Compensation and systemic risk over time
Another potential concern is that the relationship between cash components
of non-CEOs and SCS is driven by extreme market movements in certain
phases during the crisis. Table 3.8 shows therefore separate regressions for
each quarter after the first concerted liquidity provision by central banks in
q3:2007.
17 Clearly, especially for financial firms more granular compensation data on actual risk
takers, e.g. traders and brokers, would be desirable to investigate. Such data is unfortunately
not available for this sample. Instead, we attempted to separate certain executive functions
that should be pivotal in influencing systemic risk-taking, such as Chief Risk Officers and
Chief Financial Officers. Unfortunately, the data does not permit a sufficiently precise iden-
tification of these functions. Out of the 92 firms and 412 non-CEO executive observations,
we could infer on the basis of sparsely filled job titles only for less than 25% of the firms the
aforementioned functions.
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Table 3.8. Systemic Capital Shortfall throughout the Global Financial
Crisis
Dependent variable: SCS1
Quarter: 2007 - 2007 - 2008 - 2008 - 2008 - 2008 -
quarter 3 quarter 4 quarter 1 quarter 2 quarter 3 quarter 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO compensation
Cash bonus / Salary -0.132* -0.101 -0.069 -0.070 -0.065 -0.035
[0.078] [0.081] [0.070] [0.070] [0.066] [0.062]
Percentage ownership 0.045 0.046 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.047
[0.051] [0.051] [0.052] [0.051] [0.051] [0.050]
non-CEO compensation
Cash bonus / Salary 0.352*** 0.326** 0.283** 0.283** 0.262** 0.183*
[0.125] [0.129] [0.117] [0.117] [0.112] [0.107]
Percentage ownership 0.250 0.254 0.257 0.253 0.247 0.226
[0.437] [0.443] [0.446] [0.443] [0.436] [0.424]
Overall compensation
Black-Scholes volatility 1.572 1.509 1.398 1.386 1.367 1.378
of equity [1.700] [1.752] [1.741] [1.731] [1.701] [1.679]
Institution variables
RoA -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.025] [0.024]
Book to Market ratio 2.586** 2.588** 2.642** 2.619** 2.599** 2.473**
[1.119] [1.121] [1.177] [1.171] [1.158] [1.153]
log(Market value) 1.081*** 1.078*** 1.081** 1.073** 1.071** 1.068**
[0.403] [0.406] [0.415] [0.413] [0.406] [0.403]
Total capital ratio -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Constant -9.644** -9.612** -9.627** -9.555** -9.521** -9.410**
[3.710] [3.733] [3.820] [3.796] [3.732] [3.700]
Observations 78 79 78 78 81 78
R2 0.616 0.607 0.609 0.609 0.604 0.567
Adjusted R2 0.565 0.555 0.556 0.557 0.551 0.509
Notes: Table reports cross-sectional regression results, ordinary least squares, of an institution’s
contribution to systemic capital shortfall calculated for the quarters in the period July 2007 through
December 2008 on executive compensation variables and controls that cover the fiscal year 2006.The
variables under non-CEO compensation are mean values taken among non-CEO executives of an
institution. Heteroscedastic robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote
respectively significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
The results show that the effect of cash compensation of non-CEO traits
at year-end 2006 was strongest in the first crisis quarter considered and de-
clined somewhat over time. The absence of ownership or equity portfolio
effects as well as CEO payment effects is also confirmed. Thus, the import-
ance of potentially negative effects of non-CEO cash compensation seems
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fairly robust and not due to specific time periods.
In Table 3.9 we evaluate the implications of compensation schemes prior
to the fiscal year 2006, while keeping the institutional controls fixed for the
year 2006. Results are in line with the findings reported in Table 3.5 and
indicate that the effect of cash compensation for non-CEOs is robust across
fiscal years prior to 2006. Note that the drop in observations in columns
(1) and (2) highlights that compensation items are reported more sparsely
than for the years 2004 and later. Furthermore, observations on percentage
ownership data for non-CEOs are mainly not reported and are therefore
excluded from the analysis.
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Table 3.9. Systemic Capital Shortfall and past executive compensation
Dependent variable: SCS1
Compensation for the year 2002 2003 2004 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Compensation in considered year
CEO compensation
Cash bonus / Salary -0.169** 0.215 0.050 -0.093
[0.067] [0.183] [0.215] [0.064]
Percentage ownership 0.119** 0.130** 0.046 0.032
[0.067] [0.051] [0.299] [0.174]
non-CEO compensation
Cash bonus / Salary 0.698*** 0.307** 0.347*** 0.398***
[0.115] [0.149] [0.097] [0.133]
Percentage ownership
Overall compensation
Black-Scholes volatility 4.361*** 1.400 2.125 1.717
of equity [1.548] [2.726] [1.983] [1.889]
Controls for the fiscal year 2006
Institution variables
RoA 0.032 0.016 -0.056 -0.015
[0.022] [0.027] [0.057] [0.027]
Book to Market ratio 2.908** 2.885** 2.696** 2.115**
[1.388] [1.377] [1.061] [1.038]
log(Market value) 0.941** 0.892** 0.998** 0.928**
[0.448] [0.411] [0.405] [0.400]
Total capital ratio -0.026*** -0.024* -0.012 -0.013
[0.010] [0.014] [0.011] [0.009]
Constant -9.609** -8.643** -9.400** -8.403**
[4.266] [4.088] [3.743] [3.714]
Observations 54 60 67 74
R2 0.801 0.701 0.602 0.607
Adjusted R2 0.765 0.655 0.548 0.559
Notes: Table reports cross-sectional regression results, ordinary least
squares, of an institution’s contribution to systemic capital shortfall
calculated for the period July 2007 through December 2008 on execut-
ive compensation variables and controls that cover the fiscal year 2006.
The compensation variables correspond with the above mentioned
fiscal years. The variables under non-CEO compensation are mean val-
ues taken among non-CEO executives of an institution. Percentage
ownership of non-CEOs is excluded because values are mainly miss-
ing. Heteroscedastic robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote respectively significantly different from zero at
the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
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Corporate governance and imprinting conditions
The recurring result that non-CEO cash bonuses influence systemic risk sig-
nificantly while CEO bonuses do not may be related to differences in the
governance structure across financial firms. If the argument of Diamond and
Rajan (2009) holds that some CEOs were unable to control their subordin-
ates, stronger shareholder governance or more experience may mitigate the
effect.
Table 3.10 provides further robustness checks concerning differences in
the corporate governance and imprinting conditions of executives across
banks that may explain cross-sectional differences in systemic risk taking
during the crisis.
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Table 3.10. Corporate governance and imprinting conditions
Dependent variable: SCS1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CEO compensation
Cash bonus / Salary -0.045 -0.059 -0.059 -0.068 -0.055
[0.064] [0.069] [0.070] [0.069] [0.078]
Percentage ownership 0.040 0.025 0.040 0.041 0.030
[0.076] [0.055] [0.048] [0.052] [0.080]
non-CEO compensation
Cash bonus / Salary 0.228** 0.259** 0.254** 0.269** 0.257*
[0.108] [0.119] [0.119] [0.106] [0.129]
Percentage ownership 0.601 0.287 0.374 0.228 0.462
[0.650] [0.509] [0.521] [0.434] [0.735]
Governance indicators
Governance index -0.146** -0.093
[0.066] [0.060]
CEO number of years -0.115 -0.140
in the board [0.272] [0.317]
non-CEO average number of 0.496* 0.476
years in the board [0.272] [0.317]
CEO number of -0.064 -0.220
positions held [0.346] [0.417]
non-Ceo average number of 0.684 0.521
positions held [0.495] [0.502]
Board size 0.329 0.604
in persons [0.434] [0.528]
Overall compensation
Black-Scholes volatility 1.006 2.761 1.420 0.221 -0.033
of equity [1.806] [2.315] [1.954] [2.213] [3.144]
Institution variables
RoA -0.014 -0.002 -0.017 -0.010 -0.020
[0.040] [0.024] [0.027] [0.029] [0.043]
Book to Market ratio 3.168** 2.924** 2.816** 2.550** 3.339**
[1.409] [1.275] [1.328] [1.105] [1.513]
log(Market value) 1.135** 1.113** 1.084** 1.014*** 1.107***
[0.436] [0.421] [0.414] [0.380] [0.414]
Total capital ratio -0.019** -0.020** -0.016* -0.016* -0.016
[0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011]
Constant -8.872** -11.678** -10.277** -10.601** -13.720**
[3.764] [4.661] [4.023] [4.440] [6.045]
Observations 67 78 78 78 67
R2 0.619 0.610 0.604 0.602 0.644
Adjusted R2 0.551 0.545 0.537 0.543 0.540
Notes: Table reports cross-sectional regression results, ordinary least
squares, of an institution’s contribution to systemic capital shortfall cal-
culated for the period July 2007 through December 2008 on executive
compensation variables and controls that cover the fiscal year 2006. The
variables under non-CEO compensation are mean values taken among
non-CEO executives of an institution. The governance index is obtained
from Gompers et al. (2003). Heteroscedastic robust standard errors are re-
ported in brackets. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote respectively significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
In column (1) we specify the governance index of Gompers et al. (2003).
This index ranges between 0 and 12 points and higher values indicate more
shareholder right restrictions and thus more managerial power. The effects
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of managerial compensation are not affected when adding the G-index. Only
larger cash components of non-CEOs remain to have a positive effect on
SCS. Whereas the coefficient for the G-index is significantly negative when
specified individually, the last column also shows that it does not influence
systemic risk once specified jointly with further proxies of executives im-
printing conditions.
To measure imprinting conditions and experience, we first specify in
column (2) the average years that CEO and non-CEO executives served on
the board of the financial firm. Executives may not be able to influence sys-
temic risk preferences immediately after joining the firm if this requires a
fundamental change in risk cultures. Alternatively, executives that served
for a very long term already may desire to leave a ’footprint’ and are thus
willing to take very large bets only towards the end of their careers. Re-
lated, Gabbioneta et al. (2013) show that groups of professional regulators
may become jointly overconfident and influence each other to facilitate mu-
tual concealment of undesirable, or even illegal, actions. Longer terms on
boards may potentially create in analogy an environment where executives
mutually influence each other’s excessive risk-taking. Neither effect is con-
firmed by our data since both coefficients are not or only weakly significant
at the 10%-level.
Next, we control in column (3) for the experience of executives by spe-
cifying the number of positions held on boards prior to joining the financial
institution they were employed at in 2006. Numerous appointments may
indicate a richer pool of experience. Alternatively, executives that change
frequently may lean more towards the pursuit of short-term incentives that
come at the expense of systemic risks. Also these proxies do not correlate
significantly with systemic capital shortfall between July 2007 and Decem-
ber 2008.
Finally, larger boards may be better suited to avoid excessively risky
choices by a single individual, but they are also harder to coordinate. The
board size specified in column (4) does not indicate any of such effects for
systemic risk though while leaving the positive effect of larger cash com-
78 Chapter 3
pensation of non-CEOs intact.
In sum, column (5) shows that a number of corporate governance and
imprinting proxies have no significant joint effect on systemic capital short-
fall whereas the previously reported result for non-CEOs remains intact.
CEO and non-CEO compensation gaps
Another possible explanation why non-CEO incentives may matter for sys-
temic risk taking could be the compensation gap relative to the CEO. On av-
erage, Table 3.2 shows that CEOs earn around twice as much as the average
non-CEO board member. The larger these differences are the greater may be
the incentive for non-CEOs to accept projects with higher systemic risks, if
these are also associated with the option of promotion to higher ranks.
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Table 3.11. Contribution to systemic risk and compensation gaps
Dependent variable: SCS1 SCS2 ∆CoVaR CCP Tarp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CEO compensation
Cash bonus / Salary 0.016 0.015 0.034 3.405 -0.032
[0.314] [0.309] [0.044] [2.760] [0.028]
Percentage ownership 0.047 0.047 0.039*** -0.990 -0.000
[0.056] [0.056] [0.014] [1.312] [0.019]
non-CEO compensation
Cash bonus / Salary 0.259** 0.243** 0.051*** 2.677** 0.018**
[0.119] [0.118] [0.015] [1.130] [0.008]
Percentage ownership 0.130 0.133 -0.215 29.210 -0.310
[0.674] [0.672] [0.289] [22.577] [0.222]
Interaction between compensation
Cash bonus / Salary (CEO) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.138* 0.001
× Cash bonus / Salary (non-CEO) [0.009] [0.009] [0.001] [0.073] [0.001]
Percentage ownership (CEO) 0.026 0.025 -0.021 -3.783 0.031
× Percentage ownership (non-CEO) [0.067] [0.066] [0.029] [2.546] [0.025]
Overall compensation
Black-Scholes volatility 0.599 0.652 0.574 167.540* -1.028
of equity [2.382] [2.364] [0.920] [98.867] [0.764]
Institution variables
RoA -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 2.197*** 0.004
[0.029] [0.029] [0.012] [0.612] [0.013]
Book to Market ratio 2.761** 2.738** -0.017 7.507 -0.254
[1.285] [1.293] [0.424] [36.752] [0.272]
log(Market value) 1.031** 1.033** -0.238*** 19.972*** -0.003
[0.405] [0.413] [0.083] [5.896] [0.048]
Total capital ratio -0.020* -0.019* 0.005 0.078 -0.004
[0.011] [0.011] [0.004] [0.303] [0.005]
Constant -9.155** -9.166** 0.074 -60.580 0.938*
[3.774] [3.839] [0.871] [73.616] [0.538]
Observations 78 78 81 78 83
R2 0.598 0.587 0.364 0.421 0.117
Adjusted R2 0.531 0.518 0.262 0.325 -0.019
Notes: Table reports cross-sectional regression results, ordinary least squares, of an institution’s
contribution to systemic capital shortfall calculated for the period July 2007 through December
2008 on executive compensation variables and controls that cover the fiscal year 2006.The vari-
ables under non-CEO compensation are mean values taken among non-CEO executives of an in-
stitution. Heteroscedastic robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote
respectively significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
Table 3.11 therefore shows results for all measures of systemic risk in-
cluding an interaction term between CEO and non-CEO compensation com-
ponents. The direct positive effects of cash shares among non-CEOs as well
as the absence of ownership effects remains intact for all but the ∆CoVaR
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measure as before.
Larger gaps in terms of cash compensation and ownership shares bet-
ween CEOs and non-CEOs, in turn, do not have a significant impact on
virtually all of the five systemic risk measures. Only co-crash probabilities
are weakly significant and negative for a larger cash compensation share of
CEOs holding constant the share received by non-CEOs. In turn, however,
the direct effect is now also insignificant and thus in line with the results
for systemic capital shortfall as well as the simple TARP indicator. Overall,
the results therefore lend little support to the notion of compensation-envy
among lower tier executives to explain systemic risk taking of non-CEOs.
3.4.4 Compensation details and levels
Compensation components considered so far are fairly crude. Cash bonuses
match with the short-termism problems pointed out in Bolton et al. (2006)
and the potential ineffectiveness of aligned owner and agent incentives cap-
tured by equity stakes and equity incentives in the form of portfolio risk
sensitivity. Table 3.12 provides a one-by-one consideration of separate com-
pensation categories provided by the Execucomp database and the level of
total pay.18
18 We prefer to specify the log-level of total pay as a separate variable as opposed to using
it as the denominator of compensation components. The first reason is to explicitly control
for the stylised fact reported by Kaplan and Rauh (2010) that levels of pay may be exuber-
ant in the financial industry. Second, the use of fixed salary components is consistent with
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011).
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Table 3.12. Contribution to SCS1 and alternative compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO compensation
Cash bonus / -0.058 -0.064 -0.047 -0.054 -0.058 -0.052
Salary [0.069] [0.073] [0.030] [0.070] [0.067] [0.067]
Non-equity incentives / 0.048
Salary [0.224]
Value of stock grant / -0.147
Salary [0.100]
Value of option grant / 0.157
Salary [0.137]
Total deferred earnings / 0.045
Salary [0.072]
Other compensation / -0.111
Salary [0.135]
Percentage ownership 0.044 0.046 0.042 0.054 0.051 0.046
[0.052] [0.045] [0.061] [0.053] [0.047] [0.054]
log(Total Compensation) 0.235 0.137 0.580 0.207 0.091 0.283
[0.369] [0.413] [0.476] [0.370] [0.402] [0.378]
non-CEO compensation
Cash bonus / 0.293** 0.372*** 0.350*** 0.290** 0.275** 0.280**
Salary [0.123] [0.108] [0.076] [0.128] [0.122] [0.123]
Non-equity incentives / 0.462
Salary [0.646]
Value of stock grant / 0.716**
Salary [0.294]
Value of option grant / -0.314
Salary [0.289]
Total deferred earnings / -0.424
Salary [0.360]
Other compensation / -0.194
Salary [0.354]
Percentage ownership 0.375 0.410 0.007 0.292 0.306 0.385
[0.563] [0.510] [0.434] [0.564] [0.570] [0.599]
log(Total Compensation) -1.086 -1.463* -2.207** -1.066 -0.891 -1.062
[0.826] [0.845] [0.845] [0.791] [0.768] [0.826]
Overall compensation
Black-Scholes volatility 2.866 2.123 2.578 2.994 2.371 3.022
of equity [2.435] [2.372] [1.868] [2.665] [2.339] [2.413]
Institution variables
RoA 0.000 -0.007 0.039 0.006 -0.011 -0.000
[0.033] [0.029] [0.037] [0.031] [0.034] [0.033]
Book to market ratio 2.485** 1.979* 2.289** 2.601** 2.480** 2.665**
[1.158] [1.067] [1.079] [1.189] [1.159] [1.256]
log(Market value) 1.555** 1.530** 1.566*** 1.580** 1.606** 1.555**
[0.650] [0.667] [0.545] [0.748] [0.685] [0.658]
Total capital ratio -0.020** -0.015 -0.026** -0.019* -0.018* -0.020**
[0.010] [0.009] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009]
Constant -7.836** -4.333 -3.124 -8.037* -8.305** -8.370**
[3.097] [2.960] [3.170] [4.132] [3.283] [3.381]
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
R2 0.618 0.640 0.705 0.622 0.626 0.625
Adjusted R2 0.554 0.565 0.645 0.544 0.549 0.548
Notes: Table reports cross-sectional regression results, ordinary least squares, of an institution’s
contribution SCR1 to systemic risk formation calculated for the period July 2007 through Decem-
ber 2008 on executive compensation variables and controls that cover the fiscal year 2006. Het-
eroscedastic robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote respectively
significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
Column (1) confirms the earlier result that cash bonuses prior to the crisis
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increased systemic risk formation between July 2007 and December 2008.
The result that only non-CEO bonuses matter is corroborated.
Whereas the sheer level of CEO pay has no significant influence systemic
risk, higher non-CEO pay levels reduce it significantly if cash bonuses are
paired with other non-equity incentives or larger stock grants. Contrary to
predictions of agency theory that skin in the game should reduce (excessive)
risk appetite, we find however also that larger stock grants to non-CEOs
increases systemic risk.
For the most part, however, both the level of pay as well as other com-
pensation components except cash bonuses for non-CEOs are not statistic-
ally significant. Overall, the incentives borne out by the structure of bank
executive compensation therefore seem more important compared to levels
of pay as such.
3.5 Conclusion
We investigate empirically whether bank executive compensation prior to
the financial crisis contributed to the formation of systemic risk among 92
U.S. financial firms. We measure systemic risk with five different indicat-
ors between July 2007 and December 2008: two versions of systemic capital
shortfall (SCS, Acharya et al., 2012; Brownlees and Engle, 2012), ∆CoVaR
(Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011), co-crash probabilities derived with ex-
treme value theory (De Jonghe, 2010), and a simple indicator if the financial
institution received TARP funding.
In line with Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), we find no evidence of a re-
lationship between CEO and non-CEO executive compensation in 2006 and
idiosyncratic firm return performance during the crisis. However, we do
find that cash bonus shares have a significant influence on all systemic risk
measures and that the effects differ from those of managerial compensa-
tion on conventional idiosyncratic risk measures. Our results thus corrobor-
ate theoretical concerns about potentially hazardous short-term incentives
(Bolton et al., 2006).
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Importantly, this relationship is driven by non-CEO executive pay. CEO
performance pay does not correlate with most systemic risk measures, again
∆CoVaR being the exception. This result indicates that CEOs are either not
able or willing to effectively discipline all the management in large, complex
financial institutions. Hence, any possible compensation regulation needs
to consider senior management beyond the CEO. In light of the argument
by Boot and Schmeits (2000) this dichotomous finding may arise from the
differing objectives of executives. Whereas the CEO is concerned with the
overall performance of the bank, the other executives may have a bias to-
wards valuing their department or division’s performance that may lead to
excessive risk taking by non-CEO managers. This result remains intact after
controlling for systemic risk in different quarters of the crisis, differences
in corporate governance and imprinting conditions across banks, as well
as wage gaps between CEOs and non-CEOs. Additional analysis where we
specify non-CEO executive pay as endogenous yield the same insights.
Finally, it is important to note that the results are driven by a subset of
large and systemically important banks. Four banks account for around half
systemic capital shortfall, thereby underpinning the extremely skewed dis-
tribution in individual banks’ contributions to systemic risk. At the same
time, it is exactly this group of very important banks that compensated ex-
ecutives intensively by means of cash bonuses.
In sum, we complement recent studies like Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011)
who find little evidence of executive compensation effects on idiosyncratic
as opposed to systemic risk. Executive compensation of non-CEOs correl-
ates with most systemic risk measures, whereas CEO pay is not significantly
correlated. This discrepancy of effects is important in the regulation of bank
executive pay, and also calls for future research into potential agency con-
flicts inside financial firms.
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3.A Systemic Risk Measures
3.A.1 Estimation of the Marginal Expected Shortfall
This section outlines the estimation procedure of the Marginal Expected
Shortfall term represented by E[Rpi |Rpm < κ] or MESpi for short as denoted
by (3.1). The procedure derives from the work of Rabemananjara and Zakoı¨an
(1993) and Engle (2002).
Let institution i’s log return on day t be denoted by rit, and the market
index by rmt. The respective volatilities are σit and σmt, and the correlation
between the two series is denoted by ρit. The model is specified as follows:
rmt = σmtεmt,
rit = σitρitεmt + σit
√
1− ρ2itξit, (3.A.1)
εmt, ξit ∼ N (0, I).
Here, εmt and ξit are independent shocks in (3.A.1) with zero mean and unit
variance. This dynamic system allows to infer the performance of the in-
stitution under changing market conditions. It helps to identify the institu-
tion’s performance conditional on adverse market circumstances, such that
a crisis period can be accounted for.
No closed form solution of the marginal expected shortfall over a ho-
rizon of p days exist. We use Monte Carlo simulation to estimate MESpit.
Parameters in (3.A.1) are substituted with their estimates to simulate p pairs
of daily returns:
{rsi,t+τ−1, rsm,t+τ−1}τ=pτ=1 ,
where s indexes the Monte Carlo simulations. Thus, two random shocks
are generated and filtered through the model to compute the returns for
a particular day. Next, we calculate the cumulative return within the con-
sidered period as: and obtain the cumulative return for the market similarly.
This procedure is repeated for all of the S simulations. The estimate of the
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marginal expected shortfall is then calculated as the institution’s average
cumulative return across those pairs where the market return is below the







∑Ss=1 1{Rsm,t:t+p−1 < κ}
, (3.A.2)
where 1{.} is an indicator variable that equals one if the condition in braces
is true and zero otherwise.
The parameters σit, σmt and ρit of system (3.A.1) are estimated by means
of a two step maximum likelihood procedure (Engle, 2009). First, consistent
volatility estimates are obtained from predictions of a GARCH class model
specified for the log return processes. Second, a Dynamic Conditional Cor-
relation (DCC) model is specified for standardized log returns of institution
i and the market. The last step is necessary to obtain consistent estimates of
the correlation coefficients between the two log returns series.
The idiosyncratic log return processes are modeled as follows. A stand-
ard GARCH process is specified for the conditional variance dynamics of
the log return process that includes a TARCH term (Rabemananjara and
Zakoı¨an, 1993). The TARCH term implies that the conditional variance is
dependent on the state of past return realizations. The advantage is that the
conditional covariance for the market log return can be larger in absolute
size during for instance crises relative to regular periods. Formally, we spe-
cify for each log return series, as well for the market index:
rit = αi + eit, eit ∼ N (0, σit), with (3.A.3)




i,t−11{ei,t−1 < 0}+ γi3σ2i,t−1,
where 1{.} denotes an indicator variable that equals one if the condition
in braces is true and zero otherwise. The parameters of the processes are
estimated with a quasi-maximum likelihood approach. Subsequently, the
predicted values for σit serve as the parameter estimates of the volatility
terms in (3.A.1).
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A necessary step to calculate the correlation coefficients in (3.A.1) is to
standardize the residuals of (3.A.3) with the predicted volatility terms. A
DCC model is subsequently specified for the standardized residuals of the
return process of institution i and the market. Let the standardized residuals
be denoted by eˆit and eˆmt, respectively for institution i and the market log






A consequence of using standardized residuals over unstandardized resid-
uals is that the off diagonal elements reflect unit variance. The off diagonal
elements are equal to the correlation coefficient used at time t in (3.A.1). Let
eˆit := [eˆit, eˆmt]T and the correlation coefficient between the two series can be
modeled as a multivariate GARCH process:
eˆit ∼ N (0,Qit), with (3.A.4)
Qit = Si + δi1eˆi,t−1eˆTi,t−1 + δi2Qi,t−1,
and Si is restricted to be a postive definite matrix. The parameters of the
process in (3.A.4) are, as for (3.A.3), also estimated with a quasi-maximum
likelihood approach. The model’s predictions for the correlation coefficient
are used as parameter estimates for (3.A.1) to simulate log returns.
3.A.2 Estimation of ∆CoVaR
We focus on growth rates of market-valued total financial assets as perform-
ance measure of institutions. We follow Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011)
and let MEit be the market value of bank i’s equity, and LEVit the ratio of
total assets to book equity. The growth rate of market valued total assets is
calculated by applying the market-to-book equity ratio to transform book-
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The market performance Xsystem,t is the weighted average growth rate of all
considered institutions. The average growth rate is constructed on a weekly
basis and the weights are based on the proxy for the market value of total
assets.
Additionally, a set of time-varying macroeconomic state variables are
used to estimate (3.4). We use the same variables as Adrian and Brunner-
meier (2011), which are described in Table 3.A.1.
Table 3.A.1. Descriptive statistics of lagged state variables
variable mean sd p25 p50 p75
VIX 21.20 8.30 14.60 20.10 25.00
Liquidity spread 20.70 34.10 -5.20 10.30 57.80
Change in three-month T-bill rate -0.60 12.40 -18.50 -0.30 6.00
Slope of yield curve 0.10 13.10 -17.30 0.10 20.90
Credit spread change 0.02 8.00 -10.30 0.020 12.60
Market return CRSP 0.14 2.80 -4.40 0.00 3.20
Real estate sector return -0.10 3.40 -7.20 -0.10 9.10
Notes: Table lists descriptive statistics for the state variables used in the
quantile regressions to estimate ∆CoVaRqsystem|i , (3.4). Returns are reported in
percentages, other variables in basis points. Variables are weekly observed in
the period January 1992 through December 2011.
The volatility index VIX is used to capture the implied volatilities in the
stock market as reported by the Chicago Board Options Exchange. A short
term liquidity spread is calculated by taking the difference between the three-
month repo rate and the three-month T-bill rate. The change in three-month T-
bill rate is also included and obtained from the Federal Reserve Board. Addi-
tionally, the slope of the yield curve is obtained by subtracting the three-month
T-bill rate from the ten-year T-bill rate. The change in the credit spread of
BAA-rated bonds and the ten-year T-bill rate are included. Last, the weekly
equity market return from CRSP and the weekly real estate sector return in excess
of the market return.
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Time-varying CoVaRqsystem,t|i and VaR
q
it estimates are obtained for each
institution and conditioned on a vector of state variables lagged by one
week, mt−1. The following quantile regressions are executed for weekly ob-
servations to estimate the conditional performance generating processes as-
sociated with each institution:
Xit = αi + γimt−1 + ε it,
Xsystem,t = αsystem|i + βsystem|iXit + γsystem|imt−1 + εsystem,t|i.






























We calculate (3.A.5) on a weekly basis for each institution and set the
critical level q at one percent. The estimation is carried out for the period
January 1992 through December 2011. Within sample predictions are car-
ried out to compute (3.A.5) for each week in the period July 2007 through
December 2008. The average of the weekly observations in this period con-
stitute the dependent variable for each institution used for analysis.
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3.B Appended tables
Table 3.B.1. Definitions of executive compensation variables
Total Compensation Total compensation (in thousands USD) as calculated under the 1992 reporting format: Total com-
pensation comprises of the following: Salary, Cash Bonus, Total value of stocks granted, Total
value of stock options granted, Total deferred earnings, and Other compensation.
Salary The dollar value (in thousands) of the base salary earned by the executive officer during the fiscal
year.
Cash bonus The dollar value of a bonus (in thousands) earned by the executive officer during the fiscal year.
Non-equity incentives Value of amounts (in thousands USD) earned during the year pursuant to non-equity incentive
plans. The amount is disclosed in the year that the performance criteria was satisfied and the
compensation was earned.
Value of stock grant Value of stock-related (in thousands of USD) grants (e.g. restricted stock, restricted stock units,
phantom stock, phantom stock units, common stock equivalent units etc.) that do not have option-
like features. Valuation is based upon the value of shares that vested during the year as detailed
in FAS123R. The amount here is the cost recorded by the company on its income statement as well
as any amounts that were capitalized on the balance sheet for the fiscal year. This discloses the
cost that was charged to the company (and thus to shareholders) for the year, as distinct from the
grant date fair value of the award.
Value of option grant Value of option-related awards (in thousands USD) (e.g. options, stock appreciation rights, and
other instruments with option-like features). Valuation is based upon the value of options that
vested during the year as detailed in FAS123R. The amount here is the cost recorded by the com-
pany on its income statement as well as any amounts that were capitalized on the balance sheet
for the fiscal year. This column discloses the cost that was charged to the company (and thus to
shareholders) for the year, as distinct from the grant date fair value of the award.
Total deferred earnings Total aggregate earnings in deferred compensation plans in last fiscal year. Deferred compensa-
tion plans are aggregate earnings in non-tax-qualified deferred compensation plans during the
year.
Other compensation Other compensation received by the executive including perquisites and other personal bene-
fits, termination or change-in-control payments, contributions to defined contribution plans (e.g.
401K plans), life insurance premiums, gross-ups and other tax reimbursements, discounted share
purchases etc.
Value of total equity portfolio Total value of subsequent items (in thousands USD) at fiscal year end.
Value of shares Market value (in thousands USD) of shares held by the executive at Fiscal Year End.
Value of vested shares Value realized on vesting (in thousands USD). Value of restricted shares vested during the year.
Value of exercisable options Estimated value (in thousands USD) of in-the-money unexercised exercisable options. The estim-
ated aggregate value of in-the-money vested options at fiscal year end, calculated based on the
difference between the exercise price of the options and the close price of the company’s primary
issue of stock at year end.
Value of unexercisable options Estimated value (in thousands USD) of in-the-money unexercised unexercisable options. The es-
timated aggregate value (in thousands USD) of in-the-money unvested options at fiscal year end,
calculated based on the difference between the exercise price of the options and the close price of
the company’s primary issue of stock at year end.
Value of unvested restricted stock Value of shares of restricted stock (in thousands of USD) held by the executive as of fiscal year
end.
Black-Scholes volatility of equity This is the volatility figure used in calculating Black-Scholes values for options. This is a standard
deviation volatility calculated over 60 months.
Percentage ownership Percentage of total shares owned
Percentage ownership, options ex-
cluded
Percentage of total shares owned, excluding options (if greater than one percent).
Years in boardroom Denotes the number of years the executive held a function in the company’s boardroom up and
until the fiscal year 2006
Number of positions held during
years in boardrooms
Denotes the number of positions held during the years in which the executive was present in the
boardroom up and until the fiscal year 2006
Board size Size of the board in persons
Governance index Based on Gompers et al. (2003): every extra point reflects a provision that restricts shareholder
rights on a scale from 0 to 12, i.e. increases managerial power.
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Table 3.B.2. Sampled institutions and systemic risk measures (in %)
Name Institution SCS2 ∆CoVaR CCP (bp) Tarp Name Institution SCS2 ∆CoVaR CCP (bp) Tarp
Acadia Reality Trust 0.01 -0.76 140.58 no Kimco Realty 0.10 -1.86 83.40 no
American Express 1.27 -3.08 233.78 yes Legg Mason 0.08 -1.41 260.44 no
Anchor Bancorp Wis. 0.04 -1.18 76.54 yes Lexington Realty 0.04 -0.22 82.77 no
Ass. Banc-Corp. 0.18 -1.14 59.86 no LTC Properties 0.00 -0.80 163.46 no
Astoria Financial 0.19 -1.72 159.43 no Macerich Co. 0.08 -0.82 169.49 no
Avalonbay Comm. 0.07 -1.27 181.06 no Mack Cali Realty 0.04 -1.24 159.40 no
Bank Mutual 0.03 -2.18 125.65 no Metlife 4.55 -2.48 130.63 no
Bank of America 15.12 -1.21 285.35 yes Morgan Stanley 8.34 -1.27 303.38 yes
Bank of Hawaii 0.09 -3.25 60.20 no National Retail Prop. 0.02 -1.01 160.65 no
Bank of N-Y Mellon 2.04 -2.17 241.69 yes N-Y Comm. Bancorp 0.25 -1.18 252.79 no
Boston Properties 0.11 -1.89 182.73 no Northern Trust 0.70 -2.30 328.73 yes
Bristow Group 0.02 -1.73 186.27 no Park National 0.06 -1.48 188.55 yes
Brookline Bancorp 0.02 -1.55 88.66 yes Pinnacle West Capital 0.07 -2.07 228.12 yes
Brunswick Bancorp 0.00 -0.50 0.00 no Plum Creek Timber 0.06 -2.79 130.58 no
Capital One Fin. 1.19 -0.97 144.53 yes PNC Fin. Serv. Gr. 1.21 -2.87 169.45 yes
Cascade Bancorp 0.02 -1.14 162.90 yes Potlatch 0.02 -0.71 126.13 no
Central Pacific Fin. 0.05 -0.86 58.73 yes Presidential Realty 0.00 0.01 56.91 no
Citigroup 17.97 -1.05 251.72 yes Prosperity Bancsh. 0.05 -1.13 146.28 no
City National 0.13 -2.40 215.42 yes Public Storage 0.11 -1.87 195.25 no
Cullen/Frost Bankers 0.12 -2.36 113.54 no Regions Fin. 1.14 -1.75 115.08 yes
Dime Comm. Bancsh. 0.03 -2.42 157.93 no Sapient 0.00 -1.46 122.65 no
Duke Realty 0.07 -1.57 151.81 yes SEI Investments 0.03 -0.89 243.39 no
E-Trade Fin. 0.47 -1.23 102.54 no Simon Prop. Gr. 0.29 -1.26 207.46 no
East West Bancorp 0.09 -1.13 163.66 yes State Street 1.89 -1.53 135.55 yes
Eastgroup Properties 0.01 -0.88 109.43 no Sterling Bancorp. 0.02 -1.14 164.50 yes
Equity Res. Trust 0.16 -1.49 157.36 no Sterling Fin. 0.10 -1.99 88.42 yes
Essex Property Trust 0.03 -1.50 131.54 no Suntrust Banks 1.46 -2.14 110.48 yes
Federated Investors 0.02 -0.94 200.73 no Susquehanna Bancsh. 0.11 -1.52 223.00 yes
Fifth third Bancorp 0.96 -3.31 135.98 yes SVB Fin. Gr. 0.07 -2.94 178.57 yes
First Midwest Bancorp 0.07 -1.71 234.31 yes Synovus Fin. 0.28 -1.18 146.26 yes
First Niagara Fin. Gr. 0.07 -1.10 156.42 yes TD Ameritrade Hold. 0.18 -1.28 290.45 no
Firstfed Financial 0.06 -0.91 58.23 no Tetra Tech 0.01 -0.64 165.79 no
Firstmerit 0.09 -1.83 231.68 yes UCBH Holdings 0.11 -1.23 192.56 no
Franklin Bank 0.05 -0.89 88.71 yes Umpqua Hold. 0.07 -0.49 170.88 yes
Franklin Bancorp . 0.13 -2.20 215.69 yes United Banksh. 0.00 -0.81 89.36 no
Glacier Bancorp 0.04 -1.64 110.12 no Vornado Realty Trust 0.02 -2.19 286.03 no
Goldman Sachs Gr. 9.17 -2.81 210.34 yes Washington Fed. 0.09 -2.26 99.89 yes
Hanmi Financial 0.03 -0.77 108.19 no Webster Fin. 0.14 -0.98 185.76 yes
Heritage Commerce 0.01 -0.95 127.42 yes Wells Fargo & Co. 5.40 -3.54 213.50 yes
HF Financial 0.01 -2.35 33.49 yes Westamerica Bancorp. 0.04 -1.26 118.16 yes
Highwoods Prop. 0.03 -1.21 140.47 no Wintrust Fin. 0.08 -2.08 149.12 yes
Host Hotels & Resorts 0.10 -2.69 163.44 no Zions Bancorp. 0.44 -1.41 131.94 yes
Huntington Bancsh. 0.44 -1.89 162.14 yes
Independent Bank 0.03 -1.10 110.59 yes
Istar Financial 0.13 -1.43 200.15 no
Janus Capital Group 0.04 -1.21 267.27 no
Jefferies Group 0.22 -1.52 101.21 no
JP Morgan Chase & Co. 2.58 -0.93 97.82 yes
Keycorp 0.85 -2.65 224.56 yes
Kilroy Realty 0.02 -1.30 106.58 no
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Table 3.B.3. Cross-correlation table
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CEO compensation
(1) Cash bonus / Salary 1.000
(2) Percentage ownership -0.083 1.000
non-CEO compensation
(3) Cash bonus / Salary 0.822* -0.094 1.000
(4) Percentage ownership -0.085 0.397* -0.103 1.000
Overall compensation
(5) Black-Scholes volatility 0.041 0.385* 0.043 0.371* 1.000
Institution variables
(6) ROA 0.020 0.163 -0.013 0.166 0.059 1.000
(7) Book to Market ratio -0.020 -0.382* -0.011 -0.164 -0.132 -0.166 1.000
(8)log(Market value) 0.325* -0.250* 0.419* -0.250* -0.233* 0.035 -0.178 1.000
(9) Total capital ratio -0.052 0.240* -0.128 0.124 0.321* 0.435* -0.045 -0.176 1.000
Notes: Table reports correlation coefficients between two variables listed in the most




Dueling Policies: Systemic Risk
Taxation versus Constructive
Ambiguity
Deep in the human unconscious is a pervasive need for a lo-
gical universe that makes sense. But the real universe is always
one step beyond logic.
– Frank Herbert (1965) –
4.1 Introduction
The above quote from Frank Herbert’s (1965) Dune is illustrative of one of
the difficulties faced by social planners when they attempt to model or pre-
dict interactions between society’s members for the purpose of drawing up
policy. This challenge marks also the foundation for Hayek’s (1949) argu-
ment that a system of rules is inherently ineffective if its designers assume
they possess perfect knowledge about the information held by the regu-
lated. Hayek (1988) dubbed this false belief of possessing perfect knowledge
and acting upon it The Fatal Conceit. The aim of this Chapter is to provide
a preliminary to the study on limitations of regulating systemic risk form-
ation and is by no means a panacea for the problem of curtailing systemic
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risk.
However, rather in the spirit of The Fatal Conceit this chapter adds a
caveat to the manner in which macroprudential tools’ effectiveness is eval-
uated in current literature. In short, the assumption that regulatory tools,
proposed to maintain financial stability, are independent is put to the test.1
In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 new reforms
in prudential regulation have come to the fore with the aim to safeguard sta-
bility in the financial sector (Basel Committee of Banking Supervision, 2009).
This study focuses on the interdependence between two such policy tools in
a signaling game context: systemic risk taxation and constructive ambiguity
in bailout support. Failing to account for the impact of a systemic risk tax
on banks’ inferences about a regulator’s bailout decision leads to spurious
conclusions about optimal systemic risk taxation. This result follows from
banks forming and acting upon expectations about a financial regulator’s
inclination to bail out banks during a financial crisis.
The behavior of banks in this chapter has the flavor of the study by Farhi
and Tirole (2012) in which the time-inconsistency problem of a financial
regulator induces banks to coordinate with leverage choices on prospect-
ive bailout support. The main difference with their work lies in the focus
of this study on the signaling role of an introduced systemic risk tax and
how the set level of the tax contributes to interdependence among policy
tools. With respect to endogenous policy decisions, previous studies have
evaluated policy choices in light of speculative exchange rate attacks and
anticipated interventions by the IMF (Drazen, 2000; Angeletos et al., 2006;
Zwart, 2007).
The formation of systemic risk is driven in the model by banks’ endogen-
ous investment choices, which determine the aggregate correlation structure
among banks’ returns. The approach builds further on the model of Allen
1 Acharya et al. (2012) and Freixas and Rochet (2013) discuss the merit of a systemic risk
tax levied on banks as compensation for explicit or implicit financial assistance by govern-
ments in times of financial crises. A second strategy regulators can adopt to deter banks’
risk-shifting behavior induced by prospective bailout support is to employ constructive am-
biguity about bailout policies (Freixas, 1999; Kocherlakota and Shim, 2007; Shim, 2011).
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and Gale (2000) and Acharya (2009) and is close in line with the literature
on inter-bank return dependence.2 The main extension to Allen and Gale’s
model is a regulator who sets a systemic risk tax for banks and faces a com-
mitment problem in its decision to bail out distressed banks. When a sub-
stantial fraction of banks become financially distressed, the costs imposed
on society of letting distressed banks fail can force the regulator to initiate
bailout support.
In the presented model, banks have heterogeneous imperfect informa-
tion about the conditions that force the regulator to initiate bailouts. The
bailout prospects causes banks’ investment choices to become strategic com-
plements (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Farhi and Tirole, 2012). As more
banks become financially distressed the cost of their failure to society in-
creases and this induces banks to believe that the regulator is likely to initi-
ate bailout support. Preferences of banks may thereby shift towards having
higher correlated returns across banks in order to trigger bailouts during
banking crisis. To analyze this coordination problem faced by banks I use
the global games methodology (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993; Morris and
Shin, 1998, 2001). In this setting the implications of the systemic risk tax are
twofold. First, an increase in the systemic risk tax may induce banks not to
prefer joint correlated investments and thereby leads to lower systemic risk
formation. Second, the tax has the effect of informing banks about the regu-
lator’s optimal policy and thereby shapes banks’ expectations about future
bailout decisions of the regulator.
Results suggest that banks’ knowledge of the tax level and their private
information about the regulator’s inclination to initiate bailouts provide the
means to infer the likelihood of receiving bailout support. In this light, a
regulator that is perceived as highly inclined to initiate bailout support has
2 Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) show that the risk characteristics of firms’ cash flows
are endogenously determined by aggregate investment decisions in the industry. Finan-
cially distressed industry peers impose private costs on leverage of banks and may induce
risk-shifting behavior (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Rajan (1994) connects managerial short-
termism and reputation concerns to lowering of credit policy leniency when other banks are
likely to do the same. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) consider return dependence driven by
many banks coordinating on bailout prospects.
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an incentive to set a low tax in order to imitate a regulator that maintains
a tough stance towards bailouts and does not need the tax to maintain fin-
ancial stability, i.e. to curtail excessive risk taking by banks. Such a taxation
strategy based on imitation generates the necessary uncertainty a weak reg-
ulator can exploit as constructive ambiguity. The uncertainty is driven by
the observation of a low tax which does not allow banks to distinguish bet-
ween these two regulator types and may thereby curtail coordination in risk
taking by banks on bailout prospects. By taking the bailout policy into ac-
count I argue that in order to successfully curtail systemic risk formation
with a systemic risk tax, the tax should be set independent of any future
bailout policy in order to be effective.
With respect to policy implications, these results suggest that signific-
ant risks are associated with systemic risk taxation when the regulator is
inclined to bail out banks during crises. In order to credibly install an ef-
fective taxation policy the costs incurred by the regulator and tax payer to
rescue a bank need to be high, which has proven to be the case in the wake
of the 2007/2008 financial crisis. These costs are not necessarily limited to
the actual absolute costs of a bank bailout, but also include the ease with
which regulators and politicians can bail out banks. The effect of a higher
cost associated with a bailout have the effect that the regulator can generate
the necessary commitment to not bail out during a crisis if a desire exists to
do so, because in such events it is less likely that banks coordinate on bailout
prospects.
The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the setup of the
model. Section 4.3 presents the equilibrium results and Section 4.4 provides
a discussion and interpretation of results. Section 4.5 contains concluding
remarks. Derivations and proofs are reserved for the appendix.
4.2 Model
The model builds upon the framework of Allen and Gale (2000) who explain
financial bubbles and crises by risk-shifting behavior of a single investor in
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a one-period setup. I follow Acharya (2009) but extend his model with a reg-
ulator and consider many banks in order to study the formation of systemic
risk based on inter-bank interactions. A financial regulator can implement a
systemic risk tax in the first stage of the model and extend bailout support
at the end of the first period. The presence of the second stage allows banks
to derive future value from a bailout. Figure 4.1 outlines the stages of the
game.
Figure 4.1. Game Tree
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Depositors deposit D0.
Regulator sets systemic
risk tax τ .









Positive profits or bailout
ensures continuation of
the bank.
Negative profits and no





Proceeds are paid to
depositors.
Banks and depositors are active in two periods that are bounded by three
dates. Depositors can consume the proceeds of their deposits at the end of
the game. Banks are owned and run by the same agents, they maximize
their charter value over all periods and readjust strategies at the start of each
period. At the end of a period, the financial regulator evaluates whether it
is optimal to bail out financially distressed banks.
4.2.1 Banks and Depositors
A continuum of banks of measure 1 exists, banks are indexed by i and uni-
formly distributed over the unit interval. A continuum of depositors choose
to supply funds for deposits at the start of each period denoted by Dt, where
t ∈ {0, 1, 2} indexes the dates. The amount Dt is not fixed through the peri-
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ods. When a bank fails the deposits are partially destroyed, and following
favorable times positive returns are reinvested. The existence of a market
maker is assumed who pools all funds available for deposits in a period and
channels it to the banking sector. This assumption ensures that depositors’
wealth is diversified across all banks.
In a given period banks engage in perfect competition when they access
the deposit market and the rate at which banks borrow funds from depos-
itors is denoted by rDt . Depositors are paid at the end of a period. Further-
more, funds obtained from the deposit market constitute the only form of
financing for banks. At the start of each of the two periods banks can de-
cide on the allocation of raised deposits between risky assets and a safe asset
as in the framework of Allen and Gale (2000). The appended Section 4.A.1
provides a detailed exposition of the technologies underlying the safe and
risky assets.
Payoffs – Banks set strategies at t = 0 and if they survive the first period
also at t = 1. At these instances banks set the proportion of deposits to
be invested in the safe asset xSit and the proportion to be invested in the
risky assets xRit . In addition, banks set the level of idiosyncratic volatility
risk associated with the risky assets’ return σit, and their choices of asset
class ρit. The latter choices determine the aggregate correlation structure of
returns across banks.
A bank fails at the end of a period if the return on the risky asset Rit+1 is
insufficient. That is to say, if the return on the risky asset is below rcit+1 the
bank will be unable to repay depositors rDt+1Dt. The critical return r
c
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it). In the event
the return on risky assets is insufficient, Rit+1 < rcit+1, bank owners re-






Furthermore, I follow Allen and Gale (2000) and introduce costs associ-
ated with investing in risky assets. These costs can arise from monitoring
efforts, administration and risk management and are non-pecuniary. Banks
have a parsimonious cost function c : R+ → R+ which features: c(0) = 0;
c′(0) = 0; c′(x) > 0; and c′′(x) > 0.
Based on the previous discussions the expected payoff of bank i in a
given period can be denoted by v : [0, σmax]× {R+}4 → R and is defined by














− rDit+1(xRit + xSit))dh(σit, .)− c(xRit), (4.1)
where h denotes the density of the risky assets’ return Rit+1 which features
mean reversion as outlined in the appended Section 4.A.1.
4.2.2 Policy and systemic risk formation
Banks face two types of risk: idiosyncratic risk and systemic risk. The idio-
syncratic risk component, volatility σit, affects the probability of failure of
the bank in a given period. The extend with which a bank’s performance is
detrimentally affected by other bank failures is denoted as systemic risk.
Bank managers do not observe other banks’ choices of asset classes, in-
stead managers infer the likely aggregate action of banks through their pos-
terior expectation about whether to receive bailout support if financially dis-
tressed. Equilibrium choices are derived by means of backward induction.
Objective of the regulator – The regulator is concerned with maintain-
ing financial stability. To this end the regulator can bail out financially dis-
tressed banks and levy a systemic risk tax. The bailout decision is determ-
ined on the basis of whether the cost of letting a bank fail outweigh the cost
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of saving a bank. The cost of letting bank i fail depends on bank i’s perform-
ance and the performance of all other banks, −i. These costs are denoted by
C(i,−i). The costs C feature the notion that a single bank’s failure can po-
tentially be absorbed by the banking sector, but multiple bank failures may
induce failure of other banks and thus increase the costs associated with
their failure (Acharya et al., 2012). The cost the regulator perceives to be as-
sociated with rescuing a bank θ are constant and are not perfectly observed
by banks.3
The accuracy with which banks observe θ constitutes the source of the
regulator’s ability to exercise constructive ambiguity about its bailout de-
cision, which is made explicit in Section 4.3. The bailout decision is denoted
by qi ∈ {0, 1}, where qi = 1 means a bailout for bank i and qi = 0 the con-
verse. Hence, we can regard θ− C(i,−i) as the net benefit of not bailing out
bank i.
The second tool of the regulator is to levy a systemic risk tax τ. The aim
of such a tax is to discourage banks from taking activities that have the po-
tential to contribute to the formation of systemic risk. In this light recent
literature suggests to tax banks on the basis of a metric that proxies the costs
imposed on society by the bank’s failure (Acharya et al., 2012; Freixas and
Rochet, 2013). To follow up on these studies, the tax is levied in this analysis
on the probability of bank i facing financial distress given that at least one
other bank is distressed. The tax therefore aims to discourage banks from
allowing for systemic exposure to one another. However, the tax also gen-
erates costs for the regulator. These costs are measured in terms of social
welfare loss due to taxation. The tax implies an implicit transfer of funds
from depositors to the regulator. These funds are thereby not invested in
productive activities, which constitutes a welfare cost to the regulator and
are denoted by δ : [0, Dt]→ Rwith the feature δ′(τ) > 0.
Based on the bailout decision, the benefits associated with the bailout
3 The costs associated with rescuing a bank are not necessarily limited to the actual absolute
costs of a bank bailout, but also extend to the relative ease with which regulators and politi-
cians can bail out financial institutions. The costs can therefore also reflect the extend with
which funds have already been reserved for bailout funds.
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policy and the costs of the tax the following objective function of the regu-
lator can be formulated:
(1− qi)(θ − C(i,−i))− δ(τ).
Furthermore, the bailout decision of the regulator follows endogenously
from the notion of time inconsistency in bailout policy (O’Hara and Wayne,
1990; Brown and Dinc¸, 2005; Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007). If the costs
associated with letting a bank fail, C, exceed the costs of bailing out the
bank, θ, the regulator will always bail out the bank. Therefore the bailout
decision can be interpreted as an indicator variable; qi ≡ 1{θ < C(i,−i)},
such that the objective function can be stated as:4
max{0, θ − C(i,−i)} − δ(τ). (4.2)
Based on (4.2) banks form expectations about whether a bailout will be re-
ceived when financially distressed. In this light banks conjecture the prob-
ability associated with the event θ < C(i,−i) to be the probability of re-
ceiving bailout support. Increases in their portfolio weight assigned to asset
classes with high correlation ρi result in a higher likelihood of joint failure.
Consequently the probability of receiving bailout support increases as more
banks opt for more weight of correlated asset classes in their portfolio. This
constitutes the nature of the strategic complementarity in banks’ choice of
asset class ρi.
Implications for banks – A bailout event enters each bank’s payoff sched-
ule such that in the event of financial distress in the first period there exists
a possibility to be allowed to operate in the second period. Likewise, other
banks may receive bailout support when financially distressed and affects
the payoff schedule of surviving banks.
In state SF bank i survives and at least one other bank is financially dis-
tressed. The financially distressed banks can be bailed out in this state, this
occurs with probability pˆi−i1. The payoffs associated with either action of
4 Note that qi ≡ 1{θ < C(i,−i)} equals 1 if θ < C(i,−i) and 0 otherwise.
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the regulator are denoted by the charter value vSF if a bailout is initiated,
and v
′SF if not. we must have that vSF > v
′SF, as a result of the negative
spillover effect of banks’ failure on surviving banks (Acharya, 2009). Turn-
ing to state FF, where the difference with SF lies in bank i being also finan-
cially distressed. In this event, the probability that i will receive a bailout is
now denoted by pii1, and that at least one other bank is saved is denoted by
pi−i1. Note that the positive charter values in this state are equal to those in
SF. Since if bank i would not be distressed the cost of any other bank fail-
ing would be strictly lower in comparison to the case where bank i would
be distressed. This conjecture will be made explicit when banks’ ex ante ex-
pectations about the costs of failure to society are defined in Section 4.3. A
graphical depiction of the expected charter values for the various states and
their corresponding probabilities of occurrence is presented in Figure 4.2.
Furthermore, for ease of exposition if all but one bank are financially dis-
tressed, the regulator will not initiate a bailout policy.













By allowing the three bailout probabilities (pii1, pi−i1 and pˆi−i1) to be dif-
ferent, the regulator is assumed to implement bailouts for banks on a case
by case basis, rather than a blanket bailout initiated for all banks. Nonethe-
less, the setup does not exclude the possibility of a uniform bailout across
all distressed banks.
I use the notation A1 := {Ri1 ≥ rci1}, and B1 :=
⋂
j∈[0,1]/{i}{Rj1 ≥ rcj1} for
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ease of exposition. These terms denote respectively the events in which bank
i survives, and the survival of all other banks. Likewise the complements of
these events can be denoted as Ac1 := {Ri1 < rci1}, failure of bank i; and Bc1 :=⋃
j∈[0,1]/{i}{Rj1 < rcj1}, the failure of at least one other bank. The optimal























+ (1− pi−i1)v′SF)− τ)}, (4.3)
where v(.) is defined as (4.A.2). Note that banks incorporate their expected
charter value for the second period as well in determining their strategies.
The operand in (4.3) is bank i’s charter value at the start of the first period
and can be written conveniently as:






it+1) = v(.) + (1−PH(Ac1)−PH(Bc1))vSS
+PH(Bc1)(pˆi−i1v











Note that the probability that bank i and at least one other bank fail,
PH(Ac1
⋂
Bc1), is the only term in (4.4) that depends on the choice of asset
class, ρi. Bank i will set xR∗it , x
S∗
it in a similar vein as for the second period.
The key difference lies in setting σ∗it, and ρ
∗
i , since these affect the distribution
of returns for all banks and therebyPH(.). However, ρi, only affects the latter
term such that the optimal choice σ∗i1 can be expressed in terms of ρ
∗
i . It is
104 Chapter 4
assumed that the joint event where bank i fails and at least one other bank as
well is increasing in banks’ contribution to the overall formation of systemic
risk, namely all chosen correlation terms.
The regulator charges the bank the amount PH(Ac1
⋂
Bc1)τ as systemic
risk tax at t = 0 and after the banks set their choice of ρi, such that the tax is
incorporated in banks’ decision on the asset class.
4.3 Equilibrium analysis
In order to evaluate the equilibrium decisions of banks at the start of the
first period banks’ decisions with respect to their choice of asset class needs
to be determined. Each bank solves in this respect:
ρ∗(pii) ∈ arg max
ρ∈[ρl ,ρh]
{PH(Ac ⋂ Bc)(piibi − ci − τ)}, where
bi := pi−i1vSF + (1− pi−i1)v′SF;
ci := pˆi−i1vSF + (1− pˆi−i1)v′SF.
Under the assumption of perfect information, each bank has knowledge
with respect to the probability of receiving bailout support upon failure
when at least one other bank is financially distressed. The optimal strategy
for choice of asset class can then be expressed as:
ρ∗(pii) = ρh1{pii > (ci + τ)/bi}+ ρl(1− 1{pii > (ci + τ)/bi}). (4.5)
In case the bailout probability pii depends on the aggregate correlation struc-
ture, banks set ρ∗ = ρh. This result is driven by the complementary nature
of the choice of asset class. As more banks opt to assign more weight to
the asset class prone to be correlated, the likelihood of joint failure of banks
increases at the end of the first period. This reinforces banks’ incentives to
opt for more correlated asset classes, because as more banks fail jointly the
regulator is more inclined to initiate bailout support. Hence, the strategic
complementarity in choice of asset class results in multiplicity of equilibria,
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and implies either all banks choose ρh or low ρl (Morris and Shin, 2003).
To avoid multiplicity of equilibria as a result of strategic complementar-
ity I consider a noisy perturbation in banks’ knowledge about the cost for
the regulator to initiate bailout support θ. The approach follows the global
games methodology and relates closely to the works of Morris and Shin
(2003), and Angeletos et al. (2006). The regulator is given the option to reveal
the actual value of the bailout costs, θ, but this course of action is not optimal
for the regulator. The imperfect knowledge of banks concerning θ generates
the constructive ambiguity technology the regulator can exploit. The per-
turbation maintains strategic complementarily in banks’ asset class choices
but introduces additional uncertainty for banks concerning regulatory bail-
out policy. To explicitly incorporate constructive ambiguity endogenously,
rather than assuming constructive ambiguity to be present from the outset
has the advantage that signalling effects of other policy tools on this strategy
can be investigated.5 In addition to be a cost to banks, the systemic risk tax
signals the type of regulator, θ, banks face.
To evaluate the signaling role of a systemic risk tax, Bayesian-Nash equi-
libria are considered for two cases. First, a benchmark pooling equilibrium is
considered where the systemic risk tax is fixed and cannot be changed by the
regulator. This approach bears similarity to the manner in which Morris and
Shin (2003) solve their model on currency crises. In the second case, the reg-
ulator is allowed to change the systemic risk tax which results in a signaling
game. To this end, let τ(θ) be the systemic risk tax set by the regulator with
bailout costs θ ∈ R. Furthermore, let ρ∗(ξi, τ(θ)) be bank i’s equilibrium
choice of asset class based on received signal ξi ∈ R about θ and observed
tax τ; let ρ(θ, τ) be an array which contains all banks’ asset class choices.
Last, let µ(θ < θ′|ξi, τ) denote bank i’s posterior distribution of θ, i.e. bank
i’s beliefs about the regulator’s type. With the posterior distribution banks
infer the probability of receiving bailout support if financially distressed,
pii ≡ µ(θ < EH(C(i,−i))|ξi, τ) and µ(EH(C(i,−i))|ξi, τ) for short. These
5 Assuming constructive ambiguity to hold at all times conditions the analysis on this pre-
sumption, such that interactions between policy tools and constructive ambiguity cannot be
evaluated.
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expressions allow for an equilibrium definition that characterizes the main
actions by banks and the regulator in the first period of the model.
Both for the case of a fixed tax and a strategic tax these equilibrium ex-
pressions are solved in the two subsequent sections.




i0 at the start of the first
period, these are in the same manner contingent on the banks choices for ρi0
as in Acharya (2009). Since these choices do not bear consequences for the
main results of this paper they are omitted.6
4.3.1 Fixed non-strategic systemic risk taxation
In this section the systemic risk tax is fixed, i.e. τ = τ0. This implies τ∗(θ) =
τ0 for all government types θ. Banks remain therefore uninformed by the
systemic risk tax about the cost of bailouts. Under imperfect knowledge,
banks receive a noisy signal about the regulator’s cost of bailouts θ, i.e. ξi =
θ+ ε i, where ε ∼ F with density f and θ ∼ G with density g. The signal and
the prior knowledge of G allow banks to infer a posterior of θ. According to
Bayes’ rule the posterior distribution of θ of bank i can be expressed as:
θ|ξi ∼ µ(θ|ξi) :=
∫ θ
θ0
g(θ˜) f (ξi − θ˜)dθ˜∫ θ¯
θ0
g(θ) f (ξi − θ)dθ
. (4.6)
Banks believe they will receive a bailout if the cost of letting them fail
is sufficiently high. That is, the costs of bailing out the bank are lower than
some critical cost of letting the bank fail, θ ≤ θ∗. A bank with signal ξi
attaches probability µ(θ∗|ξi) to the event of receiving a bailout when fin-
ancially distressed, conditional on at least one other bank being financially
distressed. Given this probability the optimal action of bank i is denoted by
ρ∗(µ(θ∗|ξi)). The average action across banks can be denoted under true θ
6 I refer the reader to proposition 2 in Acharya (2009) and the proof thereof for a detailed




ρ∗(µ(θ∗|ξi)) f (ξi − θ)dξi.
The critical value θ∗ corresponds with the ex ante expectation banks
have of their cost of failure to the regulator C(i,−i). Since, the outcome
of C(i,−i) is random, banks associate the critical level of bailout costs θ∗
with EH(C(i,−i)), which is increasing in banks choice of ρi.7 As banks opt
for asset classes prone to be correlated the joint failure probability increases
and thus increases the expected cost to the regulator of letting a bank fail.
For ease of exposition, I assume EH(C(i,−i)) to be linearly increasing in
the average of banks’ asset class choices, such that the threshold condition




ρ∗(µ(θ∗|ξi)) f (ξi − θ∗)dξi. (4.7)
Since the aggregate action of the banking system is decreasing in θ, we have
under the critical value θ∗,∫
ξi∈R
ρ∗(µ(θ∗|ξi)) f (ξi − θ)dξi > θ.
Since f is continuous and monotonically decreasing in θ, (4.7) is a sufficient
condition for the existence of a unique threshold equilibrium.
Based on (4.7) and the monotonicity of µ there exists a unique signal
ξ∗ := ξ(θ∗|p¯i) for which a bank attaches probability p¯i to the event in which
bailout support is received when distressed and at least one other bank is
distressed. This signal is inferred from the condition
µ(θ∗|ξ(θ∗, p¯i)) = p¯i.
Suppose bank i receives such a signal ξ(θ∗, p¯i) and believes with probability
p¯i to receive bailout support when distressed and at least one other bank is
7 The expected costs of failure follows the analogy with system wide shortfall (Acharya
et al., 2012; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011).
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distressed. In addition, suppose bank j receives signal ξ j < ξ(θ∗, p¯i). It holds
that µ(θ∗|ξ j) > p¯i. Hence, the fraction of banks with stronger beliefs about
receiving bailout support when at least one other bank fails relative to bank
i with belief p¯i is denoted by:
∫ ξ(θ∗,p¯i)
inf{Ξ}
f (ξi − θ∗)dξi = F(ξ(θ∗, p¯i)− θ∗).
Differentiation of this expression with respect to p¯i results in the density of
beliefs among banks, γ(p¯i|θ∗), under the true θ∗.8 γ is the density of beliefs
about receiving bailout support distributed across the banking sector for a
given type of regulator θ∗. Combined with condition (4.7) and a change of
variable ξi to p¯i allows to pin down the average action of the banks with





Let θˆ := θ
∗−ρl
ρh−ρl and we can state this more conveniently in terms of banks’
actions:
θ∗ − ρl















Based on (4.5) the parameter θˆ can be interpreted as an index and indicates
the proportion of banks which choose ρh, whereas the remaining fraction
chooses ρl .
At first it seems that (4.8) implies an increase in the systemic risk tax τ
discourages banks from choosing ρh. The inference from this observation
would be that the regulator is in a position to curtail systemic risk taxation
by charging a sufficiently high systemic risk tax. However, a high systemic
risk tax also poses a cost to the regulator since it reduces the investment
8 This is possible since µ is monotonically decreasing in ξi.
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opportunity set of depositors and bank owners. This potential reduction
in wealth due to a high tax enters the regulator’s objective function (4.2)
through the cost δ. The result of this inference would be that the regulator
can set the systemic risk tax in a manner deemed optimal.
According to (4.8) the regulator has no incentive to reveal θ to the banks
in order to keep an ambiguous bailout policy. Since this would result in the
perfect information case where all banks can coordinate on the prospect of
receiving bailout support. In the subsequent section the systemic risk tax can
be chosen freely by the regulator and in addition to being a cost to banks the
tax acts as a signal that reflects the regulator’s optimal policy choice with
respect to bailout policy.
4.3.2 Strategic systemic risk taxation
The main result of this section is the derivation of a limited set of regulator
types for which it is optimal to levy a systemic risk tax to induce banks not
to coordinate on bailout prospects, i.e. not to choose ρh. If the costs associ-
ated with an increased dead-weight loss due to a high tax τ > τ exceed the
net costs of letting a bank fail the regulator finds the low tax, τ, the optimal
choice of systemic risk taxation. Likewise, the costs of letting banks fail can
be too low to justify a higher tax due to the ensuing welfare loss. This con-
trasts the comparative static derived from (4.8), which seems to suggest that
a high systemic risk tax results in lower systemic risk formation for any type
of regulator.
Two equilibria can be identified in the setting where the regulator chooses
τ ∈ [0, Dt]. One in which banks are unresponsive to a higher systemic risk
tax, a so-called pooling equilibrium; and one in which a subset of regulator
types benefits from setting a higher systemic risk tax.
Proposition 4.1. (Equilibria with strategic systemic risk taxation) – When
the regulator is able to set τ ∈ [τ, Dt] (with τ > 0) two equilibria can be identified
for the first period of the model, a pooling equilibrium (I.) and a semi-separating
equilibrium (II.):
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I. There exists an equilibrium in which the regulator sets τ(θ) = τ, ∀θ ∈ R.




h if ξi < ξ∗
ρl otherwise;
qi(θ) =
1 if θ < θ
∗
0 otherwise.
Where the private signal ξ∗ = ξ(θ∗, .), the critical cost of initiating no bailout
θ∗ and index θˆ, in (4.8), are the same as in section 4.3.1.




∗ if θ ∈ [θ, θ¯] ⊂ R
τ if θ /∈ [θ, θ¯];
ρ∗(ξi, τ) =
ρ
h if ξi < −∞ or (ξi, τ) < (ξ(θ, .), τ∗)
ρl otherwise;
qi(θ) =
1 if θ < θ0 otherwise.
Where θ ≤ θ∗ ≤ θ¯ and τ ≤ τ∗ ≤ τ˜ ≤ Dt. Additionally, the equilibrium
values θ, and θ¯ solve
θ = δ(τ∗) =
∫
ξi∈Ξ
ρ∗(µ(θ¯|ξi)) f (ξi − θ¯)dξi,
where the last term denotes the average action across banks.
Proof. See appendix.
The first equilibrium I. denotes a pooling equilibrium in which banks’
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are unresponsive to the regulator’s choice of τ. The optimal choice of tax-
ation by the regulator in this case is τ, since the tax will not have an effect
on bank’s choices and setting it higher only results in a welfare loss. This
equilibrium bears close similarity with the one derived in Section 4.3.1.
Regarding the second equilibrium, banks are responsive to the regu-
lator’s tax. It is in the interest of the regulator not to raise the tax beyond
τ∗. A higher tax only results in additional costs to the regulator while banks
would have already been successfully deterred in their choice for the cor-
related asset class ρh for a tax τ∗. The regulator’s choice τ∗ is dominated by
the lower tax τ if the net costs to bail out banks is not sufficiently high; or if
banks’ deem it likely for the regulator to initiate a bailout policy. This result
is derived from the regulator’s objective function (4.2) and the average ac-
tion of banks with respect to their choice of ρ. Two conditions prevail that
identify the types of regulator which do not prefer τ over τ:∫
ξi∈Ξ
ρ∗(µ(θ|ξi)) f (ξi − θ)dξi < δ(τ∗); (4.9a)
θ < δ(τ∗). (4.9b)
Condition 4.9a yields a θ¯ for which a regulator of type θ > θ¯ prefers to
set τ since the costs of letting banks fail is not sufficiently high, and banks
are likely to be deterred due to their private information about θ > θ¯, which
induces a large fraction of the banks to believe that a bailout is not a likely
outcome during a crisis.
Condition (4.9b) tells us for θ < θ = δ(τ∗) the regulator will have no
incentive to set τ∗ since banks will not be deterred in choosing ρh. In this
case banks private information is likely to induce a large fraction of banks
to believe that θ < θ, such that a large fraction of banks believes to receive
bailout support during a crisis event. However the fact that they observe τ
for such a regulator renders banks unsure whether they face a regulator of
a type θ < θ which is inclined to bail banks out, or a type θ > θ¯ which is not
inclined to do so. This ambiguity in type is the constructive ambiguity the
regulator can create as a weak type by setting a tax τ to imitate the tougher
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regulator. Setting any other tax between τ and τ∗ would immediately reveal
that the regulator is of type θ < θ and would cause the banks to coordinate
on bailout prospects.
4.4 Discussion of results
The main results of this paper are the regulator’s limitations to set optimally
a systemic risk tax for banks when the tax reveals to banks the regulator’s
inclination to initiate bailouts for banks. In section 4.3.1 the average action
across banks in equilibrium (4.8) with respect to their choice of asset class,
ρ, suggests that banks’ contribution to the formation of systemic risk can
be mitigated by setting a higher tax regardless of the regulator’s bailout
policy. This result contrasts the case where the tax is strategically set by the
regulator as discussed in section 4.3.2.
Failing to account for the fact that the tax may reflect the regulator’s
objective to safeguard financial stability may lead to spurious conclusions
about optimal systemic risk taxation. This result is driven by the regulator’s
objective to safeguard financial stability and renders the two policy tools
interdependent. If the regulator’s inclination to initiate bailout support is
high, θ < θ, a higher tax may not prove to be sufficient to alter banks’ pref-
erences for correlated assets, i.e. banks’ continue to coordinate and opt for
correlated assets and set ρh. A higher tax results in a welfare loss. This loss is
driven by the distortion in investment opportunities for banks’ owners and
depositors.
The failure of intermediate levels of taxation, τ ∈ (τ, τ∗), to deter sys-
temic risk formation is due to the private information banks have with re-
spect to the regulator’s inclination to initiate bailout support. Combined
with banks’ private information about the regulator the observation of an
intermediate tax induces banks to believe that a sufficiently high tax is ap-
parently sub optimal for the regulator they face, because the regulator is of
a type that is likely to initiate bailout support. Therefore any tax of the level
τ ∈ (τ, τ∗) that does not reflect the action of a regulator that faces relat-
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ively high costs associated with the bailout of a bank reveals to banks the
regulator’s type to be one that is highly inclined to bail out banks, i.e. θ < θ.
This result implies that an intermediate tax is informative for banks and
thereby cancels the effects of constructive ambiguity about bailout support
to deter systemic risk formation. For regulators with a high inclination to
initiate bailout support it is therefore optimal to not change the systemic risk
tax in order to keep banks in the dark concerning the bailout policy. In this
way the regulator with a high inclination to initiate bailout support imitates
a regulator’s action which is not inclined to initiate bailout support. The
ensuing ambiguity between types drives the source of uncertainty banks
face that can be exploited by the regulator as constructive ambiguity in order
to lower banks’ preferences for correlated assets.
Condition (4.9b) shows that the accuracy with which banks perceive the
regulator’s inclination to initiate bailout support has no influence on the
regulator’s lower threshold type θ who is willing to set τ∗. From this we can
infer that the above results are robust against changes in the specifications
of the noisy perturbation. Hence, the set of regulators for which θ < θ, the
optimal taxation remains the original, or low tax τ, regardless of the dis-
tribution of private information across banks. The only requirement is that
banks do not have perfect information about the regulators inclination to
initiate bailout support, in order to avoid multiplicity. The upper limit of
regulator types for whom it is optimal to set τ∗ is increasing in the average
action of banks with respect to their choice of asset class. The result is that
the equilibrium value of θ is independent renders the results in this paper
not prone to the critique made by Svensson (2006) about Morris and Shin’s
(2002) argument that welfare can be increasing in the inaccuracy of private
information.
4.5 Conclusion
The interdependence between systemic risk taxation and constructive am-
biguity is relevant for their effectiveness because banks can adjust their risk
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profile after the implementation of a systemic risk tax scheme and before a
bailout policy is executed. Banks’ risk-shifting behavior results in the model
from the set tax and expected bailout policy that reflect the regulator’s ob-
jective to ensure financial stability. Since the level of taxation signals the reg-
ulator’s stance on how to maintain financial stability, banks learn through
the perceived objective of the regulator the conditions in which bailout sup-
port is likely to be initiated. I find that the introduction of a systemic risk tax
therefore limits the degree of obfuscation the regulator can employ about
its bailout policy for distressed banks. Conversely, if the regulator desires
to maintain an ambiguous bailout policy, prospective risk shifting induced
by the signaling effect of a systemic risk tax should be incorporated in the
decision on the tax level. This finding suggests the existence of a trade-off
between the two policy tools, and results from evaluating systemic risk tax-
ation and ambiguous bailout programs in a joint framework.
The implications of this trade-off for macro-prudential policy inferences
are two-fold. First, to evaluate the effectiveness of regulatory policy tools
the policies need to be considered in a joint framework when they serve the
single objective of maintaining stability of the financial industry. Failing to
account for the interdependence between policy tools can lead to spurious
outcomes with respect to policies’ effectiveness in handling financial crises.
In the context of the considered framework I find for regulators with a high
inclination to initiate bailout support that the introduction of a systemic risk
tax can fail to successfully deter systemic risk formation. Second, the model
adds the caveat that conditioning a framework and its outcomes on the as-
sumption that one policy tool is effective at all times may give rise to spuri-
ous results as well. To maintain constructive ambiguity imposes restrictions
on the regulator’s ability to set a systemic risk tax in the considered frame-
work. If constructive ambiguity is assumed to hold at all times, the restric-
tions on the level of a systemic risk tax are ignored and can lead to undesired
outcomes.
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4.A Consequences of bank failure
4.A.1 Safe and risky assets
Safe asset – The return on the safe asset is denoted by rSt and materializes
at the end of a period. Banks channel a proportion of their raised deposits
to a sector in the economy that employs a neo-classical risk free technology.
The firms in this sector and banks engage in perfect competition in accessing
the market for the safe asset. This implies that rSt equals the marginal rate
of return on capital of the risk free technology. Let f : R+ → R+ denote
the production technology of the risk free asset which features f ′(x) > 0;
f ′′(x) < 0; limx↓0 f ′(x)→ ∞; and limx↑∞ f ′(x) = 0. In this context x denotes
the total amount invested in the risk free asset. Perfect competition implies
the equilibrium condition rSt = f
′(x).
Risky assets – The bank selects a risk profile based on idiosyncratic
volatility risk σit and preferred asset class ρi. Larger values for volatility
risk σit correspond with higher volatility in returns. For larger values of ρi
the bank opts for assets with higher correlation in returns. Based on the
bank’s risk profile the risky assets yield a random return Rit+1 ∼ h(σit, ρi),
t ∈ {0, 1}, where the density h(σit, ρi) belongs to a class of distributions
H(σit, ρi, σ−it, ρ−i) which feature mean-preserving spreads. Note that σ−it
and ρ−i denote tuples that contain the composite actions of all other banks
with respect to their choice of the risk parameters. As more banks opt for as-
set classes prone to be correlated, the overall performance of banks becomes
more correlated. This conjecture reflects both empirical and theoretical find-
ings in the literature on inter-bank return dependencies (Maksimovic and
Zechner, 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Rajan, 1994; Farhi and Tirole, 2012).
4.A.2 Equilibrium values at t = 1
The state SF is characterized by the survival of bank i and the failure of at


























it − rDit+1(xRit + xSit))dh(σit, .)− c(xRit).
(4.A.2)
For state SS v is expressed as vSS, and can be regarded as a specific case
of vSF in which all banks survive. A simplification is derived for v before
solving for the arguments in (4.A.1). This simplification is summarized in
lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.1. In any existing equilibrium rDt+1 = r
S
t+1 = rt+1, i.e. the return on the
safe asset is equal to the return demanded by depositors. This rate of return is equal









Suppose rDit+1 > r
S









Based on (4.A.2) and the above expression, for rDit+1 > r
S
it+1 ≥ 0 bank i has no
demand for the safe asset. However, this implies that rSit+1 = limx↓0 f
′(x)→
∞, a contradiction.
Suppose 0 ≤ rDit+1 < rSit+1. This implies that rcit+1 is decreasing in xSit
and (4.A.2) is increasing in xSit. Therefore, bank i has an infinite demand for




constraint or the short sale constraint would be violated, a contradiction.





Proof. OF PROPOSITION 4.1 (Strategic systemic risk tax): The proofs for
both equilibrium I and I I are considered below.
Equilibrium I. – This equilibrium constitutes a pooling equilibrium. In
this equilibrium all banks are unresponsive to the regulator’s action with
respect to τ. Therefore, a regulator of any type θ finds it optimal to set τ,
since the welfare costs associated with the tax δ are increasing in τ. The
monotonicity of δ establishes the optimality of τ.
Since the tax τ is set by all types of regulator, the tax is uninformative
to banks about the regulator’s type θ. Therefore, beliefs of banks about the
costs of a bailout are pinned down in an equal manner as for (4.6), such that
µ(θ|ξi, τ) ≡ µ(θ|ξi). Hence, as in Section 4.3.1, banks believe under non-
strategic taxation a bailout will be initiated if θ < θ˜. Additionally, as in the
case with a fixed systemic risk tax the bank finds it optimal to choose ρh if
ξi < ξ˜.
In case the regulator sets τ > τ banks detect a deviation. Let Θ¯(τ) de-
note the set of regulators for which the deviation to τ > τ is dominated in
equilibrium. Then for any signal ξi we must have the following two condi-
tions:
µ(θ ∈ Θ|ξi, τ) = 1,
µ(θ ∈ Θ¯|ξi, τ) = 0, if Θ * Θ¯(τ).
The two conditions form the natural restriction that beliefs should assign
positive measure to types that could lead to signal ξi, and require that beliefs
assign zero measure to types for which τ > τ is dominated in equilibrium.
The next step is to verify that the set of beliefs in equilibrium I. is non-
empty for all τ > τ. Banks react to the signal by choosing ρl unless they are
convinced the regulator must be of a low type, i.e. if ξi < −∞. Borrowing
the conditions (4.9b) and (4.9a) from section 4.3.2 allows us to pin down the
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set of θ which set τ such that the strategy is dominated in equilibrium by τ.
θ˜ solves:
θ˜ = δ(τ˜) =
∫
ξi∈Ξ
ρ∗(µ(θ˜|ξi)) f (ξi − θ˜)dξi,
such that Θ¯(τ) = R for τ > τ˜, and Θ¯(τ˜) = R \ {θ˜}. Therefore, the set
of beliefs satisfying the above-mentioned conditions is non-empty for τ ≥
τ˜. If τ ∈ (τ, τ˜), then the set of regulator types for which this strategy is
dominated is Θ \ [θ, θ¯], where
θ = δ(τ) =
∫
ξi∈Ξ
ρ∗(µ(θ¯|ξi)) f (ξi − θ¯)dξi.
Since θ < θ˜ < θ¯, the set of types for which τ is dominated in equilibrium is
Θ¯(τ) = R \ [θ, θ¯].
Equilibrium II. – In the second equilibrium, banks coordinate on the sys-
temic risk tax. Banks take average action∫
ξi∈Ξ
ρ∗(µ(θ|ξi)) f (ξi − θ)dξi
when τ < τ∗ ∈ [τ, τ˜], and all banks choose ρl as an optimal response when
τ ≥ τ∗. It is optimal for the regulator to choose τ if τ < τ∗, since for τ < τ∗
banks do not respond to the tax in which case it is optimal for the regulator
to minimize welfare loss δ. Banks are responsive to the tax when τ > τ∗,
such that the regulator prefers to set τ∗ > τ in this case.
For θ < 0 it is dominant for the regulator to set τ. However, when θ > 0






ρ∗(µ(θ|ξi)) f (ξi − θ)dξi
}
.
These payoffs illustrate that the costs of setting a higher τ∗ should not ex-
ceed the costs to bail out banks, and if banks deem it sufficiently likely that
no bailout policy will be initiated τ is preferred over τ∗. Based on the con-
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ditions, the regulator types which prefer τ∗ over τ have θ ∈ [θ, θ¯], where θ
and θ¯ solve
θ = δ(τ∗) =
∫
ξi∈Ξ
ρ∗(µ(θ¯|ξi)) f (ξi − θ¯)dξi.
Banks’ beliefs are pinned down by Bayes’ rule but differ from equilibrium I,
since whenever the regulator sets τ, the corresponding type θ /∈ [θ, θ¯]. Hence
beliefs about a bailout policy being initiated conditional on observing τ are
µ(θ|ξi, τ) ≡ µ(θ|ξi)1− µ(θ¯|ξi) + µ(θ|ξi) ,
where µ(θ|ξi) is defined as (4.6) and µ(θ|ξi, τ) is decreasing in ξi. The last
monotonicity result ensures uniqueness of equilibrium for the case where
banks respond to a strategically set systemic risk tax. Furthermore, the fact
that Θ ≡ R ensures that the set of regulator types for which τ ∈ (τ, τ∗) is





In the wake of Lehman Brother’s collapse on September 15, 2008 a myriad of
unparalleled support measures were issued for financial institutions. Many
of the unanticipated actions taken by financial regulators were beyond the
scope of conventional macro-prudential policy and took the form of recap-
italisations, debt guarantees, asset purchases and insurances (Panetta et al.,
2009). The main objective of the concerted efforts by regulators was to pre-
vent widespread default and a credit freeze during the ensuing crisis. How-
ever, the prospect of a cornered regulator forced to implement such meas-
ures can lead to speculation about the execution of de-facto bailouts.
Safety nets can therefore give rise to moral hazard in the form of ex-
cessive risk-taking behavior by banks’ managers as shown by Cordella and
Yeyati (2003), and Gorton and Huang (2004).1 Some financial institutions
may thereby have derived funding advantages prior to the Global Finan-
cial Crisis. Debt issued by financial institutions deemed to receive bailout
support when financially distressed are likely to borrow at more favorable
terms compared to peers for whom it is not likely to receive such support.
1 Banks may receive bailout support for reasons when deemed too-big-to-fail, or when too-
many fail simultaneously (O’Hara and Wayne, 1990; Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Brown
and Dinc¸, 2011; Dam and Koetter, 2012; Farhi and Tirole, 2012). Safety-net benefits may also
confer on difficult-to-fail-and-unwind banks (Carbo-Valverde et al., 2013).
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The nature of this funding advantage can be regarded as an implicit
guarantee extended by financial regulators and politicians to institutions
whose survival is regarded as important to maintain financial stability. This
paper aims to identify which institutions have benefited from such guar-
antees, to what extent, and how guarantees have been distributed among
institutions.
The main contribution of this paper is the estimation procedure for im-
plicit guarantees by considering guarantees as financial assets that can be
replicated from related financial assets for which we observe prices. This
has the advantage that the level of granted implicit guarantees can be freely
estimated rather than imposed by the researcher. Merton’s (1977; 1978) sem-
inal model on the cost of deposit insurance is derived from the assumption
that all liabilities are insured by the regulator. Duan et al. (1992) relax this
stringent assumption somewhat by fixing insurance on only deposits and
leave other liabilities uninsured. However, a sufficiently important institu-
tion may still receive bailout support beyond the entitled safety net support
(Freixas and Rochet, 2013). If market participants belief an institution may
benefit in the future from a bailout investors are likely to associate a lower
risk of default relative to the situation when bailouts are not expected.
Of particular interest are the costs associated with guarantees. To infer
the costs it is necessary to define the size of guarantees extended to a fin-
ancial institution. The size is often set by assumption or by following the
level set by a legal framework such as the deposit insurance of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation. By doing so the researcher may ignore rents
extracted from potential future support measures, such as bailouts, that are
beyond the assumption or the contemporary legal framework. Likewise,
setting the guarantee by assumption may result in overestimation of exten-
ded guarantees and mispricing. In this study the maximum level of implicit
guarantees is estimated from market data rather than set ex ante by assump-
tion. The estimated maximum level of implicit guarantees is subsequently
brought in relation with future bailout events to validate the implicit guar-
antee concept. The estimated value allows for calculating the annual rents,
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or the costs, associated with the implicit guarantee (Tarashev et al., 2010).
The credit risk model I propose for estimating implicit guarantees for
financial institutions relies on observations on market capitalisation, credit-
default-swap (CDS) spreads, and the institution’s book values. I take the
credit risk model of Duan and Fulop (2009) as a benchmark, but adept their
model to allow for default to occur before maturity and augment the model
with a price equation for CDS contracts. The addition of CDS spreads to the
model serves the purpose to identify implicit guarantees extended to the
institution’s creditors.
The implicit guarantees are explicitly modelled through the “loss-given-
default” of the financial institution. The presence of an implicit guarantee
lowers the loss-given-default faced by creditors. Namely, the shortfall of
the assets’ value to repay debt is reduced by the guarantee. The loss-given-
default marks a key component in the valuation of CDS contracts and is
endogenously modelled by the assets’ value of the institution and the level
of implicit guarantees. Since the acquisition of CDS contracts may serve as
a hedge against the default of an institution, an increase in CDS spreads can
be due to increases in the probability of default or an increase in the institu-
tion’s loss-given-default.
Section 5.2 presents an overview of the model. The data is subsequently
described in Section 5.3. Followed by a discussion of the results in Section
5.4. Last, I conclude in Section 5.5. Derivations and proofs are reserved for
the appendix.
5.2 Structural Model and Identification
5.2.1 Implicit guarantees as an asset
To extract the formation of implicit guarantees I consider a dynamic credit
risk model that is based on movements in a bank’s market capitalisation
and CDS spreads. Specifically, I follow the seminal work of Merton (1974)
and assume that the value of the bank’s activities at time t, Vt, follows a
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geometric Brownian motion with physical drift µt and volatility σ:
dVt = µtVtdt + σVtdWt, t ∈ [t0, T] (5.1)
where Wt denotes a standard Brownian motion.2
The value of the bank’s activities can not directly be observed, but can be
inferred from the market capitalisation of the bank. When debt matures and
no default event has arisen before maturity, equity holders repay the prom-
ised principal amount, k, to debt holders and keep any positive remainder
of the bank’s value as profit. The contingent claim equity holders have on
the bank’s activities is in this light similar to that of a barrier call option with
terminal payoff3
ET := (VT − k)1{ min
t0≤t≤T
Vt ≥ k}. (5.2)
Figure 5.1 illustrates below two scenarios of the institution’s value process
V. In case no default event occurs until maturity, equity holders receive
at maturity VT − k. In case a default event occurs shareholders loose their
claim and the assets of the institution are claimed by the debt holders, sim-
ilar to the second generation of credit risk models (Kim, Ramaswamy, and
Sundaresan, 1993; Nielsen, Saa`-Requejo, and Santa-Clara, 1993; Hull and
White, 1995; Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995, among others).4
2 The standard Brownian motion W satisfies the usual conditions, namely W = (Wt), t ∈
[t0, T] with respect to a reference filtration F = (Ft)t∈[t0,T], where T denotes maturity and t
indexes time. Let FT denote the smallest σ-field containing Ft for all t ∈ [t0, T]
3 Note that the operator (X)+ := max{X, 0}.
4 Unlike the second generation of credit risk models, in the first generation of credit risk
models default occurs only at the terminal date (Merton, 1974).
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Following the notion of put-call-parity financing the terminal payoff for
debt holders can be derived as:
DT : = VT − ET
= k1{ min
t0≤t≤T
Vt ≥ k}+VT1{ min
t0≤t≤T
Vt < k}.
The shortfall debt holders may experience at terminal time T amounts thus
to (k−VT)+, the standard terminal put payoff from Merton’s (1974) model.
In the event implicit guarantees have been extended to the institution
with terminal payoff GT the final payoff of debt amounts to:
DT = k + (VT − k)+1{ min
t0≤t≤T
Vt < k}+ (k−VT)+ + GT.
Central to the implicit guarantee is that it is allowed to differ in size, i.e.
the guarantee may apply to all creditors. In contrast, guarantees can also be
limited to only certain types of debt classes. I consider the case where guar-
antees only insure against default risk and up to an unobserved maximum
amount κ, which implies that the guarantees have the following payoff at
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maturity:
GT : = min{κ, (k−VT)+}
= (k−VT)+ − (k− κ −VT)+. (5.3)
The intuition underlying the parameter κ is that it defines the segment of
the principal, k, that is insured by the guarantor. The guarantee affects the
value of debt by reducing the default component in the debt payoff by the
amount κ. Such that debt holders no longer face the shortfall (k−VT)+, but
rather need only to hedge against the lower loss-given-default (k− κ−VT)+
to hedge default risk. This illustrates that the implicit guarantee decreases
the loss-given-default faced by the institution’s creditors, but may not ne-
cessarily imply a full guarantee. This can be interpreted as some creditors
receive guarantees but not necessarily all.
Figure 5.2. Debt holder’s payoff in case of default
Value (VT) 










Figure 5.2 highlights the effect of an increase in the maximum level of
implicit guarantees at the terminal date. The 45-degree line resembles the
regular payoff in case the institution defaulted, since creditors claim the as-
sets that generate at maturity the value VT. The creditors of the institution
face a smaller shortfall as the maximum of implicit guarantees, κ, increases,
which is resembled by a shift to the left of the regular payoff schedule when
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the terminal value VT is smaller than the notional value of debt k. Note that
the implicit guarantee payoff only occurs if the value of the assets is insuffi-
cient to cover the principal value of debt.
5.2.2 Identification of implicit guarantees
Since the value of equity is monotonically increasing in the value of the
bank, the valuation of the equity claim (5.2) yields an implied value Vt of
the institution. The market capitalisation of the institution is modelled as a
barrier option that is knocked out if the default event arises, this implies that
Vt is implicitly defined by (Musiela and Rutkowski, 2005):
Et : = E(Vt; σ, k, r, T),
= EBS(Vt; σ, k, r, T)− Eout(Vt; σ, k, r, T); (5.4)
where EBS is the standard Black-Scholes call option pricing function and Eout
the reduction in value that is due to risk of the option being knocked out,
i.e. default prior to maturity:
EBS : = VtΦ(d(Vt))− ke−r(T−t)Φ(d(Vt)− σ
√
T − t),






ln(Vt/k) + (r + σ2/2)(T − t)
σ
√
T − t ,
c(Vt) =




The implied value Vt is subsequently used in the analysis to identify the
implicit guarantees the bank received.
Based on the implicitly defined value of the institution Vt, the process
(5.1) and the default event {Vt ≤ k}we are in a position to derive the spread
terms of a CDS contract. In particular we are interested in the first time to
default in the risk-neutral world defined as τ := inf{t ≥ t0|Vt ≤ k}. which
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is derived from the condition:
Vt ≤ k,
Vt0exp{(r− σ2/2)t + σWt} ≤ k,
Wt ≤ 1
σ
(ln(k/Vt0)− (r− σ2/2)t) (5.5)
With the help of this default condition (5.5) we can derive the risk-neutral
value of a CDS contract and derive the equilibrium spread. The CDS con-
tract’s obligee, buyer of protection, pays a fixed amount, proportional to the
spread ct0, continuously to the obligor, seller of protection, until the time of
default or maturity. Once the default event arrives the obligor’s payment
(k − κ − VT)+ ensures that the obligee faces a limited shortfall at the time
of maturity, or none at all. Note that in the derivation of Proposition 5.1 the
shortfall for creditors backed by an implicit guarantee is taken into account
as in (5.3).
Proposition 5.1. : CDS spread – The combination of the default condition (5.5)
and proposition 5.2 for the distribution of the stopping time associated with this
condition yields the equilibrium credit default swap spread:





P(t0)− e−rTP(T)− H(T) + H(t0) . (5.6)
Where the survival function P() and H() are respectively defined by (5.A.1) and








the value of the expected shortfall term equals the Black-Scholes value of a put op-
tion.
Proof. For a derivation see Section 5.A.1 in the appendix
Result 5.1 shows that as an increase in the maximum of implicit guaran-
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tees extended decreases the loss given default faced by creditors and thereby
a reduction in CDS spreads.
The value of the bank’s activities (5.1), the valuation of the bank’s mar-
ket capitalisation (5.4) and CDS spreads (5.6) form the basis of the structural
credit risk model presented below. Given the structural-form of the model,
the model presented in this paper relates to the setup of second-generation
credit risk models, rather than then the third generation of credit risk models
which typically have a reduced-form specification (Madan and Unal, 1995;
Jarrow and Turnbull, 1995; Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull, 1997; Lando, 1998;
Duffie and Singleton, 1999). In the reduced-form credit risk models the loss-
given default, or recovery rate, and probability of default are generally as-
sumed to be independent from the structural features of the firm, whereas
for the purpose of inferring implicit guarantees from the recovery rate of
debt we require a structural model specification.
5.2.3 Derivation of the model’s likelihood function
We rewrite the continuous-time value process of the bank (5.1) into a discrete-
time form, and let i index observations and let h = τi − τi−1 be the constant
time increment between observations. The discrete-time form of the value
process of the bank is then given by








hε i, ε i ∼ N(0, 1), (5.7)
where the noise term ε i is assumed to be independent and identically dis-
tributed (iid).
Although the value process of the bank’s activities is not observed an
implied value process can be inferred from the bank’s market capitalisation.
Assuming that equity is a residual claim of the bank’s assets (5.4) allows
for inferring the implied value of the bank’s assets. To account for trad-
ing noise and misspecification errors a multiplicative error structure is as-
sumed which yields the following measurement equation for the value of
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the bank’s activities:
lnEτi = lnE(Vτi ; σ, k, r, T − τi) + δvi, vi ∼ N(0, 1). (5.8)
Note that vi is assumed to be iid, and δ parameterises the intensity of meas-
urement error with respect to the Black-Scholes pricing of market capitalisa-
tion.
We can regard (5.7) and (5.8) as the state-space model of Duan and Fulop
(2009), where the first equation is the unobserved transition process and
the second equation the measurement equation. The only exception being
that Duan and Fulop consider the standard Black-Scholes call option price,
whereas here we consider a barrier option.
We adopt a similar approach for the measurement equation of the bank’s
activities based on CDS spreads. For similar reasons as above a multiplicat-
ive error structure is assumed for this measure equation which is based on
(5.6) and denoted by:
lncτi = lnc(Vτi ; σ, k, κ, r, T) + ςui, ui ∼ N(0, 1); (5.9)
where ui is iid. In short, the measurement equation (5.8) based on market
capitalisation identifies the unobserved value of the bank’s activities, and
the measurement equation (5.9) then allows for identifying the maximum
of implicit guarantees extended. The issue of misspecification and credit-
risk counter party risk is evaluated subsequently in the section on results,
Section 5.4.
The noise structure imposed on the CDS-spread based measurement
equation (5.9) serves the purpose to control for omitted country-party credit
risk as well misspecification error. Counter-party credit risk may also be
priced in the CDS spreads as found by Arora et al. (2012). Although the
proportional noise structure is no panacea to the latter problem, we can ex-
pect that if counterpart credit risk is prevalent it is likely to influence the
volatility parameters of the noise structure, δ and ς. In Section 5.4 a robust-
ness test is performed to infer to what extend these parameter estimates are
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driven by counter-party credit risk characteristics.The latter argument may
as well hold for the equity-based measurement equation (5.8)
We are now in a position to extend the credit risk model of Duan and
Fulop (2009) with (5.6) to construct a state-space model that allows for the
estimation of limited guarantees on debt as perceived by the market. The
ensuing state-space model is a system of equations formed by the transition
process (5.7), the measurement equation (5.8), and (5.9). The model contains
five parameters denoted by θ = [µ, σ, δ, ς, κ].
Let the sample of market capitalisation values up to the ith observation
be denoted by Ei := {Eτj : j ∈ {0, ..., i}}, and similarly for the observed CDS
spreads by Yi := {cτj : j ∈ {0, ..., i}}. The functional form of the state-space
model associated with (5.7) - (5.9) can in principle be stated for n observa-
tions as:
f (En,Yn|θ) = f (Eτn , cτn |En−1,Yn−1, θ) . . . f (Eτ1 , cτ1 |E0,Y0, θ). (5.10)
To estimate (5.10) we simplify matters by estimating the expected values
of each term on the right-hand side of the likelihood separately in a sequen-
tial order. The first step is to take a likelihood contribution term and express
it as:




f (Eτi , cτi |Vτi−1 , θ)g(Vτi |Ei−1,Yi−1, θ)dVτi−1 , (5.11)
where g denotes the prediction density of Vτi based on previously observed
data. The error structure in the equity-based measurement equation (5.8)
complicates matters, if this error structure is not assumed the model spe-
cification would bear close resemblance to Duan (1994, 2000). However in
order to maximise the likelihood function, (5.10), in the presence of an error
structure associated with measurement, the filtering estimation procedure
proposed by Pitt and Shephard (1999) and Pitt (2002) is adopted. An outline
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of the procedure is presented in the appended Section 5.A.2.
5.3 Data
The sample of 150 financial institutions comprises of daily market capit-
alization values and daily observed CDS spread quotations that cover the
period January 2004 through July 2007. The equity data is obtained from
Thompson Reuter’s Datastream and the CDS spreads have been provided
by the Markit Group. The main motivation for the sample period lies in the
observation that prior to 2004 the data on CDS spreads showed sequences of
missing observations and July 2007 marks the first time concerted efforts by
financial market regulators were taken to stabilise the financial system.5 In
the period that followed until 2009, denoted as the Global Financial Crisis,
a myriad of unparreled support measures were issued for financial insti-
tutions. The aim of the analysis is to evaluate whether there exist a statist-
ical link between implicit guarantees estimated for the period January 2004
through July 2007 and to see if they relate to future bail out events, that
can be interpreted as the materialization of the guarantees perceived by in-
vestors, and acts at the same time as a model validation exercise. In addition
to the market data, balance sheet data is required as a proxy for the strike
level that triggers default, denoted as k above.
The time to maturity, T, is set throughout to 5 years. Motivation for this
choice is based on the observation that CDS contracts with a maturity of
five years are traded more frequent and are more liquid (BBA, 2006). The
idea is to mitigate the interference of trading noise stemming from an illi-
quid market in the estimation of the model’s parameters. To some extend
the proportional noise structure also controls for this as argued by Duan
and Fulop (2009). Corresponding to a maturity of five years, the risk-free is
the 5-year Treasury constant maturity rate obtained from the U.S. Federal
Reserve.
5 The ECB allowed for low-interest rate credit lines in the amount of USD 130 billion on
August 9, 2007. The Federal Reserve subsequently issued temporary reserves in the amount




Table 5.1 reports parameter estimates of the top 30 financial institutions in
terms of the estimated proportion of liabilities being implicitly guaranteed
and which received bailout support during the Global Financial Crisis. The
columns contain the maximum likelihood estimates of the presented credit
risk model’s parameters, (5.7)–(5.9), with their asymptotic standard errors
in brackets. The estimated asset volatility parameters, σ are stated per an-
num and are in line with what may be expected of their values. Their stand-
ard errors are generally very small, unlike the standard errors of the drift
parameter, µ, which are characterised by a substantial amount of sampling
errors. These results are so far in line with expectations.
The estimated values for the guarantee parameter, κ, can be interpreted
as a percentage of the face value of the institutions liabilities that is implicitly
guaranteed. That is to say for the case of US Bancorp, ranked first, that 29.1
percent of its face value is perceived by the market to be implicitly guaran-
teed. The test results presented in the last column relate to the likelihood ra-
tio test whether implicit guarantees are present. Only in a few cases does the
data suggest the presence of implicit guarantees. When we take a signific-
ance level of 10 percent we find that implicit guarantees have likely accrued
to 9 institutions that actually received bailout support. Notably among these
cases are AIG, Bank of America, Danske Bank, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, JP
Morgan Chase and US Bancorp.The reason for this limited number of insti-
tutions is driven by the inclusion of the noise term and associated relevance
parameter ς in the measurement of CDS spreads in (5.9). Results for the case
where ς to zero, not reported, generally result in a larger number of insti-
tutions for which likelihood ratio test indicates that implicit guarantees are
likely to be present.
Summary statistics for the credit risk model’s parameter estimates are
presented in Table 5.2 for all of the 150 sampled financial institutions. There
are no notable differences between the estimated values for the per annum
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Table 5.1. Model estimation results for 30 bailed out financial institutions
Parameter Estimates LR test
Credit risk model parameters Model noise parameters
Institution’s name σ µ κ δ× 100 ς p value
US Bancorp 0.199 [0.012] -0.024 [0.214] 0.291 [0.152] 0.349 [0.140] 0.576 [0.557] 0.032
Danske Bank 0.070 [0.005] 0.002 [0.156] 0.209 [0.115] 0.297 [0.177] 0.659 [0.603] 0.037
JP Morgan Chase 0.086 [0.003] 0.007 [0.127] 0.203 [0.117] 0.292 [0.103] 0.479 [0.515] 0.048
Freddie Mac 0.067 [0.012] 0.000 [0.220] 0.193 [0.117] 0.399 [0.149] 0.467 [0.486] 0.043
Capital One 0.151 [0.010] -0.556 [0.093] 0.178 [0.121] 0.800 [0.227] 0.396 [0.476] 0.078
Fannie Mae 0.064 [0.042] -0.004 [0.137] 0.172 [0.071] 0.320 [0.180] 0.359 [0.597] 0.042
Nordea Bank 0.064 [0.006] -0.026 [0.068] 0.170 [0.102] 0.211 [0.163] 0.413 [0.543] 0.075
Citigroup 0.076 [0.005] 0.015 [0.250] 0.137 [0.111] 0.273 [0.084] 0.627 [0.530] 0.115
ABN Amro 0.095 [0.009] -0.875 [0.147] 0.127 [0.093] 0.348 [0.277] 0.612 [0.472] 0.174
Bank of America 0.060 [0.009] 0.037 [0.100] 0.106 [0.032] 0.226 [0.187] 0.516 [0.532] 0.046
AIG 0.223 [0.006] -0.183 [0.104] 0.095 [0.024] 0.271 [0.225] 0.524 [0.592] 0.031
American Express 0.142 [0.008] 0.086 [0.100] 0.093 [0.071] 0.404 [0.148] 0.432 [0.619] 0.192
BNP 0.058 [0.010] -0.067 [0.139] 0.089 [0.077] 0.377 [0.217] 0.642 [0.541] 0.134
Societe Generale 0.076 [0.009] -0.064 [0.222] 0.083 [0.076] 0.282 [0.280] 0.447 [0.607] 0.141
UBS 0.058 [0.012] -0.092 [0.122] 0.078 [0.065] 0.233 [0.074] 0.565 [0.487] 0.171
Goldman Sachs 0.061 [0.016] 0.114 [0.121] 0.071 [0.065] 0.323 [0.346] 0.513 [0.578] 0.156
Credit Agricole 0.050 [0.017] -0.031 [0.110] 0.060 [0.054] 0.278 [0.100] 0.539 [0.608] 0.176
RBS 0.049 [0.017] -0.236 [0.150] 0.054 [0.062] 0.311 [0.193] 0.514 [0.515] 0.153
Bank of Ireland 0.098 [0.009] 0.077 [0.198] 0.040 [0.069] 0.355 [0.245] 0.632 [0.551] 0.222
Morgan Stanley 0.053 [0.019] 0.083 [0.222] 0.035 [0.059] 0.509 [0.160] 0.617 [0.522] 0.185
ING Group 0.045 [0.018] -0.072 [0.180] 0.030 [0.069] 0.265 [0.097] 0.409 [0.581] 0.191
Natixis 0.059 [0.020] 0.050 [0.066] 0.017 [0.105] 0.360 [0.174] 0.386 [0.461] 0.151
Banca Monte dei Paschi 0.050 [0.015] 0.057 [0.145] 0.014 [0.019] 0.214 [0.095] 0.645 [0.564] 0.193
KBC Group 0.072 [0.014] -0.299 [0.175] 0.000 [0.089] 0.284 [0.171] 0.535 [0.480] 0.392
Northern Rock 0.075 [0.016] -0.416 [0.204] 0.000 [0.054] 0.127 [0.182] 0.568 [0.541] 0.303
Anglo Irish Bank Corp 0.168 [0.007] -0.171 [0.135] 0.000 [0.075] 0.159 [0.068] 0.600 [0.424] 0.369
IKB 0.295 [0.006] -0.578 [0.090] 0.000 [0.135] 0.488 [0.172] 0.438 [0.488] 0.323
EFG Euro Bank 0.162 [0.015] 0.064 [0.211] 0.000 [0.094] 0.731 [0.269] 0.473 [0.406] 0.396
Suntrust Banks 0.096 [0.013] -0.261 [0.074] 0.000 [0.082] 0.575 [0.260] 0.435 [0.519] 0.374
Allied Irish Bank 0.083 [0.021] -0.033 [0.147] 0.000 [0.079] 0.343 [0.254] 0.561 [0.541] 0.312
Notes: Table reports parameter estimates of the credit risk model, (5.7)–(5.9), with associated standard
errors presented in brackets. 30 financial institutions are ranked in descending order by the estimated
value for the guarantee parameter κ. Estimates and standard errors associated with the noise parameter δ
are multiplied by 100. The final column reports test results of a model likelihood ratio test, where under
the null no implicit guarantees exist, κ = 0, and the alternative suggests the existence of a level of implicit
guarantees, κ ∈ (0, 1).
volatility and drift parameters. Combined with the presented values in Table
5.1 it can be noted that the estimated value for implicit guarantee parameter
κ is higher for institutions that received bailout support during the Global
Financial Crisis. In the subsequent section a validation exercise is provided
to test this proposition more formally.
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Table 5.2. Summary statistics parameter estimates
Parameter mean std. dev. min p25 median p75 max
σ 0.2453 0.2115 0.0440 0.0765 0.1638 0.3460 0.9797
µ 0.0567 0.2739 -0.8752 -0.0350 0.0490 0.1435 1.2919
κ 0.1065 0.1509 0.0000 0.0000 0.0413 0.1709 0.2914
δ× 100 0.7056 0.7678 0.1242 0.3202 0.4495 0.6914 4.7114
ς 0.5361 0.0988 0.3093 0.4646 0.5386 0.6121 0.7777
Notes: Table reports descriptive statistics for the 150 sampled financial institu-
tions. σ denotes the per annum volatility of the market value of the institution’s
assets; µ the drift term per annum of the market value of assets; κ the proportion
of the face value of the institution’s liabilities that is implicitly guaranteed to be
repaid. The noise parameters δ and ς correspond respectively to the model equa-
tions (5.8) and (5.9). Note that the estimated values of δ have been multiplied by
100.
The estimated values for the noise parameter δ are in line with the val-
ues found by Duan and Fulop (2009). Since the considered credit-risk model
features a similar stylised structure as the Merton (1974) model we can inter-
pret the values estimated for δ parameter as the magnitude of measurement
error stemming from misspecification. Duan and Fulop (2009) ask a sim-
ilar question and perform a cross-sectional regression analysis to ascertain
whether the estimated values for δ are in line with commonly prior adop-
ted proxies for market liquidity. Their findings give rise to the notion that
higher estimated values for δ is actually trading noise rather than measure-
ment error. They find that δ estimates are positively influenced by a growing
bid-ask spread and for larger firms they find lower estimated values of δ.
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5.4.2 Validation of implicit guarantees
Table 5.3. Validation of implicit guarantees




ln(Total Assets) 0.095*** 0.084***
[0.024] [0.031]
Observations 150 150 150
log-likelihood -80.453 -73.512 -72.850
Pseudo R2 0.253 0.223 0.261
Notes: Table reports the marginal effect of variables de-
rived from logit regressions for whether an institution
received financial support or guarantees from central
regulators during the Global Financial Crisis. κˆ stands
for the estimated proportion of the face value of the
firm’s liabilities that is implicitly guaranteed to be re-
paid in full. The regressors are obtained in the pre-crisis
period. Standard errors are robust against heteroske-
dasticity. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote respectively signific-
antly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Table 5.3 presents in a similar manner to Chapter 2 the results of a val-
idation test for the implicit guarantee estimate of the proportion of the face
value of a firm’s liabilities that is implicitly guaranteed to be repaid. While
controlling for size, to account for the too-big-to-fail hypothesis, we find a
stable marginal effect of a one percentage point increase in the implicit guar-
antee estimate results in a 2.4 percentage point increase in the probability of
receiving bailout support during a future crisis. The marginal effect of the
size variable the logarithm of total assets bears similarity to the result found
in Chapter 3.
The merit of this validation test lies in the cross-sectional analysis of im-
plicit guarantee estimates. Even though table 5.1 seems to suggest that the
measure captures the concept of implicit guarantees, since we find here es-
timates that differ significantly from zero in a statistical sense, it may still be
the case that the measure picks up measurement or misspecification error. To
some extent the proportional noise term may account for measurement er-
ror. These errors may for instance arise from the model specification which
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contains the assumption that maturities and default risks are equal across
liabilities. This shortcoming motivates the validation of the guarantee es-
timates in the cross-section to test if the measurement error is sufficiently
random .
5.5 Concluding Remarks
This Chapter presents an adaptation and extension of the credit risk model
by Merton (1974). The main difference lies in the possibility of default to oc-
cur maturity and the inclusion of a pricing scheme for CDS contracts that
allows for determining the spreads of such a contract. The recovery rate of
the firm’s liabilities is assumed to be determined by the shortfall the firm
is likely to face at maturity and is therefore time-varying rather than con-
stant. Additionally, creditors may benefit from so-called implicit guarantees
that materialize when the firm is facing a shortfall at maturity and the fin-
ancial regulators deem it optimal to bail out the firm’s creditors to keep the
business afloat.
Despite the result that we only find a handful of firms that seem to have
benefitted from implicit guarantees by obtaining a few estimates of implicit
guarantees which are significantly differ from zero, a cross-sectional valid-
ation study indicates that the guarantee estimates pertain to future bailouts
in a significant manner.
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5.A Derivations
5.A.1 Terms of the Credit Default Swap
In this section the derivation of the no-arbitrage spreads of the CDS contract
is presented. In what follows we require a standard Brownian motion W that
satisfies the usual conditions, namely W = (Wt), t ∈ [t0, T] with respect to a
reference filtration F = (Ft)t∈[t0,T], where T denotes maturity and t indexes
time. Let FT denote the smallest sigma field containing Ft for all t ∈ [t0, T].
Additionally, a survival function of the underlying reference institution is
required to value the cash flows associated with the CDS contract.
The following proposition is useful to obtain the distribution of the de-
fault time.
Proposition 5.2. Let the random variable Yt := y0 + νt+ σWt, where ν ∈ R, y0,
σ > 0, and Wt is a standard Brownian motion under P. Then the random variable
τ := inf{t ≥ t0|Yt = 0} has an inverse Gaussian probability distribution under
P, that is for a default time s:













where Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
Proof. For a derivation see Section A.18. in Musiela and Rutkowski (2005)
Substituting the condition (5.5) for Yt = 0 in proposition 5.2 implies,
under risk-neutral valuation, ν = r − σ2/2, and y0 = −lnk/Vt0 and yields
the probability function of no default up and until time s:
P(s) =Φ





− exp{2(r + σ2/2)σ−2ln(k/Vt0)}
×Φ







Differentiating this survival function with respect to s and negating then
yields the probability density function of the time of default:














where φ denotes the standard normal density function.
The CDS contract’s obligee, buyer of protection, pays a fixed amount c
continuously to the obligor, seller of protection, until the time of default or
maturity. Once the default event arrives the obligor’s payment ensures that
the obligee faces no shortfall at the time of maturity. This payment therefore









The value of this claim amounts to a down-and-in put-barrier option and
equals the payoff of an European put option.
The discounted risk-neutral value of the stream of payments c the obli-











































The value of the the CDS contract equals zero, which implies that val-




















P(t0)− e−rTP(T)− H(T) + H(t0) .
5.A.2 Maximum likelihood estimation with a particle filter
To deal with the potential problem of encountering measurement errors in
inferring the implied value of the bank’s activities we introduce an adapta-
tion of the expression for the likelihood contribution (5.11) above. This ad-
aption allows us to to evaluate the likelihood function numerically. Note
that below we make use of the short-hand expression
Vˆ(Eτi , vi) := E
−1(Eτi e
−δvi ; σ, k, r, T − τi),
which is the inversion of (5.8). In addition, we require the derivative of this
measurement equation with respect to market capitalisation Et, which is
equivalent to :
Ψ(Eτi , vi, k, r, T − τi|θ) :=
∂E(Vˆ(Eτi , vi); σ, k, r, T − τi)
∂Vt
.
Since measurement errors are considered to be independent from the value
of a bank’s activities the first term in the integrand of the likelihood contri-
bution (5.11) can be stated as:








f (Vτi = Vˆ(Eτi , vi), cτi |vi, Vτi−1 , θ)
Ψ(Eτi , vi, k, r, T − τi|θ)eδvi
φ(vi|θ)dvi (5.A.3)
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Note that Theorem 2.2 from Duan (1994) is used to rewrite (5.A.3). Tak-
ing both (5.11) and (5.A.3) allows for a convenient expression of the ith like-
lihood contribution:






f (Vτi = Vˆ(Eτi , vi), cτi |vi, Vτi−1 , θ)
Ψ(Eτi , vi, k, r, T − τi|θ)eδvi
× φ(vi|θ)g(Vτi |Ei−1,Yi−1, θ)dvidVτi
= E
[
f (Vτi = Vˆ(Eτi , vi), cτi |vi, Vτi−1 , θ)





f (Vτi = Vˆ(Eτi , vi), cτi |vi, Vτi−1 , θ)




The first step towards the second equality in (5.A.4) is to express the like-
lihood contribution in terms of the expectation of both measurement error
and the value of the bank’s activities. The last expression is a simplification,
since the expectation only needs to be conditioned on the preceding values
of market capitalisation and the CDS spread.
The above expression can be estimated by the approach proposed by Pitt
and Shephard (1999), Pitt (2002) to deal with measurement error in a state-
space model’s measurement equation. This estimation procedure is rooted
on the work of Gordon et al. (1993) and Doucet et al. (2001) on the applic-
ations of particle filtering. Estimation of the contributions to the likelihood
function are carried out sequentially for all terms in (5.10).
The particle filter initiates with the assumption V(m)τ0 = Vˆ(Eτi , 0) for all
m, where m indexes the M replications of the filtering procedure. For sub-
sequent observations we adopt the following three-step procedure (Duan
and Fulop, 2009):
• Step 1: Start with V(m)τi in the equal-weight filtering sample. For i = 1
this translates in the use of the initially set V(m)τ0 . Take a pre-sampled
standard normal value v(m)i+1 and calculate V
(m)
τi+1 = Vˆ(Eτi , v
(m)
i ). This
procedure results in M pairs {V(m)τi+1 , V(m)τi }.
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• Step 2: Calculate the importance weight associated with the
pair {V(m)τi+1 , V(m)τi }:
wmi+1 =
f (Vˆ(m)τi+1 |V(m)τi , θ)
Ψ(Eτi , vi, k, r, T − τi|θ)
.






i+1 to the value Vˆ
(m)
τi+1 . Note that from (5.7)
we arrive at












• Step 3: Construct an empirical distribution with the weighted sample
{V(m)τi+1 ,pi(m)i+1} for all m. Use this empirical distribution to resample M
new candidate lagged values in order to filter the next observation.
As found by Pitt (2002), the importance weight in Step 2 is the term in-
side the expectation operator of (5.A.4). This conditional likelihood can now
be approximated for a given set of parameters θ by







This procedure allows us to estimate sequentially the contribution (5.11) for
each observation such that we can estimate the likelihood function (5.10),
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Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift is een bundeling van vier studies op het gebied van de for-
matie van systeem risico in de financie¨le sector. Hoofstukken 2 en 3 bevatten
de beschrijving, opzet en resultaten van twee empirische studies. De laatste
twee hoofdstukken 4 en 5 beschrijven twee theoretische modellen waarbij
het laatste model in hoofdstuk 5 wordt geschat met behulp van gegevens
over de krediet posities van banken. Naast de bijdragen op het gebied van
de formatie van systeem risico bevat dit proefschrift ook bijdragen op het
gebied van het modelleren van krediet risico met behulp van premies voor
het financie¨le derivaat Credit Default Swap (CDS). Een contract waarvoor
een periodieke betaling van een premie verzeker biedt tegen het faillisse-
ment van een instantie.
De Globale Financie¨le Crisis werd in augustus 2007 ingeluid met de
georganiseerde interventies van verscheidene centrale banken in de ban-
ken sector. Sindsdien is het concept systeem risico onderwerp van discus-
sie in academische kringen, onder beleidsmakers, maar heeft ook de aan-
dacht gekregen van het algemeen publiek. De formatie van systeem risico
kan worden beschouwd als een toename van risico’s die bijdragen aan de
waarschijnlijkheid en kosten die gemoeid zijn met substantie¨le schade aan
de financie¨le sector met als gevolg de ontwrichting van de algehele econo-
mie. Academici hebben op dit gebied getracht systeem risico exact te de-
finie¨ren en te meten. Beleidsmakers trachten te voorkomen dat het vooruit-
zicht op financie¨le ondersteuning voor banken niet leidt tot een opzettelijke
verslechtering van risico posities. Het publiek houdt zich bezig met systeem
risico vanwege de substantie¨le beroepen die gedaan worden op belasting-
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gelden om banken te herkapitaliseren. In de voorgaande hoofdstukken wor-
den deze bovengenoemde perspectieven nader belicht en onderzocht.
In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt het concept too-connected-to-fail geı¨ntroduceerd.
Met deze classificatie worden banken geduid wiens stabiliteit van cruciale
betekenis is voor de stabiliteit van de financie¨le sector. Echter wordt deze
classificatie niet noodzakelijk gedreven door de grootte van de bank, als in
de marktwaarde van de activa, maar eerder vanwege de verbondenheid met
ander financie¨le instellingen door middel van bijvoorbeeld kredietbesmet-
ting.
Aangezien het niet mogelijk is de intensiteit van de verbindingen tussen
banken waar te nemen worden deze afgeleid en geschat met behulp van
Extreme Waarde Theorie. Uit herhaalde substantie¨le bewegingen in de pre-
mies van CDS contracten en rendementen op aandelen leiden we de mate
van verbondenheid tussen financie¨le instellingen af. Een substantie¨le toe-
name van een CDS premie is indicatief voor een toename op de kans en
de kosten van het faillissement van de onderliggende instantie. Op het mo-
ment dat twee instanties herhaaldelijk dergelijke toenames in hun CDS pre-
mies tegelijkertijd ervaren kan men spreken van een krediet risico verbin-
ding, al dan niet beı¨nvloed door externe factoren. Een verbinding waarbij
het voor kan komen dat als e´e´n instantie failliet dreigt te gaan de ander een
dergelijk scenario ook waarschijnlijk zal ervaren, visa versa, of tegelijkertijd.
Hetzelfde geldt voor negatieve rendementen behaald op het bezit van aan-
delen. Resultaten geven weer dat naarmate financie¨le instanties een centrale
rol vervullen binnen de financie¨le sector zij eerder in aanmerking kwamen
voor financie¨le ondersteuning uit belastinggelden ten einde de bank te her-
kapitaliseren. Dit resultaat is verkregen terwijl rekening is gehouden met
de grootte van de instantie en risico factoren die voor de bank specifieke
elementen controleren.
In hoofdstuk 3 is het onderwerp van studie de relatie tussen compen-
satie voor directeuren van financie¨le instellingen en de formatie van sys-
teem risico in de financie¨le sector. Resultaten wijzen erop dat met name
de grootte van de bonus compensatie voor leden van de bestuursraad die
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geen voorzitter zijn (non-CEO directeuren) bijdraagt aan de formatie van
systeem risico. Dit resultaat sluit aan bij eerdere theoretische bevindingen
in de literatuur waarin de voorzitter begaan is met de algehele prestaties
van de bank, terwijl de overige directeuren begaan zijn met de prestaties
van met name de afdelingen die zij vertegenwoordigen. Die risico’s die bij-
dragen aan de formatie van systeem risico kunnen hierdoor afkomstig zijn
van keuzes die gemaakt worden door managers die zich met name bezig
houden met risico-rendement afwegingen die de eigen afdeling betreffen.
Waar vervolgens door de afdeling risico posities worden ingenomen die
worden afgewenteld op andere afdelingen en uiteindelijk op partijen bui-
ten de bank als de bank als geheel failliet dreigt te geraken. Het is daarom
van belang dat financie¨le markt autoriteiten zich niet enkel bezig houden
met de grootte van de beloningen voor top mangement, maar ook met de
vraag hoe door de beloningstructuur van de bank de belangen en acties van
de overige management lagen worden beı¨nvloed.
In Hoofdstuk 4 worden twee beleidsinstrumenten bestudeerd: een sys-
teem risico belasting en een fonds waarmee herkapitalisering van failliete
banken kan worden gefinancierd. Een systeem risico belasting is een nog
niet bestaand middel om banken te ontmoedigen bij te dragen aan de forma-
tie van systeem risico, maar wordt op dit moment besproken in de academi-
sche literatuur en beleidsvoorstellen. In tegenstelling tot de bestaande litera-
tuur wordt in dit hoofdstuk de afhankelijk tussen beide beleidsinstrumen-
ten gemodelleerd. Deze afhankelijkheid volgt uit het gemeenschappelijke
doel waarvoor deze instrumenten worden gebruikt, namelijk het behouden
van financie¨le stabiliteit. Het model laat zien dat het negeren van deze af-
hankelijkheid kan leiden tot verkeerde interpretaties met betrekking tot de
effectiviteit van beide instrumenten. De intuı¨tie ligt in het signaal dat wordt
afgegeven door het zetten van een systeem risico belasting over de mate
waarin de overheid begaan is met het behouden van financie¨le stabiliteit.
Dit signaal kan door banken worden gebruikt om nauwkeuriger de kans
vast te stellen dat zij in aanmerking komen voor herkapitalisering fond-
sen gedurende een crisis. Indien deze kans als acceptabel wordt geacht kan
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deze informatie tot meer systeem risico formatie leiden, terwijl de bedoeling
van de belasting was dergelijke risico’s juist terug te dringen. Dit resultaat
suggereert dat afhankelijkheid tussen beleidsinstrumenten in ogenschouw
dient te worden genomen om de effectiviteit van deze instrumenten vast te
kunnen stellen.
Hoofdstuk 5 presenteert een krediet risico model waarmee wordt onder-
zocht in welke mate financie¨le instellingen baat hebben gehad van mogelijke
herkapitalisering fondsen in het vooruitschiet. Het anticiperen van bailout
fondsen tijdens een financie¨le crisis kan leiden tot financieringen voordelen
voorafgaand aan de crisis. Dit financieringsvoordeel volgt uit het feit dat
crediteuren het risico op faillissement niet langer volledig dragen, maar ge-
deeltelijk af kunnen wentelen op toekomstige fondsen gefinancierd met be-
lastingen. Krediteuren vragen vanwege dit voordeel een lagere compensatie
voor het risico op faillissement. Voor banken werkt deze lagere compensa-
tie door als financieringsvoordeel wat gemeten kan worden met behulp van
het gepresenteerde model. Resultaten wijzen erop dat banken inderdaad
baat hebben gehad voorafgaande aan de financie¨le crisis van 2007/2008. Dit
blijkt uit de empirische relatie tussen de geschatte garanties van de overheid
op de schulden van banken voorafgaande aan deze crisis en de bailouts die
zijn uitgekeerd ten tijde van de crisis.
